Guiser v. Sieber

237 A.3d 496

Scott GUISER, Dennis Zeiders, Diane Zeiders, George Biddle, Jeffrey Biddle, Brooks Arnold and Sharon Arnold

v.Matthew S. SIEBER and Susan L. Sieber, His Wife, Appellants

No. 674 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 11, 2019

Filed August 05, 2020

Larry L. Miller, Taneytown, MD, for appellant.

Orris Clair Knepp III, Lewistown, for appellee.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.^*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:

Appellants Matthew S. Sieber and Susan L. Sieber appeal from the order finding against them and in favor of Appellees Scott Guiser (Guiser), Dennis Zeiders, George Biddle, Jeffrey Biddle, Brooks Arnold, and Sharon Arnold. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining that a twenty-one acre tract belonged to Appellee Guiser, that Appellees had a right to use a road that crossed Appellants' properties, and that Appellees were entitled to an injunction barring Appellants from blocking the road. For the reasons that follow, we quash in part, vacate in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The procedural history of this matter is as follows. On August 15, 2013, Appellees filed a complaint against Appellants. Appellees asserted claims of easement by prescription, equitable servitude, and irrevocable license with respect to a dirt road referred to as "Woods Road" and requested a preliminary injunction restraining Appellants from denying Appellees access to their properties by way of Woods Road. Additionally, the complaint also contained requests for Appellees to conduct a centerline survey of Woods Road. Appellants filed an answer.

On October 31, 2013, the trial court heard testimony regarding Appellees' request for a preliminary injunction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court did not rule on Appellee's request for an injunction until after trial.

During discovery, Appellees requested leave to file an amended complaint, which the trial court granted. In January of 2016, Appellees filed an amended complaint stating an additional claim by Appellee Guiser against Appellants to quiet title as to approximately twenty-one acres of land claimed by Appellants.¹ Appellants filed an answer and new matter as to the additional claim.

The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial that commenced on April 28, 2017. Following the first day of trial, the trial court continued the matter and kept the record open to receive expert testimony. During the continuance, the parties deposed Appellees' expert, George Campbell, a recording of which was admitted into evidence. During the second day of trial on June 21, 2017, Appellants' experts testified.

On July 24, 2017, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss Appellees' claims for failure to join indispensable parties regarding Woods Road. Appellants claimed that Appellees failed to sue Beale Township and "other numerous property owners between the public road known as Hammer Hollow Road and [Appellees'] lands." Appellants' Mot. to Dismiss, 7/24/17, at 1-3. The trial court heard additional arguments on the motion. Thereafter, in December of 2017, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On February 8, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying Appellants' motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties. On March 25, 2019, the trial court issued an order finding in favor of Appellees and against Appellants. The order, which was docketed on April 2, 2019, read, in part, as follows:

AND NOW, March 25, 2019, after review of Trial Testimony, Exhibits and the Arguments made by counsel, both orally and through Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Replies thereto, the [c]ourt is ACCEPTING and ADOPTING the [Appellees'] Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as filed on December 20, 2017, in full.^[2]

The [c]ourt is, therefore, entering Judgment in favor of [Appellees] and against [Appellants].

The [c]ourt is specifically entering Judgment in favor of [Appellee Guiser] against [Appellants] Quieting his Title to the property as outlined in Count 1 of the Amended Complaint.

The [c]ourt is also DIRECTING that an Injunction restraining [Appellants] from denying the use of "Woods Road" to the [Appellees] is hereby GRANTED. This Injunction is necessary to preserve and enable [Appellees'] rights to use of that road. The [c]ourt finds that [Appellants'] actions have and will continue in the future to result in irreputable [sic] harm to [Appellees] if the Injunction is not granted.

The [c]ourt is specifically finding that [Appellees] acquired an Easement by prescription over and along "Woods Road" where it intersects with [Appellants'] parcels.

The [c]ourt also finds that an Equitable Servitude exists in favor of [Appellees], who are the property owners to the West of [Appellants'] parcels b[e]aring Tax Assessment Numbers 9-13-46 and 9-13-47.

The [c]ourt also finds that [Appellees] obtained irrevocable license to use "Woods Road" from [Appellants].

Order, 4/2/19, at 1-2.

On April 12, 2019, Appellants filed a post-trial motion. On April 29, 2019, before the trial court had an opportunity to rule on Appellants' post-trial motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.

The trial court issued an order requiring the filing and service of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellants timely filed a nineteen-page Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed an opinion.

Appellants present the following questions on appeal, which we have reordered as follows:

[1.] Did the [trial] court err in entering judgment for [Appellee Guiser] on his quiet title claim when the decision was not supported by any competent evidence?

[2.] Did the [trial] court erroneously determine that [Appellees'] action for access [to Woods Road] should not be dismissed for failure to join indispensable parties?

[3.] Was it clear error to strike the trial testimony of an adjoining landowner who opposed the use of "Woods Road" as access for Appellees?

[4.] Did the [trial] court erroneously rule that [Appellees] had an entitlement to access over 4.5 miles of a logging road through unenclosed mountain woodlands when:

(1) [Appellees] failed to introduce a metes and bounds description of the proposed easement;

(2) The logging road goes through unenclosed woodlands that [Appellees] used with permission until June 21, 2012, and when they sought the consent of other landowners, including [Appellants], to use the logging road as access on October 2, 2012;

(3) The covenant involving the [Appellants'] parcel no. 9-13-37 is unreasonably vague and did not affect their other parcels;

(4) When no evidence supported a claim of an irrevocable license to use the logging road and, [Appellees] sought consent to obtain an easement from the [thirteen] sets of affected landowners?

[5.] Did the [trial] court erroneously grant an injunction?

Appellants' Brief at 5-7.

Because the certified record and associated docket entries in this matter do not show that the trial court denied Appellants' post-trial motion or entered a formal judgment in this matter, we must first consider whether this Court has jurisdiction to address this matter. It is well settled that "an appeal lies from the entry of judgment." Melani v. N.W. Eng'g, Inc. , 909 A.2d 404, 405 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation and internal alterations omitted).

In Melani , the trial court entered an opinion and order determining the location of a right of way after a non-jury trial. Id. The appellants timely filed a post-trial motion within ten days of the opinion and order. Thirty days after the entry of the opinion and order, but before the trial court ruled on the post-trial motion, the appellants filed a notice of appeal from the opinion and order. Id.

The Melani Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory. The Court explained that the appeal was premature because the appellants timely filed a post-trial motion, but appealed before the trial court ruled on the post-trial motion. Id. at 406. Additionally, the Court noted that the appellants filed their appeal before the 120-day period to decide the motions lapsed and before a judgment was entered. Id.

Here, as in Melani , Appellants timely filed a post-trial motion from the order entered following a non-jury trial. See id. Appellants filed a notice of appeal before the trial court ruled on the post-trial motion, before the 120-day period to decide the motion expired, and before a judgment was formally entered on the record. Therefore, this appeal is premature.³

However, this conclusion does not end our analysis. In its April 2, 2019 order, the trial court found in favor of Appellee Guiser and against Appellants in the quiet title action to approximately twenty-one acres of land. The trial court also found in favor of Appellees and Appellants as to the right to access Woods Road. Significantly, the trial court also granted Appellees' request for an injunction prohibiting Appellants from blocking access to Woods Road.

As to the trial court's grant of injunctive relief, Pa.R.A.P. 311 states:

(a) General rule.— An appeal may be taken as of right and without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

(4) Injunctions. —An order that grants or denies, modifies or refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:

* * *

(ii) After a trial but before entry of the final order. Such order is immediately appealable, however, if the order enjoins conduct previously permitted or mandated or permits or mandates conduct not previously mandated or permitted, and is effective before entry of the final order .

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4)(ii).

In Thomas A. Robinson Family Ltd. P'ship v. Bioni , 178 A.3d 839 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied , 648 Pa. 568, 194 A.3d 560 (2018), this Court stated that the purpose of Rule 311(a)(4)(ii)

is to permit an immediate appeal if an immediately-effective permanent injunction makes such a change to the status quo that the aggrieved

...