Guzman v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.

460 P.3d 443

Wilber Ernesto MARTINEZ GUZMAN, Petitioner,

v. The SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF WASHOE; and the Honorable Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge, Respondents,andThe State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.

No. 79079

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED MARCH 26, 2020

John L. Arrascada, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Joseph W. Goodnight, Katheryn Hickman, and Gianna Verness, Chief Deputy Public Defenders, Washoe County, for Petitioner.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks, District Attorney, Marilee Cate, Appellate Deputy District Attorney, and Travis Lucia, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County; Mark Jackson, District Attorney, Douglas County, for Real Party in Interest.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, CADISH, J.:

In resolving this writ petition,¹ we consider the meaning of territorial jurisdiction under NRS 172.105, which is the statute that defines the authority of a grand jury to inquire into criminal offenses. The Washoe County grand jury indicted petitioner Wilber Martinez Guzman on ten counts. Four of the counts concerned offenses committed in Douglas County.² Martinez Guzman filed a motion to dismiss the four Douglas County counts, arguing that the Washoe County grand jury did not have the authority to return an indictment for offenses committed in Douglas County. The district court denied Martinez Guzman’s motion, finding that a grand jury’s authority to return an indictment under NRS 172.105 "extends statewide to all felony offenses." The district court based its denial on its interpretation of the statute’s language permitting the grand jury to "inquire into all public offenses triable in the district court or in a Justice Court, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which it is impaneled." NRS 172.105.

We hold that the district court incorrectly interpreted this language in denying Martinez Guzman’s motion to dismiss, as "territorial jurisdiction" of the district court does not extend statewide, thereby encompassing any offense committed within Nevada. Rather, we hold that "territorial jurisdiction" under NRS 172.105 is tied to our existing statutes governing the proper court where a criminal case may be pursued, and thus the statute empowers a grand jury to inquire into an offense so long as the district court that empaneled the grand jury may appropriately adjudicate the defendant’s guilt for that offense. We therefore grant the petition in part and vacate the district court’s order so that it may reconsider Martinez Guzman’s motion to dismiss. In doing so, the district court shall review the evidence presented to the Washoe County grand jury to determine whether there is a sufficient connection between the Douglas County offenses and Washoe County. To do so, the district court must determine whether venue would be proper in Washoe County for the Douglas County offenses. If so, then the Washoe County grand jury has the authority to inquire into the Douglas County offenses, and criminal proceedings may continue. If not, then the Washoe County grand jury does not have the authority to inquire into the Douglas County offenses, and the district court must grant Martinez Guzman’s motion to dismiss. We deny the petition to the extent that Martinez Guzman seeks a writ directing the district court to grant his motion to dismiss outright.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the charging documents, the following was alleged. On January 3, 2019, Martinez Guzman burglarized the home of Gerald and Sharon David in Washoe County. The following day, Martinez Guzman returned to the Davids’ home, stealing a revolver from an outbuilding located on the property. On or about January 9, Martinez Guzman entered the home of Constance Koontz located in Douglas County, fatally shot Koontz, and burglarized her home. Martinez Guzman used the revolver stolen from the Davids in the murder. On or about January 12, Martinez Guzman entered the home of Sophia Renken, also located in Douglas County, and fatally shot her with the same revolver. On or about January 15, Martinez Guzman returned to the Davids’ home, fatally shot the Davids, and further burglarized the property. Following Martinez Guzman’s arrest and subsequent interrogation, police discovered various firearms belonging to the Davids wrapped in a tarp and buried in the hills around Carson City. The State alleges that Martinez Guzman placed the stolen firearms in that location.

The Washoe County grand jury returned an indictment, which the Washoe and Douglas County District Attorneys jointly filed. The indictment charged Martinez Guzman with ten felony counts. Martinez Guzman filed a motion to dismiss the four counts alleging criminal offenses committed in Douglas County. He argued that the Washoe County grand jury lacked the "territorial jurisdiction" to return an indictment for offenses committed in Douglas County.³ Martinez Guzman relied on NRS 172.105, which provides that "[t]he grand jury may inquire into all public offenses triable in the district court or in a Justice Court, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which it is impaneled." Martinez Guzman argued that "territorial jurisdiction of the district court" is a limiting term that confines the grand jury’s authority to crimes allegedly committed within the boundaries of Washoe County.

After considering NRS 172.105 ’s legislative history, as well as other statutes, constitutional provisions, and caselaw, the district court denied the motion. It determined that "territorial jurisdiction" is an expansive term giving Nevada district courts "jurisdiction over felony offenses, not confined to the respective county or counties that are part of their district," and thus "the Second Judicial District Court’s territorial jurisdiction extends statewide to all felony offenses." The district court concluded that the Washoe County grand jury had the same statewide authority and thus could properly return an indictment on the Douglas County counts. Martinez Guzman filed the instant petition, requesting that this court order the district court to grant his motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

Standards for writ relief

A writ of mandamus is available "to compel the performance of an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office or where discretion has been manifestly abused or exercised arbitrarily or capriciously." Redeker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 520, 522 (2006), limited on other grounds by Hidalgo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 124 Nev. 330, 341, 184 P.3d 369, 377 (2008) ; see NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and issuance of such a writ is discretionary. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Generally, writ relief is not appropriate if the petitioner has "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law " NRS 34.170. While an appeal from the final judgment generally constitutes an adequate legal remedy precluding writ relief, Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004), we have exercised our discretion to intervene "under circumstances of urgency or strong necessity, or when an important issue of law needs clarification and sound judicial economy and administration favor the granting of the petition." State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002). This petition presents such a case because the meaning of territorial jurisdiction, and thus the scope of a grand jury’s authority, under NRS 172.105 is an important question of law that needs clarification. Additionally, under these pretrial circumstances, the interests of sound judicial economy and administration favor consideration of this petition.

Statutory interpretation of NRS 172.105

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 642, 218 P.3d 501, 506 (2009) ; see Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 40, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008) ("Even when raised in a writ petition, this court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo."). Statutory interpretation concerns determining legislative intent, and the starting point is the statute’s plain language. State v. Lucero , 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). When the meaning of the language is clear, the analysis ends, "[b]ut when ‘the statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations,’ the statute is ambiguous," and this court may then look to other tools such as legislative history, reason, and public policy to determine legislative intent. Id. (quoting State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004) ). The statute at issue here, NRS 172.105, defines the power of the grand jury. The statute states that "[t]he grand jury may inquire into all public offenses triable in the district court or in a Justice Court, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which it is impaneled." NRS 172.105 (emphasis added). Our criminal procedure statutes do not define the term "territorial jurisdiction." Moreover, both Martinez Guzman’s interpretation of the term, as providing a clear geographic limitation within which the crime must have occurred, as well the State’s interpretation, relying on the statewide jurisdiction of district judges under NRS 3.220, are plausible interpretations.

Since the meaning of the term is not clear but instead lends itself to more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to tools of statutory construction, including legislative history. Lucero , 127 Nev. at 95, 249 P.3d at 1228. During its 54th session, the Legislature adopted NRS 172.105 as part of an omnibus criminal procedure bill, Assembly Bill 81, which amended Nevada’s existing criminal procedure laws. See 1967 Nev. Stat., ch....