Gunawardana v. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n

515 F.Supp.3d 892

Subhadra GUNAWARDANA and David Seely, Plaintiffs,

v.AMERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Educational Commission for Foreign Veterinary Graduates, and Council on Education, Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-96-NJR

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

Signed January 28, 2021

Subhadra Gunawardana, Florissant, MO, for Plaintiff Subhadr A. Gunawardana.

David Seely, Florissant, MO, for Plaintiff David Seely.

J. Hayes Ryan, Marissa Louise Dellacroce, Gordon & Rees, et al., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Dr. Subhadra Gunawardana and Mr. David Seely's First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant American Veterinary Medical Association ("AVMA") (Doc. 80). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Obtaining a license to practice veterinary medicine is a critical step for all veterinarians. For foreign graduates seeking licensure, the AVMA administers a certification process known as the Educational Commission for Foreign Veterinary Graduates ("ECFVG"). The ECFVG includes the Clinical Proficiency Exam ("CPE"), a "performance based exam intended to assess the practical clinical veterinary skills of the candidate" (Doc. 81, p. 2).

Dr. Gunawardana, a foreign veterinary graduate, started the ECFVG process in September 2009 (Doc. 63, p. 6). As a part of the ECFVG process, Dr. Gunawardana signed a document that contained the following release provision:

I hereby release, discharge, and exonerate the AVMA, the ECFVG ... from all actions, suits, obligations, damages, claims and demands arising out of, or in connections with, this application, the grade or grades given with respect to the examinations or the failure of the ECFVG to issue me a certificate. It is understood that the decision as to whether my examinations qualify me for a certificate vests solely and exclusively in the ECFVG and its decision is final.

(Doc. 81, p. 24).

After signing the release and completing the appropriate steps, Dr. Gunawardana worked towards completing the CPE. Dr. Gunawardana's first attempt at the CPE was in September 2015 (Doc. 63-1, p. 64). Unfortunately, Dr. Gunawardana did not pass the surgery, anesthesia, and equine sections.

Dr. Gunawardana's second attempt at the CPE took place October 17-19, 2016 (Id. at p. 65). But seven days before the retake of the surgery, anesthesia, and equine sections of the CPE, Dr. Gunawardana was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of the first carpometacarpal joint (Id. at p. 59). The next day, on October 11, 2016, Dr. Gunawardana requested accommodations including an assistant to help on the surgery section, use of a hand-brace during the equine and anesthesia sections, and time to stop between tasks to take pain medication during all sections (Id. at p. 60). AVMA denied this request because their CPE Testing Accommodation Policy requires candidates to submit the necessary documentation at least 90 days in advance (Id. at p. 61). Ultimately, Dr. Gunawardana failed the anesthesia section of the October 2016 CPE (Id. at pp. 62-63).

Determined to attain her ECFVG certification, Dr. Gunawardana retook the anesthesia section of the CPE in November 2017 (Id. at p. 4). Unfortunately, Dr. Gunawardana again failed the anesthesia section (Id. ). Dr. Gunawardana filed a petition for reconsideration and a petition for review, but both affirmed Dr. Gunawardana's failing score (Id. at pp. 1-18). Notably, Dr. Gunawardana did not cite lack of accommodations for the November 2017 CPE.¹

On February 1, 2019, Dr. Gunawardana and her husband, David Seely, filed a complaint against AVMA, ECFVG, and the Council on Education ("COE")² (Doc. 63). Dr. Gunawardana brings seven counts against AVMA under various state and federal laws, including: Section 2-302 of the Illinois Uniform Commercial (Count I), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq ("Title VII") (Count II), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III); Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause (Count IV); Sherman Antitrust Act (Count V); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count VI); and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Count VII). Mr. Seely brings two counts against AVMA under federal law, including: the ADA (Count VIII) and Sherman Antitrust Act (Count IX). The Court has federal question jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

On May 14, 2019, AVMA was granted time to answer or respond to the complaint (Doc. 18). AVMA then timely moved to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 22). On September 10, 2019, before deciding AVMA's Motion to Dismiss, Magistrate Judge Beatty ordered the parties to appear for a settlement conference on October 17, 2019 (Doc. 38). A week before the conference, Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely admitted that they served discovery on AVMA on September 21, 2019, and, as a result, would not be prepared to answer the items in the settlement statement (Doc. 41). Accordingly, Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely asked to reset the settlement conference to November 14, 2019 (Id. ). Magistrate Judge Beatty ultimately held the settlement conference on February 20, 2020, but the case did not settle.

On November 30, 2019, Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely moved to amend their complaint (Doc. 51). On January 6, 2020, this Court granted Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely's motion to amend (Doc. 62). On January 12, 2020, Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely filed their First Amended Complaint (Doc. 63). AVMA subsequently filed this Motion to Dismiss arguing the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 81).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion seeking dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must " ‘clearly ... allege facts demonstrating’ each element" required to establish he has standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2215, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing requires a showing that a plaintiff has "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. The burden of establishing these three elements falls on the party invoking the court's jurisdiction. Id.

Whether a defendant argues that a complaint fails to (1) properly state a claim, or (2) properly plead the elements of standing, courts apply the same analysis. See Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). The factual allegations contained within a complaint must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 554-55, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ("[T]rial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party."). Complaints that contain only "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, courts "need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [during the pleading stage] we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’ " Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed. , 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ).

ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness of AVMA's Motion to Dismiss

Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely argue that the Court should deny AVMA's Motion to Dismiss outright because the filing was untimely, and enter default judgment (Doc. 91). The Court will not. This Court—as well as Magistrate Judge Beatty—has granted Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely's multiple extensions and requests to continue (Docs. 41, 82, 98). Additionally, this Court has even allowed Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely to amend their complaint while AVMA's First Motion to Dismiss was pending (Doc. 51).

Not only has this Court extended deadlines and granted Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely's requests to continue, but their amended complaint was not filed until January 2020. January 2020 was the beginning of COVID-19 outbreak that has impacted all 50 states, and countries around the world. In March, this Court extended the deadline for answering or otherwise responding to most complaints by sixty days. While AVMA's response became due before this Court extended the deadline because of COVID-19, this does not mean the Court should ignore the impact COVID-19 had on the parties. Thus, the Court will exercise its discretion in allowing AVMA's untimely Motion to Dismiss. See e.g., Mommaerts v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 472 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir. 2007) (district court properly exercised its discretion in allowing answer to complaint to be filed after responsive pleading deadline had passed where the delay was "harmless"); Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear , 462 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2006) ("district courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets ....").

More importantly, Dr. Gunawardana and Mr. Seely have not suffered prejudice. AVMA's First Motion...