Gurule v. Nissan Motor Co.

1

EDWIN GURULE as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JERLYN YAZZIE, MARGIE C. PIASO as Next Friend of N. CANALES-YAZZIE and J. CANALES-YAZZIE, Minor Children, Plaintiffs, v. NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD; NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC., and ANNAMARIE PIASO, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00872-JCH-SCY

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

August 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Edwin Gurule, as personal representative of The Estate of Jerlyn Yazzie, and Margie C. Piaso, as next friend of N Canales-Yazzie and J. Canales-Yazzie, minor children (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Motion to Remand (ECF No. 14) based on lack of diversity jurisdiction. The Court, having reviewed the motion, briefs arguments, and applicable law, concludes that Defendant Annamarie Piaso was fraudulently joined, that this Court has diversity jurisdiction, and thus, that the motion to remand should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a single vehicle accident that occurred on September 27, 2021, when Jerlyn Yazzie was driving her minor children to school on Interstate 40 in an Infiniti QX4. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, ECF No. 1-1 at 16 of 32.) Ms. Yazzie lost control of the vehicle and it rolled several times. (Id. ¶ 10.) Tragically, the roof caved into the occupant compartment, causing Ms. Yazzie's death. (Id. ¶ 11.) The seatbelt restraints also failed to protect her children and they suffered enhanced and severe injuries as a result of the defective seatbelts. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiffs filed suit in state court on September 7, 2022, against Defendants Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., and Nissan North America, Inc., (collectively, the “Nissan Defendants”) as well as against Annamarie Piaso. (Notice of Removal 1, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed a first amended complaint, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, and punitive damages against the Nissan Defendants. (First Am. Compl. 3-6, ECF No. 1-1.) In their fourth claim for relief, Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against Defendant Piaso. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Piaso is liable for providing the vehicle to Ms. Yazzie equipped with a defective roof, for failing to properly inspect the vehicle and roof, and for failing to warn Ms. Yazzie of the dangers of the defective roof. (Id.) Ms. Piaso was served with the complaint on October 3, 2022. (See Register of Actions, ECF No. 1-1 at 1 of 32.) She has yet to make an appearance in the case. It is undisputed that Ms. Piaso owned the Nissan, Jerlyn Yazzie was her sister, and that they lived together at the time of the crash. (Compare Defs.' Ex. A at ECF No. 19-1 at 3 of 5, with Pls.' Reply 2, ECF No. 21.)^[1]

Plaintiffs served Nissan North America, Inc., with the first amended complaint on October 17, 2022. (Notice of Removal 1, ECF No. 1.) On November 16, 2022, the Nissan Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. (Id. at 2-3.) The Nissan Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are all citizens of New Mexico; Defendant Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., is from Japan and not a citizen of New Mexico; and Defendant Nissan North America, Inc., is a citizen of California and Tennessee. (See id.) The Nissan Defendants contend that Ms. Piaso, although a resident of New Mexico, was fraudulently joined for the purpose of destroying diversity. (Id. at 3-4.) They argue not only that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Ms. Piaso under tort law, but also that Plaintiffs do not really intend to pursue their claims against Ms. Piaso, as evidenced by the fact that she is a close family member, she has not filed a responsive pleading, and Plaintiffs have not sought a default judgment against her. The Nissan Defendants argue that the Court should disregard her citizenship and conclude there is complete diversity between the non-fraudulently joined parties. (See id.)

Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that Nissan cannot establish fraudulent joinder because they have legitimate claims against Ms. Piaso. (Pls.' Mot. to Remand 1-2, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum or the citizenships of each of the parties. Instead, the question for the Court is whether it is completely certain Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim against the non-diverse defendant, Ms. Piaso.

II. STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and there is a presumption against removal. See Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2013). Removal statutes must be strictly construed with ambiguities resolved in favor of remand. Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982). When jurisdiction is based on diversity, a party must show that there is complete diversity of citizenship between adverse parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Dutcher, 733 F.3d at 987. “Complete diversity is lacking when any of the plaintiffs has the same residency as even a single defendant.” Id. A court may disregard the citizenship of a party who was fraudulently joined to defeat federal jurisdiction. See id. at 98788.

To prove fraudulent joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either (1) actual fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) the inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party. Id. at 988. The removing party bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder, and all factual and legal issues must be resolved in favor of the nonremoving party. Id. The removing party must demonstrate that the claim cannot stand with complete certainty, upon undisputed evidence, such that it is subject to summary determination. Smoot v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967). This standard is more exacting than for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Montano v. Allstate Indemnity, 211 F.3d 1278, 2000 WL 525592, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2000). A court, however, may pierce the pleadings and consider the entire record. Dodd v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Removal may be made without consent of the fraudulently joined party

Plaintiffs assert that the Nissan Defendants removed the case without obtaining Ms. Piaso's consent to remove. Only the consent of the defendants who have been properly joined and served is required for proper removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). Consequently, if Ms. Piaso was fraudulently joined, her consent was not required to effect removal. See Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that unanimity rule may be disregarded where a defendant has been fraudulently joined).

B. Ms. Piaso was fraudulently joined

The Nissan Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs do not really intend to seek damages against Ms. Piaso. In support, they assert that she is the minor plaintiffs' aunt, she has failed to answer the complaint, and yet Plaintiffs have not moved for default judgment. Plaintiffs point out that they have a reason for not moving for default in this Court - they believe the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. While that explanation has merit, the close family relationship between Plaintiffs and Ms. Piaso suggests Plaintiffs' motive to file suit against Ms. Piaso is only to destroy diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the motive of a plaintiff in joining a defendant is immaterial so long as there is in good faith a cause of action against that defendant. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (“in a removal proceeding the motive of a plaintiff in joining defendants is immaterial, provided there is in good faith a cause of action against those joined”). Consequently, the Court must look to whether Plaintiffs are able to establish a cause of action against Ms. Piaso, regardless of their familial relationship with her.

The Nissan Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Ms. Piaso was a “supplier” of the vehicle or that she knew or should have known of the alleged defective roof. Plaintiffs respond that the Nissan Defendants have not proved with complete certainty that Plaintiffs cannot recover against Ms. Piaso, who, as the owner and supplier of the vehicle, had a duty to warn of its dangers of which she knew or about which she should have known. According to Plaintiffs, the mere possibility that they will fail to prove the knowledge element does not meet the heavy burden for fraudulent joinder.

Plaintiffs' claim against Ms. Piaso is for negligence, not strict liability. Under New Mexico negligence law, a supplier of a product has a duty to use ordinary care to warn of a risk of injury. N.M. U.J.I. 13-1415. A supplier has no duty to warn if the supplier does not know of the danger, unless the supplier should have known of the risk by the use of ordinary care. See N.M. U.J.I. 131415. A supplier owes this duty to use ordinary care to avoid a foreseeable risk of injury caused by a condition of the product to anyone who can reasonably be expected to use the product. N.M. U.J.I. 13-1402. All persons supplying a product owe this duty of ordinary care. N.M. U.J.I. 131402, Committee commentary. Unlike for strict products liability cases, “the duty of ordinary care does not depend upon the supplier's regular engagement in the business of supplying chattels and applies even to the gratuitous, isolated bailment.” Id.

Plaintiffs are therefore correct that the fact that Ms. Piaso is not in the business of selling or providing vehicles does not doom their claim against her as a matter of law where she purportedly lent the use of the vehicle to the plaintiff. See Eichel v. Goode, Inc., 1984-NMCA-035, ¶ 11 101 N.M. 246 (relying on Section 388 of the Restatement (Secon...