Guillory v. Gukutu

534 F.Supp.2d 267

Allison Marie Dunbar GUILLORY, Administratrix of the Estate of Patrick Guillory, and as Parent and Next Friend of Winter Lapatria Guillory and Ariel Ju'Nea Keon Guillory, Plaintiff, v. Reason GUKUTU and Christian Personnel, Inc. d/b/a Christian Construction, Inc., Defendants.

C.A. No. 06-171 S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 13, 2008.

Vincent T. Cannon, Decof & Decof P.C., Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Robert E. Collins, Clinton & Muzyka, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.

Defendants Reason Gukutu and Christian Personnel, Inc. d/b/a Christian Construction, Inc. ("CCI"), (collectively "Defendants") move jointly for summary judgment on all claims brought against them by Plaintiff Allison Marie Dunbar Guillory ("Plaintiff'), acting as Administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Patrick Guillory ("Guillory"), and as Parent and Next Friend of Guillory's children. For the reasons set forth below, and after careful review of the legal and factual bases for Defendants' motion, the Court will grant summary judgment on all counts.

Background

The material facts at issue here are not disputed. CCI is an Alabama staffing company that provides skilled workers to businesses in the maritime industry. In September 2003, CCI and Senesco, a shipbuilder, entered into a contract pursuant to which CCI would provide, Senesco with skilled workers. That same month, Reason Gukutu became employed by CCI and was sent to Rhode Island to work as a shipbuilder/shipfitter at the Senesco facility at Quonset Point, North Kingstown. In the spring of 2005, Gukutu was working with Patrick Guillory, a Senesco employee, in the construction of a barge at the Senesco facility. The two had worked together for approximately one month when, on June 15, 2005, Guillory tragically was killed when the man-lift that Gukutu had been operating pinned Guillory between the man-lift basket and the controls.

After the fatal accident, Senesco filed for workers' compensation benefits on behalf of the decedent under both the Rhode Island Workers' Compensation Act, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA" or the "Act"). Plaintiff was awarded workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Rhode Island's statutory scheme.¹ Plaintiff then filed the instant action asserting claims of negligence and wrongful death against both Gukutu and CCI, and negligent hiring and training against CCI. In this Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants invoke the "borrowed servant" doctrine, asserting that while Gukutu was the nominal employee of CCI, he was a borrowed servant of Senesco, and thus entitled to the protection from tort liability afforded to co-workers under the LHWCA. Defendants further assert that CCI is entitled to share the immunity of its nominal employee on the counts against it sounding in negligence via respondeat superior and as to any negligent hiring and training claims. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir.1997).

An issue of fact is "genuine" if it "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," id. at 960 (citation omitted), and an issue of fact is "material" "only when it possesses the capacity, if determined as the nonmovant wishes, to alter the outcome of the lawsuit under the applicable legal tenets." Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir.1996). Summary judgment involves' shifting burdens between the moving and the nonmoving parties. Initially, the burden requires the moving party to show "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Having established this, the burden then falls upon the nonmoving party, who must oppose the motion by presenting facts that demonstrate a genuine trialworthy issue' remains. Cadle, 116 F.3d at 960. This burden can be satisfied by presenting "enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party." Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993).

Analysis

The LHWCA "is a no-fault federal compensation scheme designed to give protection to injured maritime workers while at the same time affording employers some degree of predictability with regard to those workers' recoveries," White v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 222 F.3d 146, 148 (4th Cir.2000). Pursuant to the LHWCA, "every employer subject to [it] shall be liable to its employees for workers compensation. 33 U.S.C. § 904. Such liability is exclusive and in place of all other liability, and extends to fellow servants. 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(a), 933(i)." Canty v. A. Bottacchi, S.A. de Navegacion, 849 F.Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D.Fla.1994). Though an exclusive remedy for employees in relation to their employers and co-workers, the LHWCA does allow for actions against third parties when a person other than the employer is liable for damages. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 933(i).

In this case, Defendants have asserted, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Guillory and Gukutu were employees engaged in marine employment as shipbuilders and that the injuries complained of fall within the parameters of the Act's coverage. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a). Because the situs and status elements are established and undisputed, there is no dispute that federal law applies to the analysis of the LHWCA. Anaya v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 478 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir.2007) ("To receive benefits under the LHWCA, a worker must satisfy both a situs and status test."); see also Canty, 849 F.Supp. at 1556 (because the issue of borrowed servant status "is essentially one of determining the extent of coverage under the LHWCA, federal law applies").

I. Borrowed Servant Status

Gukutu's employment status under the LHWCA determines the potential liability that he and CCI face in this action. Therefore, the primary issue before this Court is whether Gukutu was a borrowed servant of Senesco at the time of the accident, because if he was, both he and CCI are cloaked from liability by the immunity enjoyed by Senesco.

Under these circumstances, the question of borrowed servant status generally is a matter of law. See Canty, 849 F.Supp. at 1556; Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 357-58 (5th Cir.1977); Raymond v. I/S Caribia, 626 F.2d 203, 205 (1st Cir. 1980). "A dispute over whether one is a borrowed servant ... could still exist although all the facts were stipulated, for it concerns not only the facts themselves but the implications to be drawn from the facts." Gaudet, 562 F.2d at 358. "[I]f sufficient basic factual ingredients are undisputed, the court may grant summary judgment." Capps v. N.L. Baroid-NL Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir.1986).

The First Circuit has not Adopted a specific test for determination of borrowed servant status for purposes of the LHWCA. Without setting forth any particular guidelines, however, the Court in Raymond recognized that "[t]he prime requisite for invoking the borrowed servant doctrine is some sort of control by the borrower over the loaned employee(s)." 626 F.2d at 205. There, the Court inquired as to whether a ship's crew members were borrowed servants of the stevedore after they were sent into the hold of the ship to assist the stevedore's longshoremen-employees, who were unloading the ship's cargo. Utilizing the control-based standard above, the Court ruled as a matter of law that crew members were not borrowed servants of the stevedore. After evaluating the "indicia that is necessary for a finding of borrowed servants," — namely the level of control and direction asserted by the stevedore over the work performed by the crew, whether the crew was paid by the stevedore, either directly or indirectly, and the employer relationship between the stevedore and the crew members — the Court determined the situation to be a case of cooperation, rather than one of subordination. Id. at 205.

The general formula used in Raymond echoes the Fourth Circuit's test, which requires inquiry into whose work "is being performed ... by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the servants in the performance of their work." White, 222 F.3d at 149 (declining to adopt a multifaceted test, but ruling in favor of borrowed servant status). "The authority of the borrowing employer does not have to extend to every incident of an employer-employee relationship; rather, it need only encompass the servant's performance of the particular work in which he is engaged at the time of the accident." Id. There, the key question is "whether the borrowing employer has authoritative direction and control over a worker." Id. Likewise, in Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 903 F.2d 935, 941 (3d Cir.1990), the Third Circuit determined that when "an entity other than the one that putatively employs that claimant is really the claimant's employer, that borrowing employer [shall be] found to be the claimant's employer under the Act and has been held to be both subject to the burdens and entitled to the benefits that come with such status."

In contrast to these "Right of Control" decisions, the Fifth Circuit has formulated a nine-part test aimed at assessing borrowed servant status;

(1) Who has control over the employee and the work he is...