Guthrie v. State

1

MELVIN LEE GUTHRIE SR., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. A-13280, A-13300

No. 7094

Court of Appeals of Alaska

March 6, 2024

UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)

Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Ketchikan William B. Carey, Judge Trial Court No. 1KE-15-00424 CR.

Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley Michigan, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy Anchorage, for the Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TERRELL, JUDGE

Melvin Lee Guthrie Sr. was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of first-degree sexual assault for engaging in digital and penile penetration with T.H. without her consent.^[1]

Prior to trial, Guthrie moved to compel discovery of T.H.'s medical and mental health records, including superior court records referencing T.H. from a different criminal case in which T.H. was the alleged victim. Guthrie asserted that these records were relevant to T.H.'s credibility and competence to testify. The superior court denied these motions, and Guthrie appeals. Because we conclude that Guthrie demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that these records will contain exculpatory evidence that is unavailable from a less intrusive source, we remand for the superior court to order production of these documents, review them in camera, and disclose any materially exculpatory evidence to Guthrie. The superior court must then determine, in light of any evidence that may be disclosed, if the failure to perform this procedure in the first instance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Guthrie also appeals the superior court's order precluding Guthrie from presenting DNA evidence showing that T.H. had sex with her fiancé the day before the incident. The superior court's ruling relied on Alaska's rape shield law.^[2] For the reasons explained, we conclude that any error in precluding this evidence was harmless.

The State also cross-appeals, arguing that the superior court's order suppressing statements that Guthrie made to the police shortly after the incident was erroneous. We decline to address this issue at this time. We will consider the State's cross-appeal if, on remand, the superior court determines that Guthrie is entitled to a new trial.

Why we conclude that Guthrie sufficiently demonstrated the need for in camera review of records pertaining to T.H.'s medical and mental health

On appeal, Guthrie argues that the superior court erred when it denied his motions for in camera review of various records discussing T.H.'s medical and mental health. In his motions, Guthrie asserted that T.H. had been diagnosed with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD), as well as other mental health conditions that could negatively interact with FASD. Guthrie asserted that people with FASD often cannot accurately distinguish social cues or discern truth from fiction when recounting events, and that these symptoms can be even more serious when combined with other mental health conditions. The superior court denied these motions, concluding that T.H.'s records were privileged under the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Alaska Evidence Rule 504(b), and that Guthrie had not made a sufficient showing that his constitutional rights as a defendant required piercing this privilege.

As an initial matter, the State argues that Guthrie waived this argument because he sought to exclude evidence of T.H.'s FASD at trial. After the superior court denied his motions to review T.H.'s mental and medical health records, Guthrie moved in limine to prohibit the State from mentioning T.H.'s FASD at trial, and the court granted the motion in limine.^[3]

In support of its waiver argument, the State cites to State v. Wickham and Sam v. State^[4] Wickham and Sam concern situations where a trial court made a conditional ruling that, if the defendant introduced certain evidence, the State would be allowed to introduce certain other evidence in rebuttal. However, after these conditional rulings, the defendants declined to introduce the initial evidence at trial. In this situation, Wickham and Sam held that the defendants waived any appellate argument challenging the conditional rulings. Because preliminary rulings are subject to change, a reviewing court has no way of knowing if the preliminary ruling was the reason the defendant declined to introduce the evidence or whether the State would have actually introduced its rebuttal evidence.^[5] This lack of evidence also impedes meaningful review of whether any error was harmless.^[6]

In this case, Guthrie is not challenging a conditional ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial; he is challenging the denial of discovery motions. Unlike the erroneous denial of a conditional ruling, the erroneous denial of a discovery motion will always require a limited remand for the discovery to be provided before harmlessness can be evaluated.^[7] Any need for an additional record before harmlessness can be evaluated was not caused by Guthrie. Accordingly, we conclude that Guthrie has not waived this claim, and we proceed to evaluate his claim on the merits - i.e., whether the superior court erred by not ordering the in camera review of T.H.' s medical and mental health records.

In Douglas v. State, we recently considered the interplay between the constitutional rights of a defendant and the psychotherapist-patient privilege. We held that "a defense request for in camera review of privileged mental health records should be granted if the defendant has shown a reasonable likelihood that the records will contain exculpatory evidence that is necessary to the defense and unavailable from a less intrusive source."^[8] Following in camera review, the court will "disclose those records containing information that qualifies as materially exculpatory under the facts of that case."^[9]

To support his claims about T.H.'s FASD diagnosis, Guthrie relied on a report from T.H.'s hospital visit on the night she reported the sexual assault in this case, which listed FASD in T.H.'s medical history. Guthrie also relied on court records from a 2004 superior court case, State v. Williams, ^[10] where T.H. was also the alleged victim. In that case, the defendant first presented expert testimony about FASD generally. Then, after the court granted the defendant's motion to subpoena T.H.'s mental health records, the expert testified specifically about T.H.'s condition.

The expert witness in Williams testified that people with FASD "very commonly" have difficulty separating fact from fantasy, are easily influenced by others, have poor comprehension of social rules and expectations, and have difficulty in predicting the consequences of their own and others' behavior. The expert explained that alcohol damages the frontal lobe, which is the source of these abilities within the brain. As a result, according to the expert, people with FASD are commonly reported to be "lying."

After the court in Williams granted the defendant's motion for in camera review of T.H.'s documents, and after the expert witness reviewed the documents the superior court disclosed to the parties, the expert confirmed that T.H. had been diagnosed with a particularly debilitating type of FASD - static encephalopathy, alcohol exposed. Based on this diagnosis, the expert concluded that there was a greater than fifty percent chance that T.H. did not have the capability to understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth. The expert witness testified to these conclusions at trial. The defendant in Williams was acquitted.

Based on the above information, Guthrie moved the superior court to subpoena T.H.'s medical and mental health records for in camera review. He moved for in camera review of the confidential and sealed record in Williams - i.e., the portion of the record in Williams that might pertain to T.H.'s mental health.

We conclude that the expert testimony in Williams was sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the records Guthrie identified in his motions - T.H.'s medical and mental health records and the confidential and sealed files in Williams - would contain exculpatory evidence that is necessary to the defense and unavailable from a less intrusive source.^[11] We therefore remand for the superior court to order production of these records, review them in camera, and disclose any materially exculpatory evidence contained therein. The court should then determine whether the failure to conduct an in camera review in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The case will then return to this Court.^[12]

Why we conclude that the superior court's order precluding admission of evidence of TH. 's recent sexual activity was harmless

Guthrie also argues that the superior court erred by granting the State's motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence under Alaska's rape shield statute, AS 12.45.045. Specifically, T.H. had told a forensic nurse who examined her after she reported the assault that she had sex with her fiancé the night before, and testing of vaginal and cervical swabs from T.H. contained DNA from both Guthrie and T.H.'s fiancé. The State asked the court not...