Guinn v. Crumpler

THOMAS MCCLAIN GUINN, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES CRUMPLER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:18-cv-00274

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

April 3, 2020

By: Elizabeth K. Dillon United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Thomas McClain Guinn, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts various claims against the remaining five defendants: S. Massenburg, Melvin Davis, K. Henderson, Charles Crumpler, and L. Gibbs.¹ His amended complaint (Dkt. No. 8) is the operative complaint in the matter,² and defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all claims.

Guinn's amended complaint does not clearly state what claims he is bringing against who, but the court construes as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging:

(1) a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,³ against Massenburg, Davis, and Crumpler;(2) retaliation based on his exercise of First Amendment rights, against Massenburg, Henderson, Crumpler, and Gibbs;

(3) a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, against Henderson, based on a strip search he conducted of Guinn and the confiscation of Guinn's shorts; and

(4) a violation of his First Amendment right of access to the courts, against Gibbs, alleging that she did not timely send out his legal mail.

(See generally Am. Compl.)⁴

In opposing the summary judgment motion, Guinn states that, in addition to his constitutional claims, he also is asserting state-law claims and he cites to two statutes, neither of which create causes of action. First, he cites to Virginia Code § 8.01-243.2, which simply provides a statute of limitations and requires exhaustion for claims brought by persons confined in a state or local correctional facility relating to the conditions of his confinement. Second, as to defendant Davis, Green Rock's warden, Guinn cites to Virginia Code § 8.01-247.1, which sets out Virginia's statute of limitations for claims of libel, slander, insulting words, or defamation.

Pending before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 31), which is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.⁵ Upon review of the record, the court concludes that the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Accordingly, judgment will be entered infavor of defendants as to all of Guinn's federal claims, and the court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over any state-law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Guinn is a Virginia inmate who, at all relevant times, was held at the Green Rock Correctional Center ("Green Rock"), where he remains incarcerated. In his amended complaint, he describes a "continuous series of violations" in which defendants have "been negligent, violated [his] rights and denied [him] due process protection." (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.)

A. Guinn's Use of Grievance Procedure & Other Allegations Against Davis

Many of Guinn's allegations focus on what he alleges were attempts to interfere with his use of the grievance process at Green Rock. Indeed, his allegations against Massenburg stem almost exclusively from her treatment of his grievances, the sole exception being the disciplinary charge she brought against him. Likewise, most of his allegations against Warden Davis stem from Davis's involvement in the grievance process. In general terms, he alleges that Massenburg repeatedly improperly handled his grievances, by either denying them incorrectly, not answering them, or otherwise not following Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") operating procedures concerning his grievances. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5; Compl. 14-16, Dkt. No. 1; see also Pl.'s 2nd Opp'n 2-5, Dkt. No. 77.)

Attached to the summary judgment motion is an affidavit by Massenburg, who is the Institution Ombudsman at Green Rock. (Massenburg Aff. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 32-1.) She attaches to her affidavit both a copy of VDOC Operating Procedure 866.1, which sets forth the applicable grievance procedure, and approximately one hundred pages of Guinn's grievance-related documents. These include a summary of his grievances since he arrived at Green Rock on June 13, 2017, (id., ¶ 4), as well as some of the actual grievance documents that relate to his allegations in this lawsuit. In her affidavit, Massenburg describes the general policy concerningexhaustion of grievances and discusses Guinn's failure to exhaust certain of his claims.

She also repeatedly avers that "Guinn's grievances have been processed in accordance with the offender grievance policy." (Id., ¶¶ 9, 17.) She states that she has "not harassed Guinn or retaliated against him for any reason," and she notes that if a regular grievance is not accepted for intake by her, Guinn may appeal that decision to the Regional Ombudsman. (Id., ¶ 17.) She also notes that, as of the date of her affidavit on January 8, 2019 (which was approximately eighteen months after Guinn arrived at Green Rock), she had "accepted and processed 85 informal complaints and 9 regular grievances for Guinn, not including those that have been rejected for not meeting the intake criteria." (Id., ¶ 9.)

As to Davis, Guinn complains that he "contributed to the denial of due process and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment," by upholding the grievances and thereby allowing staff to harass Guinn. (Compl. 13; Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) With regard to his claims against Davis, he also specifically identifies Davis's alleged failure to investigate Henderson's strip search, discussed infra. (Id.) Lastly, he points to Davis's upholding of his disciplinary convictions and his alleged reference to Guinn as "Johnny Cochran" on a grievance form.⁶

A. Disciplinary Charges and Hearings

Guinn received two disciplinary charges that he contends were false and filed against him in retaliation for filing lawsuits and grievances. The first was initiated by Massenburg. Specifically, on April 10, 2018, she charged Guinn with disciplinary offense #222, for usingvulgar or insolent language or gestures toward an employee. The charge was based on language he included in an offender request in which he referred to "Massenburg's unqualified negligence and ignorance" and also wrote: "I know you have a childish pheble⁷ mind and like to play games like a child." (Dkt. No. 32-1, at 78.) Guinn was found guilty of this charge and given a $15.00 fine. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) Davis upheld the charge on appeal.

The second disciplinary charge was filed by Bateman, who is no longer a defendant. In this April 28, 2018 charge, Bateman accused Guinn of improperly using a typewriter to send a typed letter to the Regional Ombudsman, when the typewriters are to be used only for preparing legal documents. (Bateman Aff. ¶¶ 1, 4.) Guinn was found guilty of the charge, and a $3 fine was imposed. Davis later upheld it, as did the Regional Administrator.

The policy at issue clearly disallows inmates' use of the typewriter for such a letter: typewriters are available "for preparing legal documents only and are not to be used for typing personal letters, request forms, grievances, disciplinary appeals, etc." (Bateman Aff., Encl. A.) Nonetheless, Guinn claims that this disciplinary charge was false because he intended to later submit the document to a court as evidence. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) Based on his own definition of a "legal document," Guinn argues that Davis's upholding of the second charge was improper. He also contends that Davis committed slander by allegedly referring to Guinn as "Johnny Cochran" on paperwork related to this charge. (See Dkt. No. 8-2 at 3 (a grievance form with handwritten notes, including one saying "Johnny Cochran," although with no clear indication of who wrote the notes).) Guinn contends that Davis's calling him "Johnny Cochran" was a "racial slur" and "insolent disrespect towards Guinn, [who] is 'White.'" (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)

B. Strip Search by Henderson

Guinn's allegations against Henderson, who is a Corrections Sergeant at Green Rock, stem from a single incident. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Henderson Aff. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 32-2.) Specifically, on or about February 6, 2018, Henderson strip-searched Guinn as Guinn was leaving the institutional law library. He did so upon orders from the Major (Chief of Security) to conduct random searches of offenders leaving the law library to search for drug contraband being passed in the law library. (Henderson Aff., ¶ 5.) During the search, Henderson found that Guinn had a pair of gray shorts that appeared to have been altered by adding a string to the waistband. Henderson prepared a confiscation report and confiscated the shorts. The shorts were returned two days later to Guinn, after it was determined by the property staff that the shorts had not been altered. (Id., ¶ 5 & Encl. A.)

Guinn claims that this incident deprived him of his property for no legitimate reason. (Compl. at 8.) He further states that, because he did not own sweatpants and his pants were "very uncomfortable and irritate [his] legs," Guinn had to wear his boxers in his cell. From this, he states that Henderson "forced" him into a "state of undress" and exposed him to possible sexual harassment at the prison. (Id.) Guinn also states that Henderson ordered the shorts to be held in personal property for an additional two weeks after they were verified to be okay, (Compl. ¶ 4), although he admits in his opposition that he actually received them back approximately two days later, allegedly in response to telephone complaints from Guinn's family members. (Pl.'s 2nd Opp'n 8.)

Henderson denies that he strip-searched Guinn as retaliation for complaining about Massenburg or to respond to Guinn's "intention to file a civil action against Massenburg," (Am. Compl. ¶ 5). (Henderson Aff. ¶ 4.) Indeed, he avers that at that time, he did not have any knowledge of complaints or grievances Guinn had filed regarding Massenburg, nor did he recallGuinn ever complaining to him about Massenburg. (Id.) He further avers...