Gunderson v. Corcoran

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SEAN GUNDERSON, Plaintiff, v. JAMES P. CORCORAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 21-cv-04891

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 15, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FRANKLIN U. VALDERRAMA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Sean Gunderson (Gunderson) was charged with attempted murder in the Circuit Court of Cook County. After being found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) he was involuntarily committed to the Elgin Mental Health Center (Elgin). After he was released, Gunderson sued Elgin senior administrators and psychiatrists James Corcoran and Richard Malis and senior administrators William Epperson and Thomas Zubik (collectively Defendants), alleging that he was confined long after he no longer met the clinical criteria for confinement thereby violating his Fourth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, among other claims. R.^[1]6 FAC. Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). R. 7, Mot. Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Background^[2]

In 2002 Gunderson was charged with attempted murder in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. FAC ¶ 8. After being found NGRI in 2005, he was involuntarily committed to Elgin under the Illinois Department of Human Services' (IDHS) custody with a Thiem date (release date) of July 2053. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. During his involuntary confinement, IDHS prescribed psychiatric drugs to treat Gunderson's mental, emotional, and behavioral problems. Id. ¶ 12. In December 2011, Gunderson elected to try a different course of treatment including a vegan diet, daily exercise, mediation, and forgoing psychotropic drugs, as well as participating in individual counseling and group and activity therapy at Elgin. Id. ¶ 13. Gunderson went into full remission. Id. Around this time, Gunderson began to advocate for changes at Elgin, including the right to refuse psychotropic medications. Id. ¶ 14. Defendants, posits Gunderson, found his complaints and advocacy to be a nuisance between 2011 and 2019. Id. ¶ 15.

Defendants, perceiving Gunderson as a threat, began efforts to discredit him and portray him as unrecovered and mentally ill. FAC ¶ 17. To that end, Defendants delayed Gunderson from being conditionally released for approximately two years, by falsifying legal documentation reporting Gunderson's progress, providing false testimony, confiscating Gunderson's electronics through false documentation, and using false information to punish Gunderson by transferring him to a different unit amid health-related progress. Id. ¶¶ 17-22. These efforts led to Gunderson's petitions for conditional release being denied. Id. ¶ 17.

Additionally, Gunderson experienced sexual harassment, sexual battery, and sexual misconduct by various staff members at Elgin that went unreported. FAC ¶ 23. Defendants also refused to accommodate Gunderson's requests for proper food for a vegan diet. Id. ¶ 40(b).

Gunderson was unconditionally discharged from state custody on April 12, 2021. Id. ¶ 8. After his unconditional discharge, Gunderson filed this multi-count lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 asserting claims of: false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment (Count I); improper treatment during confinement, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive “fine” by extended deprivation of liberty under the Eighth Amendment (Count II); denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III); conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, obstructing justice under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count IV); slavery or peonage in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (Count V); and state law healing art malpractice against Corcoran and Malis under 735 ILCS 5/2-622 (Count VI). Defendants' fully briefed Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is before the Court.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014). When deciding a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction-that is, when the defendant argues that the plaintiff's allegations as to jurisdiction are inadequate-“the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). But district courts may also “look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Taylor, 875 F.3d at 853 (citing Apex Digit., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009)). In that case, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations,” and the court is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Apex Digit., 572 F.3 at 444 (internal citations omitted).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

Analysis

Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Gunderson's claims, and that he fails to state a claim. Defendants' jurisdictional argument is that Gunderson's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his claims are intertwined with a state-court judgment. Id. at 8-10. For their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, first, Defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Gunderson's false imprisonment, due process, conspiracy slavery, and constitutionally improper treatment claims because his claims call a state court ruling into question or otherwise invalidate his NGRI conviction. R. 8, Memo. Dismiss at 5-8. Second, in the alternative, Defendants contend that Gunderson fails to state a Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim. Id. at 10-13. Finally, Defendants request that the Court relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over Gunderson's state law claim. Id. at 13-14. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Rule 12(b)(1) - Rooker-Feldman Doctrine^[3]

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, arguing that Gunderson's false imprisonment, due process, conspiracy, and slavery claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. Memo. Dismiss at 8-10 (citing Jakupoic v. Curran, 803 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2017)).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a “narrow” doctrine that precludes federal district court jurisdiction “over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Sykes v. Cook Cty Cir. Ct. Probate Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). In effect, lower federal courts-such as this one-are not vested with appellate authority over state courts. Id. Rather, “the Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court that may review judgments entered by state courts in civil litigation.” Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014). The rationale for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that “no matter how wrong a state court judgment may be under federal law, only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it.” Sykes, 837 F.3d at 742.

To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction, courts apply a two-step analysis. Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2019). At step one, courts consider whether “a plaintiff's federal claims are independent or, instead, whether they either directly challenge a state court matter jurisdiction unlike Heck. See Andrade v. City of Hammond, Indiana, 9 F.4th 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2021) (if a case is subject to Rooker-Feldman, the district court is stripped of jurisdiction over it); Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Heck concerns timing rather than subject-matter jurisdiction.”). judgment or are inextricably intertwined with one.” Id. (cleaned up).^[4] “If they are independent claims, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over them. But if they directly challenge or are inextricably intertwined with a state-court judgment,” then courts move onto step two. Id. (cleaned up). “The ‘inextricably intertwined' determination hinges on whether the federal claim alleges that the...