Guthrie v. Wetzel

DAWN GUTHRIE, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL^[1], et al ., Defendants

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-2351

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

January 12, 2022

SCHWAB, M.J.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the court is Magistrate Judge Susan C. Schwab's December 13, 2021 report and recommendation (hereinafter “report”), (Doc. 13), which recommends the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the civil rights complaint filed by transgender prisoner Dawn Guthrie, (Doc 6). The report also recommends that at this stage of the proceedings, the case proceed with respect to the plaintiff's 8^th Amendment claims in which she alleges that defendant prison officials violated her rights by refusing to provide her with adequate care for her gender dysphoria, including gender affirming surgery. Defendants have filed objections to the report, (Doc. 14), and plaintiff filed a response to the objections. For the following reasons, the report will be adopted in its entirety and the defendants' objections will be overruled. Plaintiff's claims will proceed against all defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Since the complete background of this case is stated in the report, it will not be fully repeated herein. At all relevant times, plaintiff was a state prisoner at SCI-Mahanoy, a men's prison, and as a transgender woman who is recognized by the DOC as female, she has raised constitutional claims under the 8^th Amendment against four defendant prison officials regarding their alleged failure to provide her with proper medical care for her gender dysphoria condition, including denying her gender affirming surgery and failing to provide her access to a transgender health specialist. Plaintiff further claims that all of the defendants have violated her rights by interfering with her attempt to socially transition, denying her access to female commissary items, hair removal, and transferring her out of a women's prison, (SCI-Muncy), to a men's prison.

The named defendants include Wetzel, who is sued in his individual and official capacities, but he will remain a party only in his individual capacity, and George Little will be substituted for Wetzel to the extent that he was sued in his official capacity. Dr. Paul Noel the former Chief of Clinical Services for the DOC, who is sued in his individual capacity, Dr. Palukuri (incorrectly spelled by plaintiff as “Paluki”) Reddy, the Chief Psychiatrist for the DOC, who is sued in his individual and official capacities, and Dr. Arlene Seid, the Chief of Clinical Services for the DOC, who is sued in her official capacity.

As relief, plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.^[2] On March 8, 2021, defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 6). On December 13, 2021, Judge Schwab issued her report recommending that defendants' motion to dismiss be denied. (Doc. 13). On December 22, 2021, defendants filed timely objections to the report. On January 5, 2022, plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to defendants' objections. (Doc. 15).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard of review is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge and the court may rely on the magistrate judge's recommendations to the extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

For those sections of the report to which no objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes. See also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that judges should give some review to every report and recommendation)). Nonetheless, regardless of whether or not timely objections are made to the report, the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

The court, when reviewing a complaint for failure to state a claim, applies the legal standard set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The standard set forth regarding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), requires the court to test the sufficiency of a complaint's allegations. All well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine whether, “‘under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.' ” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Estate of Bailey by Oare v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must describe “‘enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' [each] necessary element” of the claims alleged in the complaint. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege facts that “justify moving the case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Id. at 234-35.

Initially, as the report states, the 11^th Amendment bars plaintiff's claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Wetzel, Dr. Reddy, and Dr. Noel in their official capacities. The report also finds that the 11^th Amendment does not bar plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, to the extent noted above, and that her claims against defendants Wetzel, Dr. Noel, and Dr. Reddy for money damages in their individual capacities are also not barred and will proceed. No doubt that plaintiff cannot seek compensatory and punitive damages against any of the DOC defendants in their official capacity, and any such claims are dismissed. See Atwell v. Schweiker, 274 Fed.Appx. 116 (3d Cir.); see also Gannaway v. Stroumbakis, 842 Fed.Appx. 725, 729 (3d Cir. 2021) (Holding that “[w]hen a plaintiff brings a civil rights action against a government employee, courts distinguish between the employee's official and individual capacity. [A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official's office. The Eleventh Amendment render[s] states-and, by extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in interest-generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, plaintiff can seek damages against defendant state officials, including Wetzel and Dr. Noel, in their individual capacities. See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, the above stated findings in the report will be adopted.

Next, the report explains, in a thorough fashion, why the 8^thAmendment claims raised by the plaintiff should proceed against all defendants at this stage of the litigation.^[3] The report correctly finds that plaintiff's gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need for purposes of an 8^th Amendment claim. See Doe v. Pa. DOC, 2021 WL 1583556, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2021), adopted by 2021 WL 1115373 (March 3, 2021);^[4] see also Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 785 (9^th Cir. 2019) (holding that “[prisoner's] gender dysphoria is a sufficiently serious medical need to trigger the State's obligations under the Eighth Amendment.”) (string citations omitted). “[Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the 8^th Amendment, and the DOC has a duty to provide proper medical care for state inmates serving sentences in its prisons. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285.

Since plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently serious medical need she must now “show the [DOC officials'] response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786. Thus, the issue becomes whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged in her complaint that defendants have shown deliberate indifference to her serious medical need by denying her requests for access to a transgender healthcare specialist, hair removal, gender affirming surgery, female commissary items, and a transfer to a women's prison. Although the likelihood of plaintiff succeeding on all of her claims may be doubtful, see Aliahmed v. Troxler, 839 Fed.Appx. 675, 677 (3d Cir. 2021) (Third Circuit affirmed district court's denial of the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction insofar as plaintiff inmate with gender dysphoria claimed prison officials deprived her of her 8^th Amendment rights, in part, by failing to transfer her to a women's prison, since she lacked a “cognizable liberty interest in being confined in any particular institution) (citation omitted), this does not prevent her claims from proceeding at this juncture of the case under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Further, in Aliahmed, the Third Circuit also affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction motion finding that “[a]t this time, [plaintiff's] request to be scheduled for immediate gender reassignment surgery reflects disagreement as to the proper course of treatment rather than any...