Gutierrez v. Tryax Realty Mgmt., Inc.

JAIME GUTIERREZ and RAMON GUTIERREZ, Plaintiffs, v. TRYAX REALTY MANAGEMENT, INC., 1027 WALLCO L.L.C., MICHAEL SCHMELZER,MATTHEW SCHMELZER, MIGUEL LEON, and CESAR MALDONADO, Defendants.

17 Civ. 6752 (PAE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 18, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:

Plaintiffs here seek to collect unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 650-665; id. §§ 190-199-A, for their work as porters at Bronx apartment buildings. The parties have moved for partial summary judgment on two issues that, while not dispositive of the case, if resolved pretrial would shape the scope of plaintiffs' claims. First, the parties have filed cross-motions on the question of whether plaintiffs—in light of security camera footage which defendants allege shows plaintiffs taking extended, unauthorized breaks during the workday—should, for overtime purposes, be treated as having worked for the entirety of the time they were present at the buildings, or whether such extended breaks, to the extent that they are established,¹ should be excluded from plaintiffs' total weekly hours. Second, plaintiffs have moved forsummary judgment on the question of whether, as a matter of law, they were entitled to time-and-a-half overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

For the following reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to plaintiffs on their second motion, holding that plaintiffs are eligible for time-and-a-half overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. The Court, however, denies the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the first issue, the proper treatment of extended breaks for purposes of tabulating overtime hours, because unresolved disputes of material fact preclude pretrial resolution of that issue.

I. Background

A. Facts

1. The Parties

Plaintiffs Jaime Gutierrez ("Jaime") and Ramon Gutierrez ("Ramon") are porters responsible for cleaning Bronx apartment buildings managed by defendant Tryax Management, Inc. ("Tryax"). From 2010 through 2016, defendant Michael Schmelzer was Tryax's President and defendant Matthew Schmelzer was Tryax's Vice President. Since 2016, Matthew Schmelzer has been the sole officer of Tryax. Defendant 1027 Wallco LLC ("Wallco") is a New York business that shares a headquarters with Tryax. Michael and Matthew Schmelzer are managing members of Wallco. Defendant Miguel Leon is Tryax's Director of Administration and acting supervisor of defendant Cesar Maldonado, who is a field supervisor for Tryax and has supervised Ramon since January 2013 and Jaime since April 2015.

2. Factual Background²

Since February 1998, Jaime has worked as a porter at 1027 Walton Avenue, a six-floor, 85-unit apartment building in the Bronx. JSF ¶¶ 26, 27. Since October 1998, Ramon has also worked as a porter, id. ¶ 31, splitting his time between three buildings: 1454 Walton Ave., 1475 Walton Ave., and 1478 Walton Ave., id. ¶ 33. The buildings where plaintiffs work (together, the "Properties") are all managed by Tryax. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.

Plaintiffs' responsibility as porters "is to keep the building clean" by, inter alia, separating trash from recyclables, "taking out the garbage, sweeping, mopping, cleaning windows, and sweeping the sidewalks." Id. ¶ 86; see also id. ¶ 87. In addition, Ramon maintains and, when necessary, unclogs the trash compactor at 1454 Walton Ave. Id. ¶ 92.Porters are also "responsible for responding to any occurrences that require cleaning," id. ¶ 101, and assisting the building superintendent with tasks such as moving furniture on an as-needed basis, see id. ¶ 102. Porters are issued a company cell phone, id. ¶ 115, although the parties dispute how important the phones are for the successful completion of a porter's duties.

Tryax has never issued a written schedule of hours for plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 66. Throughout their employment, they have been scheduled to work from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., five days a week. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. "Tryax provides a windowless room in the basement of 1454 Walton Avenue for Ramon to use to change his clothes, keep his things, eat his lunch and to use as a break room." Id. ¶ 71. "Tryax provides a small studio apartment on the first floor of 1027 Walton Avenue for Jaime to use to change his clothes, keep his things, eat his lunch and to use as a break room." Id. ¶ 72.

In September 2017, plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case, alleging that they had routinely worked more than 40 hours per week but had never received overtime pay. See Dkt. 58 (First Amended Complaint ("FAC")) ¶¶ 37, 47, 54-55, 63. In the course of responding to the complaint, Tryax began reviewing video footage from the Properties. This footage, Tryax asserts, shows plaintiffs regularly taking extended—and, Tryax claims, unauthorized—breaks in their respective on-site break rooms throughout the workday. Leon Decl. ¶ 14.

As a result of this revelation, Tryax has now moved for partial summary judgment. Before undertaking a full review of video footage for the entire period in which plaintiffs seek overtime pay, it seeks a ruling that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are not entitled to count time spent on unauthorized breaks toward hours that might establish their eligibility for overtime. Plaintiffs have cross-moved for summary judgment on this point. They ask the Court to rule that all their hours on the premises during their work shifts are compensable, even if spent on lengthybreaks. Plaintiffs have also moved for summary judgment on a separate issue, asking the Court to hold as a matter of law that the weekly salary they received compensates them only for 40 hours of work, such that they are eligible for time-and-a-half overtime pay for hours worked in excess of that in a given week.

B. Procedural History

On September 5, 2017, plaintiffs filed their complaint. Dkt. 1. On November 7, 2017, defendants, who had waived service, see Dkt. 22, filed an answer, Dkt. 25, and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiffs' third cause of action, Dkt. 26. After the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Freeman for settlement purposes, Dkt. 37, the parties participated in settlement discussions while undertaking discovery; the Court extended the discovery process several times in deference to settlement discussions, but these ultimately did not bear fruit. See Dkts. 43, 46, 51, 56. On January 14, 2019, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. FAC. On March 20, 2019, the Court held a pre-motion conference. See Dkt. 65.

On May 3, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 71, a supporting memorandum of law, Dkt. 72, and the Arenson Declaration, Dkt. 73. On May 6, 2019, plaintiffs filed a corrected memorandum of law. Dkt. 75 ("Pl. Mem."). On May 29, 2019, defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with exhibits, Def. Mtn., a combined memorandum of law in support and in opposition to plaintiff's motion, Dkt. 79 ("Def. Opp'n Mem."), and a Rule 56.1 statement, Def. 56.1. On June 6, 2019, plaintiffs filed a Rule 56.1 statement. Pl. 56.1. On June 14, 2019, defendants filed a response to plaintiffs' 56.1 statement. Def. 56.1 Response. On June 28, 2019, plaintiffs filed a response to defendants' 56.1 statement, Pl. 56.1 Response, and a combined memorandum of law in opposition to defendants' motion and in support of their own, Dkt. 88 ("Pl. Opp'n-Reply Mem."). On July 12, 2019, defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 89 ("Def. Reply. Mem.").

II. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must "show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact. In making this determination, the Court must view all facts "in the light most favorable" to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the movant meets its burden, "the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). "A party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Rather, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009).

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" will preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)).

III. Discussion

A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment as to Whether Extended Breaks Between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. Count Towards Overtime Hours

The Court first addresses the parties' cross-motions. These ask the Court to determine whether, as plaintiffs argue, all 40 hours that they were scheduled to work each week—from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., five days per week—are countable as "work" under the FLSA for purposes of tabulating plaintiffs' overtime eligibility, or whether, as defendants claim, plaintiffs' extended breaks should be excluded from countable hours.

"Enacted in 1938, the [FLSA]...