Gullo v. State

1

Kyle Z. Gullo, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D23-2434

Florida Court of Appeals, Fifth District

March 22, 2024

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County LT Case No 2015-303217-CFDB. Leah R. Case, Judge.

Kyle Z. Gullo, Graceville, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Kyle Gullo appeals the postconviction court's order summarily denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. We affirm the denial of the second of two grounds raised by Gullo in his motion without further discussion. Concluding that Gullo's first ground for relief has merit, we reverse.

Under a negotiated plea agreement, Gullo is currently serving a twenty-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for aggravated assault with a firearm and discharge. Gullo was also sentenced under this plea agreement to serve five years in prison, with a three-year mandatory minimum provision, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Both sentences were imposed under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2014), and, under the terms of the agreement, the sentence for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction is to be served consecutively to the sentence for the aggravated assault with a firearm and discharge conviction.

Gullo argues that this consecutive sentencing structure is illegal because these two crimes were committed by him during a single criminal episode where there was one victim and with a single shot being discharged that did not strike the victim.^[1] Based on the following precedent, we agree.

In Swanigan v. State, 57 So.3d 989, 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), the appellant and an accomplice burst into a home looking for money, kicking and hitting one person and then shooting a second person. Following trial, the appellant was convicted of several felonies arising from this criminal episode, including attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, aggravated battery with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. Pertinent here the appellant received a consecutive mandatory minimum prison sentence under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2007) for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Id.

Citing to precedents from the Florida Supreme Court that the imposition of consecutive mandatory minimum sentences under section 775.087(2) is improper where the offenses occurred during a single criminal episode unless the defendant discharged the firearm and injured multiple victims or caused multiple injuries to one victim, we vacated the appellant's consecutive mandatory minimum prison sentence for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Id. In doing so, we specifically observed that "there is no authority for imposition of a consecutive sentence for the conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the course of the single criminal episode." Id.

Subsequently, in Torres-Rios v. State, 205 So.3d 883, 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), the appellant there had challenged the postconviction court's summary denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. In an unelaborated opinion, we granted relief, in part, holding that consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were illegal where there was only a single discharge of a firearm and only one person was shot during the single criminal episode. Id. Significantly, Torres-Rios was later approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Miller v. State, 265 So.3d 457 (Fla. 2018).

Accordingly based on Miller, Torres-Rios, and Swanigan, we reverse the postconviction court's denial of ground one of Gullo's motion. Since Gullo's consecutive mandatory minimum prison sentences at issue here were imposed under a plea agreement, and not after trial, the State, on remand, shall have the option either "to agree to a legal sentence or to withdraw from the plea agreement and proceed to trial on the original charges." Echevarria v. State, 296 So.3d 543, 545 (Fla....