Gwendolynne v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 19-cv-3844-JMY

GWENDOLYNNE, S. THROUGH HER PARENTS JUDY S. and GEOFF S. OF WEST CHESTER, PA v. WEST CHESTER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT

19-cv-3844-JMY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM

Younge, J

This is an appeal from the due process decision of a Hearing Officer under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. ("IDEA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"). The issue that was before the Hearing Officer, and is now before this Court, is whether West Chester Area School District (hereinafter "School District" or "Defendant") met its obligations to the student, Gwendolynne, under the IDEA and Section 504. Specifically, Gwendolynne's parents, acting as Plaintiffs, contend that she was denied a free, appropriate public education when the School District determined that she was not eligible for special education services. Plaintiffs further contend that the School District violated its "Child Find" obligations by failing to evaluate Gwendolynne for a specific learning disability which, they contend, requires special educational services. The Parents further seek reimbursement for the costs of an independent educational evaluation and other costs that they incurred in relationship to Gwendolynne's education.

Pending before this Court are two cross-motions: (1) Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record ("Def. Mot.," ECF No. 13), and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record and Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. ("Plfs.' Mot.," ECF No. 19.) The Court will first provide an overview of the IDEA and Section 504. It will then discuss the applicable standard of review in administrative proceedings, and the procedural history of this case. The Court will then summarize the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Finally, the Court will analyze the merits of the parties' motions for judgment on the administrative record with a specific focus on allegations of error averred by the Plaintiffs in their Motion to Supplement the Record and Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Simply stated, Plaintiffs fail to make a persuasive argument to establish that the decision rendered by the Hearing Officer lacked support in the administrative record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant's motion and deny Plaintiffs' cross-motion thereby affirming the Hearing Officer's decision.¹

I. IDEA AND SECTION 504 OVERVIEW

A. IDEA

In 1975, Congress provided that it would make funds available for state special education programs on the condition that states implement policies assuring a "free appropriate public education" (commonly known as a "FAPE") for all their disabled children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 65 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Under the IDEA, a state receiving federal educational funding must provide children within that state a FAPE."). "Congress passed the law known today as the [IDEA] 'to assure that all children with disabilities have available to them . . . a [FAPE] which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs[.]'" Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)).

"A school district provides a FAPE by designing and implementing an individualized instructional program set forth in an Individualized Education Plan ('IEP'), which must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light ofthe student's intellectual potential." P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 729-30 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187-204 (1982). "Meaningful benefit" means that a student's program affords the student the opportunity for significant learning in light of his or her individual needs, not simply de minimis or minimal educational progress. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017); see also K.D. v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2018).

"An IEP is developed through collaboration between parents and school districts, and must include an assessment of the child's current education performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide." Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 405 F. Supp. 3d 620, 624- 25 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If "parents believe that the school district is not providing a FAPE for their child, they may unilaterally remove him [or her] from the school, enroll him [or her] in a different school, and seek tuition reimbursement for the cost of the alternative placement." Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).

The IDEA provides recourse in the form of an impartial administrative due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). "If either party is aggrieved by the findings and decision reached after such a hearing, the IDEA further allows that party to file a civil suit in state or federal court." S.D., 405 F. Supp. 3d at 625. "When parents challenge a school's provision of a FAPE to a child, a reviewing court must (1) consider whether the school district complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements, and (2) determine whether the educational program was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009).

B. Section 504

Section 504 also requires that Pennsylvania schools provide a free, appropriate public education to children with disabilities. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a). Specifically, under Section 504, recipients of federal funds must "provide a [FAPE] to each qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's handicap." Id.; see also A.B. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 440 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2020) ("As for Section 504, it and the IDEA do 'similar statutory work.'") (citing P.P., 585 F.3d at 735). In other words, Section 504 "is parallel to the IDEA in its protection of disabled students: it protects the rights of disabled children by prohibiting discrimination against students on the basis of disability[.]" P.P., 585 F.3d at 735; see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.4. A student with a disability who is otherwise qualified to participate in a school program, and was denied the benefits of the program or otherwise discriminated against, has been discriminated against in violation of Section 504. See S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F. 3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013). A student who claims discrimination in violation of the obligations of Section 504 must show deliberate indifference on the part of the school district. Id. at 263-64.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

In considering a challenge to an administrative decision on an IDEA claim, district courts employ a "modified de novo" standard of review. S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). Under this standard, "although the [d]istrict [c]ourt must make its own findings by a preponderance of the evidence," it "must also afford due weight to the [Hearing Officer's] determination." Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004); see also P.P., 585 F.3d at 734. Thus, courts are not free to "substitutetheir own notions of sound education policy for those of the educational agencies they review." Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 1995). Specifically,

factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct, and if a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why. In addition, if a state administrative agency has heard live testimony and has found the testimony of one witness to be more worthy of belief than the contradictory testimony of another witness, that determination is due special weight. [T]his means that a [d]istrict [c]ourt must accept the state agency's credibility determinations unless the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.

Shore Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d at 199.

Further, "claims for compensatory education and tuition reimbursement are subject to plenary review as conclusions of law . . . [W]hether the District fulfilled its FAPE obligations—[is] subject to clear error review as [a] question of fact." P.P., 585 F.3d at 735. The reviewing court should not, however, "substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of local school authorities. S.H, 336 F.3d at 270. Lastly, the burden of proof is on the party bringing the administrative complaint, a burden that continues on appeal. See L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005)).

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs felt that Gwendolynne was eligible for special education and made their first request for an evaluation in fall of 2015 when she enrolled in the School District for second grade. (Admin. Record, Ex. 7, S-4.) The School District denied this first request for an evaluation and Plaintiff took no action at that time. (Id.) In September of 2017, Plaintiff made a second request to have Gwendolynne evaluated to determine if she had a specific learning disability that required special educational services and accommodations. (Id.) In the fall of 2017, the School District assembled a team to conduct an evaluation. (Id. Ex 7, S-8 (Evaluation Report).) The School District team issued a written evaluation on November 14, 2017 that wassigned by School District psychologist Peggy Katsouros, Gwendolynne's fourth grade teacher, and Denise Kelly who was a School...