Gunzl v. Stewart

ANTHONY W. GUNZL, Plaintiff, v. LARRY STEWART, et al. Defendants.

Civ. No.15-1160-SLR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

April 6, 2016

Anthony W. Gunzl, New Castle, Delaware. Pro se Plaintiff.

Douglas A. Shachtman, Esquire, The Shachtman Law Firm, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants Larry Stewart, One Off Rod & Custom, Inc., Douglas Shachtman, One Off Rod & Custom, and One Off Rod & Custom, LLC.

Joseph Clement Handlon, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Jane M. Brady.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dated: April 6, 2016

Wilmington, Delaware

ROBINSON, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony W. Gunzl ("plaintiff") proceeds pro se. He filed this lawsuit on December 17, 2015, alleging violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (D.I. 1) Presently before the court are numerous motions, including defendants' motions to dismiss. (D.I. 13, 18, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 38) For the following reasons, the court will grant the motions to dismiss and deny the remaining motions as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2012, plaintiff filed a lawsuit for breach of contract in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County ("Superior Court") against Larry Stewart ("Stewart") and One Off Rod & Custom, Inc., C.A. No. N12L-4-017 MJB. (D.I. 22, ex. A) Plaintiff amended the complaint and added defendants One Off Rod & Custom, and One Off Rod & Custom, LLC.¹ (Id. at ex. B) Plaintiff alleged that One Off, a custom repair shop, improperly painted and transported his classic motor vehicle which caused dents and other damage.

Plaintiff appeared pro se in the Superior Court action, and Douglas A. Shachtman ("Shachtman") (a defendant in the instant action) represented Stewart (a defendant in the instant action) and the One Off defendants (also defendants in the instant action) in the Superior Court. The Honorable M. Jane Brady ("Judge Brady") (a defendant in instant action) presided over the Superior Court case. The Superior Court dismissed the action on September 16, 2013, for plaintiff's failure to comply with a courtorder that required his submission of an expert report. Gunzl v. One Off Rod & Custom, Inc., 106 A.3d 1049, 2015 WL 59749, at *1 (Del. 2015) (table). Plaintiff appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court following the Superior Court's denial of his motions for reargument and reconsideration. On January 2, 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed and held that dismissal of the complaint for failure to identify an expert as required by scheduling order was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at *2. On January 29, 2016, the Delaware Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for rehearing en banc.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on December 17, 2015 raising claims that revolve around the Superior Court action. (D.I. 1) It is evident from the allegations that plaintiff does not agree with rulings made by Judge Brady. In addition, plaintiff alleges that Shachtman did not properly respond to discovery requests or subpoenas, and he takes exception to Shachtman's conduct during judicial proceedings. Finally, plaintiff alleges that Judge Brady sided with defendants throughout the Superior Court proceedings. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and asks the court to reopen the Superior Court case, for a finding in his favor that One Off breached its contract, sanctions against defendants for discovery abuse and contemptuous behavior, and for an investigation of Judge Brady.

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) and 12(h)(3). More particularly, Judge Brady moves for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) she has absolute judicial immunity; (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) the action is time-barred. (D.I. 13) Stewart, One Off, and Shachtman move for dismissal on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff has no legal basis to assert rights under the SixthAmendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the claims fall under the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (3) the claims are barred by reason of res judicata.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction." A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2014). In reviewing a facial attack, "the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. at 358 (quoting In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). In reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94. To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must containsufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court may consider the pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346. Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Immunity

Judge Brady moves for dismissal on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity. "A judicial officer in the performance of h[er] duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for h[er] judicial acts." Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action [s]he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of h[er] authority; rather, [s]he will be subject to liability only when [s]he has acted 'in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.'". Id. (citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff's claims are founded entirely on orders entered against him and/or other judicial action taken in the course of the Superior Court proceedings. Because plaintiff's claims against Judge Brady are based on the performance of her official duties, judicial immunity clearly applies. Accordingly, the court will grant the motion to dismiss.²

B. Sixth Amendment Rights

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial. Stewart, One Rod, and Shachtman move to dismiss the Sixth Amendment claims. Plaintiff responds that the Sixth Amendment is not limited in scopeto only criminal prosecution. Plaintiff interprets the Sixth Amendment to protect his ability to obtain a fair trial and to ensure that he would receive a trial by an unbiased and fair judge.

The Sixth Amendment states that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Sixth Amendment guarantees are applicable only in the context of criminal prosecutions, and are inapplicable to civil cases. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011); Coulter v. Unknown Probation Officer, 2013 WL 2249296, at *9 (M.D. Pa. 2013).

Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial claim fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant the motion...