Guzman v. Boeing Co.

366 F.Supp.3d 219

Adriana GUZMAN, Plaintiff,

v.The BOEING COMPANY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-12615-JGD

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed February 6, 2019

Elaine W. Sharp, Randy M. Hitchcock, Whitfield Sharp & Sharp, Marblehead, MA, Michael R. Rezendes, Rezendes & Trezise, Quincy, MA, Christopher D. Stombaugh, Pro Hac Vice, Dicello Levitt & Casey, Mentor, OH, for Plaintiff.

Daniel P. Ridlon, Thomas J. McLaughlin, Pro Hac Vice, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Kathleen M. Guilfoyle, Campbell, Campbell, Edwards & Conroy, PC, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON BOEING'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(e), FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 59(a), AND FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER RULE 50(b)

Judith Gail Dein, United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 2010, the plaintiff, Adriana Guzman, was a passenger on American Airlines flight 1640 from Costa Rica to Boston when there was a rapid decompression incident which caused the aircraft to drop suddenly and the oxygen masks to be deployed. The plane was brought under control by the pilot and landed safely in Miami approximately 30 minutes later, after which Ms. Guzman and others continued to Boston on another plane. The aircraft was a Boeing 757, and the defendant The Boeing Company ("Boeing") agreed to be responsible for any damages proximately caused by the decompression incident. Several persons on board brought the instant case, and all claims were settled prior to trial except for Ms. Guzman's claims.

Ms. Guzman contends that as a result of the decompression incident, she suffered from PTSD, major depressive disorder and, to a lesser extent, decompression sickness. On April 12, 2018, after a nine day trial on the issue of damages, the jury returned a verdict finding that the plaintiff had suffered $ 2.2 million in damages, but that she had failed to mitigate $ 726,000 of those damages. (See Docket No. 348). On April 19, 2018, this court entered judgment for the plaintiff, which included prejudgment interest at the rate of 12%, for a total judgment of $ 2,271,651.60. (See Docket No. 349).

This matter is presently before the court on Boeing's "Motions to Amend the Judgment under Rule 59(e), New Trial under Rule 59(a), and JMOL under Rule 50(b)" (Docket No. 380) ("Motion for a New Trial"). After extensive briefing on this and other post-trial motions filed by the parties,¹ oral argument was heard on August 6, 2018. Thereafter, the parties requested leave to file post-hearing briefs. The final brief was filed on October 22, 2018 and the Motion for a New Trial is now ripe for consideration. For the reasons detailed herein, Boeing's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.

II. AMOUNT OF THE AWARD - GENERALLY

As an initial matter, Boeing challenges the jury award as excessive on the grounds that the evidence of pain and suffering did not support the award, and that Ms. Guzman's failure to mitigate mandates the conclusion that the award was excessive. After careful consideration, this court finds Boeing's arguments to be unpersuasive.

A. Standard of Review

This court "is obliged to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and to grant remittitur or a new trial on damages only when the award ‘exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.’ " E. Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc., 40 F.3d 492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982) ). Under this standard, an award of damages must stand unless it is "grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand." Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159, 89 S.Ct. 331, 21 L.Ed.2d 309 (1968) ). The burden on the party seeking remittitur or a new damages trial is a heavy one, and the jury's assessment of the appropriate damages award is entitled to great deference. Monteagudo v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado, 554 F.3d 164, 174 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Toucet v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1993). It goes without saying that "converting feelings such as pain, suffering, and mental anguish into dollars is not an exact science" and, consequently, the jury's assessment will be upheld so long as it " ‘does not strike such a dissonant chord that justice would be denied were the judgment permitted to stand.’ " Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal punctuation omitted) ). A jury verdict should not be disturbed merely because it is extremely generous or because the court thinks that the damages are considerably less. Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). "[M]erely showing that the damage award is generous in comparison to other (hand-picked) cases is insufficient to warrant relief." Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198.

As noted above, the jury award was to compensate the plaintiff for PTSD, major depressive disorder and, to a lesser extent, decompression sickness. Ms. Guzman's symptoms of decompression sickness, namely headaches, general malaise, and fatigue, only lasted a few days, and there was evidence that any abnormalities in her brain could have been related to a number of different conditions. (Tr. III:45-48; VIII:109-11).² Moreover, there was evidence that any such abnormalities did not cause, and were not expected to cause, Ms. Guzman any continuing problems. (Tr. III:47-48). The parties agree that virtually all of the award had to be to compensate Ms. Guzman for her PTSD and major depressive disorder.

According to the plaintiff, "in a survey of 1,369 civil jury verdicts across all jurisdictions, two-thirds of plaintiffs received compensation for PTSD, and about one-third of those were awarded $ 1 million or more." (Docket No. 390 at 34 & n.5). Similarly, courts have upheld damages in excess of $ 1 million for PTSD claims even absent significant physical injuries. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Am. Airlines (In re Air Crash at Little Rock Ark.), 291 F.3d 503, 512-13 (8th Cir. 2002) ($ 6.5 million jury verdict for severe PTSD but limited physical injuries following plane crash reduced to $ 1.5 million by Appeals Court in light of limitations on recovery imposed by the Warsaw Convention). "The reported cases reflect a broad range of verdicts for PTSD[,]" including many in excess of $ 1 million. Webb v. TECO Barge Line, Inc., No. 07-514-DRH, 2012 WL 780851, at *31-32 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012) (after bench trial, judge awards $ 2,750,000 for pain and suffering as a result of PTSD), and cases cited. This court recognizes that "[i]ndividual cases can differ from each other enormously in terms of witness credibility, the quality of presentation, the nature and extent of the injuries, the vulnerability of the victim, the reactions of jurors to the particular circumstances, and hosts of other variables." Ibanez v. Velasco, No. 96 C 5990, 2002 WL 731778, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (declining to reduce $ 2.5 million compensatory damage award in excessive force case despite fact that plaintiff's physical injuries were "not severe," because of plaintiff's significant emotional injuries, including PTSD). In the instant case, $ 2.2 million was awarded to compensate the plaintiff for her suffering for almost 8 years following the plane decompression, which the jury then reduced by approximately one-third.³ While the award is probably higher than what this court would have awarded in a bench trial, as detailed below, this court finds that there was ample evidence that the plaintiff suffered severe PTSD and a major depressive disorder, that the reduction for failure to mitigate is supported by the record, and that there was no evidence that the jury acted out of any improper motive in awarding the damages. This court finds no basis to disturb the jury's award.

B. The Evidence Supports the Award

All of the experts, including Dr. Jhilam Biswas for the plaintiff, and Dr. Charles Marmar for the defendant, agreed that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and major depressive disorder as a result of the decompression incident. (Tr. III:107; Tr. VII:70-71; 77-78). While Boeing argued that a substantial portion of Ms. Guzman's symptoms were attributable to the stress she suffered during her time as a student at MIT years earlier, and the fact that MIT was suing her for unpaid student loans, the jury apparently rejected this argument. There was ample evidence from which the jury could find that Ms. Guzman suffered from PTSD and a major depressive disorder as a result of the decompression incident, and that these conditions lasted through trial.

Experience at MIT

Since Boeing's theory focused on Ms. Guzman's time at MIT, some details are necessary. Ms. Guzman was from Costa Rica. (Tr. V:27). From 1995 through 2005 she attended MIT in Massachusetts. (Id. at 42, 67). She obtained a Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering in June 1998, and continued in a Ph.D. program in the department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. (See Tr. VII: 156-57; Tr. VIII:50). While at MIT, Ms. Guzman borrowed in excess of $ 100,000 from MIT. (See Tr. VII:186).

Candidates in a Ph.D. program at MIT have to pass a qualifying general examination before they are approved to start work on their Ph.D. thesis. (See id. at 156-57). It was undisputed that in 2000, Ms. Guzman began receiving official warnings that she had taken too long to take her general examination, although the reason for the delay was disputed. (See Tr. VII:155-60). Ms. Guzman eventually elected to take a medical leave of absence from MIT. (Tr. V:73-74). There was evidence in the record that during this period she was suffering from anxiety and depression that interfered with her...