Gunn v. Bentivegna

DARRELL GUNN, Plaintiff, v. DR. ROBERT V. BENTIVEGNA, F.H.S.D.; MS. HENNESSY, MHU Unit Chief;CHRISTINE RAFFAELE, Registered Nurse, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENTOF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, Defendants.

1:20-CV-2440 (LLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 19, 2020

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action alleging that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. He sues (1) Dr. Robert V. Bentivegna, the Facility Health Service Director of the Green Haven Correctional Facility, (2) Ms. Hennessy, the Mental Health Unit Chief at that facility, (3) Christine Raffaele, a nurse assigned to that facility, and (4) the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), which operates that facility. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory relief. He sues the individual defendants in their official and individual capacities.

By order dated May 8, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.¹ For the reasons discussed below, the Courtdismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff leave to replead certain claims in an amended complaint to be filed within 30 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Courtmust accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678-79.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: On July 28, 2017, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility, he sought medical treatment from Raffaele, a nurse. But Raffaele "became repulsive, . . . insensitive, [and] upset, and act[ed] irate towards [him, and gave him] a hard time . . . ." (ECF 2, at 4.) She asked him, "why are you here at sickcall," and then told him, "I sent you a letter. You should not be coming to sickcall!" (Id.) Plaintiff told Raffaele that he was in pain, was losing his hearing, and needed pain medication. He also asked to speak to Hennessy, the Mental Health Unit Chief.

DOCCS officials, including Dr. Bentivegna, had previously referred Plaintiff to "sickcall," that is, they had told him to seek medical treatment. But Raffaele was frustrated that Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment. She stated that she was going to "'steal someone's water.'" (Id.) Raffaele then gave Plaintiff a "Styrofoam cup with someone's water she stole[] from an abandon[ed] prison guard one gallon jug that she found sitting on [a] table." (Id.) She gave Plaintiff a "non-aspirin packet" and "the foul tasting unhygienic water [so that he could] swallow the two non-aspirins." (Id. at 5.) Raffaele did this to retaliate against Plaintiff for "coming to sickcall, and filing grievances[] and lawsuits." (Id.)

To protest Raffaele's actions, Plaintiff went on a hunger strike. The "unsafe water" and "needless medication" Raffaele gave him caused him "to have [an] upset stomach, loss of appetite, n[a]usea, fear, high levels of stress, worrying, depression, anxiety, [and] emotional andpsychological injury." (Id. at 5-6.) When he began his hunger strike, Plaintiff was held in the Green Haven infirmary. But on August 7, 2017, he was released from the infirmary, and two days later, he was confined to his cell for a "72 hour cell confinement investigation." (Id. at 6.) On August 14, 22, and 24, 2017, while Plaintiff was still on his hunger strike, officials denied him medical treatment. On August 24, 2017, he was escorted to Green Haven's psychiatric satellite unit, but officials there "refused to help" him; Hennessy "laughed at [him] the whole time she responded to [his] problems [sic]." (Id. at 7.) One day later, he was allowed to go to sickcall, but was not allowed to be examined by a physician or speak to a mental-health professional.

During his hunger strike, Plaintiff was forced to wear "a sack as clothing in an isolation cell." (Id.) His hunger strike "was not being properly treated according to policy and procedure of DOCCS Departmental Directive #4309 by . . . Bentivegna . . . and . . . Hennessy, . . . dereliction of duty and negligence, who lacking integrity, accountability, no responsibility, and zero transparency, has no respect for the rule of law causing [P]laintiff's civil rights being infringed upon [sic]." (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A. DOCCS and official-capacity claims

Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS are barred by the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. "[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . ." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). "[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state." Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, this immunity bars claims under § 1983 for damages against state officials in their official capacities. See Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993).

Congress has not abrogated the States' immunity for claims under § 1983. See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990). And the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). DOCCS, as an arm of the State of New York, enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Madison v. New York State Dep't of Corrs. No. 19-CV-3401, 2019 WL 4933594, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019). And DOCCS officials enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under § 1983 for damages in their official capacities. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lilley, No. 19-CV-11829, 2020 WL 905989, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff' claims under § 1983 against DOCCS, as well as his claims under § 1983 for damages against the individual defendants (who are all DOCCS employees) in their official capacities, under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity.² See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

B. DOCCS Directive #4309

Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by not following DOCCS Directive #4309. But an official's failure to follow a prison directive does not constitute a violation of a prisoner's federal constitutional rights. See Holcomb v. Lykens, 337 F.3d 217, 224-25 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a state corrections directive did not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Rivera v. Wohlrab, 232 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[T]he law is settled that failure to follow a DOCS Directive or prison regulation does not give rise to a federal constitutional claim."); see also McDarby v. Dinkins, 907 F.2d 1334, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that his right to due process was violated by a New York City agency's failure to follow the City's Administrative Code); Morton v. Cnty. of Erie, 335 F. Supp. 3d 449, 455 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) ("Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal, and not state, rights."), aff'd, 796 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2019) (unpublished...