Gwyn v. Booker

ROBERT W. GWYN, JR., Plaintiff, v. B. W. BOOKER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:17-cv-00143

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

FILED: May 8, 2018

May 7, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

By: Hon. Michael F. Urbanski Chief United States District Judge

Robert W. Gwyn, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names four defendants associated with the Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC") and Green Rock Correctional Center ("GRCC"): Former GRCC Warden B. W. Booker; Current GRCC Warden Melvin Davis; GRCC Institutional Programs Manager ("IPM") R. Bateman; and VDOC Western Regional Administrator Marcus Elamlap. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated equal protection and religious rights by not approving a separate meeting at GRCC for inmates of the Apostolic faith only. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff responded, making the matter ripe for disposition.¹ After reviewing the record, the court grants Defendants' motion.

I.

A.

VDOC Operating Procedure ("OP") 841.3, Religious Services, governs inmates' access to religious group activities such as communal worship services or study groups. Included as Attachment 3 to OP 841.3 is a list of the recognized religions that may operate without further approval in VDOC facilities where inmate participation, facility resources, and religious leadership are available. However, the OP recognizes that "although each [inmate] has the right to worship in their chosen manner, levels of inmate participation and availability of facility resources and religious leaders do not permit separate services for every possible form of worship at every facility." Consequently, the OP requires five inmates be "the standard minimum number to establish, maintain[,] and hold group services, programs or meetings" for any religious group. However, the OP does not prevent informal religious discussions in leisure areas such as dayrooms or recreation yards as long that are not disruptive.

Inmate requests for a new religious group activity for an already-approved religious group are filed at the facility. "If there appears to be sufficient . . . interest, the Facility Unit Head, in consultation with the facility Chaplain, should consider the request and provide time and space for the group to meet within the restrictions of the facility security level, mission, space, time, available supervision, etc." The facility must balance inmates' religious rights with inmate movement, room capacity, staffing challenges and in-room supervision at certain security levels. No recognized religious group with the minimum number of adherents should be denied at least one service and one study session per week.

Protestants are a recognized religious group authorized to operate in VDOC facilities. The Protestant religious group encompasses the various Protestant Christian denominationsincluding, inter alia, Seventh Day Adventists and Pentecostals. The VDOC considers Plaintiff's Apostolic faith as a type of Pentecostal faith.

Two separate multi-denominational Protestant worship services had been held at GRCC in order to accommodate the large number of Protestant inmates. Effective March 11, 2017, GRCC added a third multi-denominational Protestant worship service, "Discipleship Study," which meets in the visitation room on Saturday evenings. Protestant inmates at GRCC may now choose to attend one of the three multi-denominational Protestant worship services in addition to Bible study.

B.

Plaintiff asserts four enumerated claims "in light of the Defendants' blatant violations of . . . OP 841.3 . . . ."² First, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff's Apostolic faith. Second, Defendants refused to provide space, time, and staff for an Apostolic group meeting. Third, Defendants negligently applied OP 841.3. Fourth, Defendants' negligence was the actual or proximate case of constitutional injury. Plaintiff relies solely on his various administrative remedies to support the claims.

On March 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint because Booker had previously refused Plaintiff's request for space and time for him to practice his faith. Booker refused the request two days later, citing the lack of space and time.

On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a regular grievance based on the allegations in the informal complaint. Bateman met with Plaintiff but did not satisfactorily resolve Plaintiff'sgrievance, and on April 4, 2016, Davis deemed the grievance unfounded. Davis noted that Bateman had informed Plaintiff that Protestant services are multi-denominational and that GRCC did not have space to divide out the various Protestant services out individually. Elamlap upheld Davis' decision on administrative review.

On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request form to the GRCC Chaplain asking whether the visitation room was available on Saturday or Sunday evenings. Plaintiff noted he wanted to have space and time reserved for an Apostolic Christian Faith Group to "peaceably assemble." The Chaplain responded that same day, noting he believed no meetings take place in the visitation room on Saturday or Sunday evenings.

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request form pursuant to OP 841.3 for an Apostolic group service and study session per week. Booker denied the request without elaboration on August 4, 2016.

Plaintiff learned that another VDOC Protestant - Pentecostal group, the Seven Day Adventists, were allowed to meet as a separate group although Plaintiff's request for an Apostolic group meeting had been denied. Plaintiff acknowledges that once the number of participants in the Seven Day Adventists meetings dropped below the minimum allowed, the group was no longer authorized to meet separately.

On January 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a request for a Christian Discipleship meeting for Saturday or Sunday evening. On February 15, 2017, the Chaplain responded that he still had not received the necessary number of requests to process the request. Nearly two weeks later on February 28, 2017, the Chaplain informed Plaintiff that the Discipleship Class was approved for meetings weekly starting on March 11, 2017.

II.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, the defense of qualified immunity. A party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, the disclosed materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those necessary to establish the elements of a party's cause of action. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if, in viewing admissible evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. The moving party has the burden of showing - "that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant satisfies this burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. Id. at 322-24. A party is entitled to summary judgment if the admissible evidence as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the non-movant. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). "Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff cannot use a response to a motion for summary judgment to amend or correct a complaint challenged by the motion for summary judgment.³ Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 336 (4th Cir. 2009).

A government official sued in an individual capacity via § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity. Cooper v. Sheehari, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). "The doctrine of qualified immunity 'balances two importantinterests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.'" Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The "qualified immunity analysis typically involves two inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff has established the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 881 (4th Cir. 2015); see In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 593 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n official may claim qualified immunity as long as his actions are not clearly established to be beyond the boundaries of his discretionary authority."). A "court may address these two questions in the order . . . that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case." Estate of Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 898 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff's claim "survives summary judgment, however, only if [the court] answer[s] both questions in the affirmative." Id.

III.

A.

An inmate's right to religious exercise under the First Amendment must be balanced with a prison's institutional needs of security, discipline, and general administration. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1987). A "substantial burden" on religious exercise occurs under the First Amendment if it "put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, or . . . forces a person to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one...