Gutierrez v. San Juan Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

MONCERRATH GUTIERREZ, on his own behalf and on behalf of a class ofsimilarly situated persons; RICARDO OLIVAS, on his own behalf and on behalfof a class of similarly situated persons; SUSANA PALACIOS-VALENCIA, on herown behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons; andSOMOS UN PUEBLO UNIDO, Plaintiffs, v. SAN JUAN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS;and THOMAS C. HAVEL, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. CIV 14-1050 WJ-KBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

March 26, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES and DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO JOIN

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss For Failure to Join Necessary Parties, or in the Alternative, Motion to Join Necessary Parties, filed January 27, 2013 (Doc. 6). Having reviewed the parties' briefs and applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants' motion is well-taken to the extent that certain parties are necessary parties and should be joined in this lawsuit under Fed.R.Civ.P.19, but the motion is denied as to Defendants' request to dismiss the case for failure to join necessary parties under Rule 19.

BACKGROUND

This is a putative class action brought by three illegal aliens who were detained by agents working for the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in 2012 (two of the Plaintiffs) and 2014 (one Plaintiff) for being in the United States without lawful authority and being subject to deportation or removal from the country. According to the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), ICE agents took the Plaintiffs to the San Juan County Adult Detention Center ("County Detention Center") in Farmington, New Mexico, for a brief period of time, apparently confirmed they were subject to removal from the United States, and then ICE transported them to a facility in Albuquerque for further detention and processing. Plaintiffs allege that their detentions at the County Detention Center were violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and claim that they are entitled to monetary damages. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief requiring release of any individuals held in Defendants' custody based on an immigration detainer issued by ICE and enjoining Defendants from detaining any person in their custody in the future based on an immigration detainer.

Some background of these "immigration detainers" is necessary. See Doc. 6 (Mot.) at 5 (overview and history of ICE immigration detainers). ICE and its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") have routinely enlisted local law enforcement agencies and local detention facilities throughout the county to hold suspected illegal aliens for ICE.¹ ICE Detainers (Form I-247) are issued pursuant to 28 CFR §287 in order to advise a federal, state or local law enforcement agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The Detainer is a request to a local law enforcement agency to hold the alien for up to 48 hours in order for theDepartment to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.

DISCUSSION

Defendants (or "County") seek to join necessary federal agencies such as ICE and DHS, contending that these parties are required to be joined because rulings in this case would have a direct impact on the interests of the United States and the ability to protect its interests; and also because rulings in this case could expose Defendants to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. Plaintiffs contend that no federal entity is a necessary party required to be joined in this case.

I. Legal Standard

A. Rule 19

The Court's inquiry under Rule 19 is twofold. First, the court must determine whether a person is necessary pursuant to Rule 19(a). Next, and only if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the Court must determine, under 19(b), whether to proceed in that person's absence if joinder is not feasible. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Tuco, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 665, 671 (D.Wyo. 1994); Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. AT & T Corp., 320 F. 3d 1081, 1096 (10th Cir. 2003). A party is necessary within the meaning of Rule 19(a) if: (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. As the movants, Defendants bear the burden of showing that the United States or its appropriateagencies and officials are required and are indispensable parties. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1293 (10th Cir. 1994).

Defendants seek joinder as an alternative, which would preclude a finding that joinder is not feasible. In fact, Defendants expressly argue that DHS and/or ICE and their officials can be feasibly joined. See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F.Supp.2d 19 (D.R.I. 2014) (naturalized citizen who was detained on immigration detainer had alleged plausible claim against the United States); Moreno v. Napolitano, 2014 WL 4911938, unpubl. opin. (N.D.Ill. 2014) (class of individuals certified in case involving Form I-247 detainers against federal agencies and officials only). Thus, the Court's analysis will focus on whether certain parties should be joined, rather than whether the case must be dismissed because joinder of indispensable parties is not feasible. See U.S. v. Supreme Court of New Mexico, 980 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1344 (D.N.M. 2013) (Rule 19 requires dismissal of an action for failure to join a party only where an absent party is found to be indispensable); see also Direct Supply, Inc. v. Specialty Hosps. of Am., LLC, 878 F.Supp.2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2012) (courts are generally reluctant to grant Rule 12(b)(7) motions, and do so "only when the defect is serious and cannot be cured").

B. Rule 14 Does Not Apply

Plaintiffs contend that dismissal under Rule 19 does not apply here because Defendants have conceded that federal parties can feasibly be joined. They also suggest that Defendants can implead ICE, DHS or any other federal entities or officials under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relying on EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Peabody plaintiff sought indemnification against the federal government. The court determined that it was not feasible for the plaintiff to name the Secretary of the Interior as a party, even though the Secretary was a necessary party under a Rule 19analysis. The court, "in equity and good conscience," concluded that the Secretary could be impleaded under Rule 14 in order to allow the declaratory relief claims to go forward. Thus, the Peabody case held that Rule 19 was not intended to require the joinder of potential indemnitors and does not control here because Defendants have not alleged indemnity against the United States.

Rule 14 cannot be used here to implead the United States because Rule 14 only permits a defending party to sue a nonparty "who is or may be liable to [the defending party] for all or part of the claim against it. . . ." Rule 14 does not permit a defending party to name a nonparty solely because the nonparty is or may be liable to the Plaintiffs, such as in the instant case. See Lopez v. American Baler Co., 2013 WL 4782155, unpubl. opin. (D.N.M. 2013); see also, Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir.1983) (defendant not permitted to implead nonparty solely to allege comparative fault because "impleader is proper only where the third-party defendant's liability is 'in some way derivative of the outcome of the main claim'") (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs are incorrect in alleging that Defendants can simply bring in any federal defendants for any reason through a third-party action. Rather, the issue here is whether rulings in this case will later impact United States immigration policies and practices and expose the County defendants to multiple and inconsistent obligations to the United States and thus, Rule 19 is the appropriate procedural vehicle for addressing this scenario.

C. Court May Consider Pleadings Outside Complaint

Defendants have attached Exhibits A through I to support their arguments in this motion, but Plaintiffs argue that this is improper because the Court must accept Plaintiffs' allegations in the complaint as true on a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) (failure to join party under Rule 19). However, under Tenth Circuit precedent, a proponent's burden can be satisfied byproviding "affidavits of persons having knowledge of these interests as well as other relevant extra-pleading evidence." Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1293 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968) (Whether an absent party is indispensable "can only be determined in the context of particular litigation"). Thus, the Court will consider Defendants' exhibits in deciding this motion.

II. United States' Interest

Under Rule 19, a person must be joined as a party if "that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may. . . as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest." Rule (a)(1)(B)(1).

A. Immigration Policies

Defendants define the United States' interest as related to the government's immigration policies, procedures...