Guy v. Eliwa

1

FRANCIS GUY, Plaintiff, v. MOHAMED S. ELIWA, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:23-CV-00412

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

September 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MATTHEW W. BRANN CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case arose following a three-car accident on the Interstate 80 highway. On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff Francis Guy (hereinafter “Guy”) was parked in his tractor trailer on the westbound side of the Interstate 80 highway in Centre County, Pennsylvania.^[1] At that time, two Defendants, Mohamed S. Eliwa (hereinafter “Eliwa”) and Humphreys Namilaza (hereinafter “Namilaza”), were also on the westbound side of the Interstate 80 highway.^[2] Eliwa's freightliner was traveling in a lane to the left of Namilaza's semi-trailer.^[3] The chain of events provoking this litigation began when Eliwa crossed into Namilaza's lane of travel.^[4] Guy alleges that Eliwa lost control of his tractor trailer, exceeded the speed limit, and failed to safely change lanes.^[5] Namilaza “violently swerved” his semi-trailer in response, and his semi-trailer then struck the Plaintiff's parked tractor trailer.^[6]

Eliwa thereafter fled the scene of the accident without attempting to stop or render aid, despite understanding his legal duty to do so.^[7] Namilaza's post-accident conduct is not described in the complaint. Guy alleges that Eliwa was subsequently charged by the Pennsylvania State Police with accidents involving death or personal injury, disregarding a traffic lane, accident involving property damage, failure to stop and give information and render aid, careless driving, and recklessly endangering another person.^[8] As a result of the accident, Guy avers that he sustained various serious physical injuries requiring ongoing medical care.^[9]

Guy has also sued Eliwa and Namilaza's alleged employers, on grounds of vicarious liability and negligent hiring and supervision of their employees.^[10] Eliwa's alleged employer is G.S.C. Heavy Hauling, LLC (“GSC”);^[11] Namilaza's is M. Brothers Trucking, LLC.^[12] Guy alleges that GSC was negligent or reckless in its hiring and supervision of employees; in hiring Eliwa despite knowing that his driving record and propensity for speeding made him unfit to safely operate a commercial vehicle; and in failing to ensure that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) hour of service requirements were adhered to.^[13]

B. Procedural Background

On March 8, 2023, Guy filed a six-count complaint against Defendants, three of which are directed against the moving defendants, Eliwa and GSC (“Moving Defendants”).^[14] The other three counts are directed against Namilaza and M. Brothers Trucking,^[15] who filed an answer rather than joining in their co-defendants' motions.^[16] This is a case of negligence predicated on this Court's diversity jurisdiction^[17] and brought under Pennsylvania law.

On June 5, 2023, Moving Defendants filed three motions: a motion for a more definite statement, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e); a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); and a motion to strike, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

The motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED as to paragraphs 37(m), 37(o), 37(p), 37(t), 37(u), 37(x), 29(m), (o), 29(p), 29(t), 29(u), 29(x), 34(p), 34(s), and 34(bb), and DENIED as to paragraphs 37(n), 29(n), 34(p), 34(q), 34(r), and 34(cc);^[18]the motion to dismiss is DENIED; and the motion to strike is DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for More Definite Statement

1. Standard

Sometimes, a pleading is so “vague or ambiguous” that the opposing party “cannot reasonably prepare a response.”^[19] When that happens, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits a party to move for a more definite statement. That motion “must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.”^[20] Whether to grant a motion for a more definite statement is “committed to the discretion of the district” court.^[21] At the same time, such motions are generally disfavored.^[22] They should be used to “provide a remedy for an unintelligible pleading rather than as a correction for a lack of detail.”^[23]

2. Analysis

Defendants request a more definite statement as to paragraphs 37(n), 37(o), 37(p), 37(t), 37(u), 29(n), 29(o), 29(p), 29(t), 29(u), 34(p), 34(q), 34(r), 34(s), 34(bb), and 34(cc) of Plaintiff's complaint, which Defendants assert are insufficiently specific as to which statutes have been violated,^[24] and a more definite statement as to paragraphs 37(m), 37(x), 29(m), and 29(x) of the complaint, which Defendants assert contain “vague or open-ended allegations of negligence.”^[25]Defendants also moved for a more definite statement as to the words “but is not limited to” in paragraphs 37, 29 and 34, but because the parties have already agreed to strike these portions of the complaint, the Court need not address them in this opinion.^[26]

i. Statutes, Rules, and Regulations

The Court will first discuss those parts of Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement concerning Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated various statutes, rules, and regulations. The Court will grant the motion for a more definite statement as to paragraphs 37(o), 37(p), 37(t), 29(o), 29(p), 29(t), 37(u), 29(u), 34(p), 34(s), and 34(bb). The Court will deny the motion for a more definite statement as to paragraphs 37(n), 29(n), 34(p), 34(q), 34(r), and 34(cc).

Paragraphs 37(o), 37(p), 37(t), 29(o), 29(p), and 29(t) allege that Eliwa was negligent or reckless by failing to “appraise himself of,” “abide by,” and “operate his tractor trailer in accordance with” Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”). This amply suffices as a pleading to which Defendants cannot reasonably prepare a response. The FMCSRs span Parts 300 to 399 of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations,^[27] leaving Defendants with no way of responding “even with a simple denial[] in good faith or without prejudice to himself.”^[28] Paragraphs 37(u) and 29(u) sweep even more broadly, alleging that Eliwa was negligent or reckless by “[v]iolating the applicable rules, regulations, and laws pertaining to the safe and proper operation of motor vehicles and/or tractor trailer units;” similarly, paragraphs 34(s) and 34(bb) respectively allege that GSC itself was negligent or reckless by “[v]iolating the applicable rules, laws and regulations pertaining to and governing the operation of commercial vehicles” and “knowingly violating federal and state law regarding the responsibilities of motor carriers and the operation of commercial vehicles.”

As Defendants point out, refusing to grant a Motion for a More Definite Statement as to these paragraphs risks allowing Plaintiffs to “backdoor new and/or different theories of recovery . . . as the case proceeds, or they are mere surplusage.”^[29] As to these paragraphs, the motion for a more definite statement is granted, and the paragraphs will be stricken if they cannot be re-pled with the requisite degree of specificity.

Paragraph 34(cc), however, alleges that GSC was negligent or reckless by “failing to act upon and remedy known violations of FMCSA regulation 395.” Regulation 395, titled “Hours of Service of Drivers,” sets out limitations on the driving hours of commercial drivers^[30] and requires them to keep records of their hours of service through an Electronic Logging Device.^[31] Guy adds additional context to this allegation by elaborating elsewhere in the complaint that GSC “knew or should have known that [Eliwa's] violation of FMCSA hours of service made him unfit to safely operate a commercial vehicle,” and that GSC did not monitor or regulate its drivers' hours, audit its drivers' logs, or have a policy in place to address fatigue in its drivers.^[32] The Court is satisfied that Guy's citation to the “Hours of Service of Drivers” provision of the FMCSRs is specific enough for Defendant GSC to provide an answer at the motion to dismiss stage of this litigation; Plaintiff's additional allegations related to the hour of service requirement even further solidify that his pleadings are sufficiently intelligible.

Paragraphs 37(n) and 29(n) allege that Eliwa's negligence or recklessness consisted of “violating the written and unwritten policies and procedures of Defendant GSC.” Although these paragraphs also allege violations of unspecified rules, they will survive the motion for a more definite statement. “Plaintiffs cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the details of corporate internal affairs at the pleading stage.”^[33] Because “Defendant, not Plaintiff[], is in possession of, and knowledgeable about, such policies,” Defendants can formulate a defense based on Plaintiff's allegations, and move for summary judgment if no details about specific policies and procedures emerge during discovery.^[34] Unlike Plaintiff's opaque references to violations of the FMCSRs or “applicable laws,” Plaintiff's allegation that Eliwa and GSC failed to comply with GSC's internal policies and procedures also captures a far smaller scope of materials, making it far more practical for Defendants to respond in good faith.

Paragraphs 34(p) and 34(q) allege that GSC was negligent or reckless by failing to ensure that its personnel “were aware of” and “complied with” the FMCSRs. Paragraph 34(r) alleges the same for “the rules, laws and regulations pertaining to and governing the operation of commercial vehicles.” As mentioned the FMCSRs are a sprawling tome of rules, and Plaintiff's reference to “rules, laws and regulations pertaining...