H.V. v. Vineland City Bd. of Educ.

1

H.V. and F.J., individually and on behalf of their minor child, A.T.V., Plaintiffs, v. VINELAND CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-20592-NLH-AMD

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

November 22, 2022

BRUCE H. ZAMOST HELMER CONLEY & KASSELMAN On behalf of Plaintiffs

JEFFREY L. SHANABERGER HILL WALLACK, LLP On behalf of Defendants

OPINION

NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF 5). For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' motion will be granted in part.

I. Background

Defendant Vineland City Board of Education (“BOE”) is the entity in charge of the operations of schools in Vineland New Jersey. (ECF 1-1 at ¶ 1). Defendant Mary Gruccio was superintendent of Vineland schools during the relevant period while Defendants Suzette Demarchi and John Provenzano served as principal and head of security, respectively, for Defendant Vineland High School (“VHS”). (Id. at ¶ 4). Defendants John Doe 1 through 20 are fictious names of individuals who served as security, teachers, or administrators at VHS. (Id.). Defendant A.R.^[1] was a freshman at VHS and John Doe 21 through 30 were fellow students. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4). Plaintiff A.T.V. was also a freshman student at VHS at the time in question and Plaintiffs H.V. and F.J. are her parents (collectively “Plaintiffs”), all of whom resided in Florida as of the institution of this action. (Id. at pg. 1, ¶ 3).

The instant action stems from a December 5, 2019 incident in which A.R. was allegedly permitted into VHS during school hours without vetting and thereafter followed A.T.V. up to an unlocked second-floor computer lab and sexually assaulted her. (Id. at ¶ 9). At the time immediately preceding and during the assault, a security station was located at VHS's entrance and cameras and monitors were utilized to track activities within the building. (Id. at ¶ 10).

Plaintiffs filed a six-count Amended Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey - Law Division in November 2021,^[2] alleging, among other causes of action, violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the United States and New Jersey constitutions, violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., negligence, and several intentional torts. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-43). Defendants BOE, VHS, Gruccio, Demarchi, and Provenzano (collectively “Vineland Defendants”) thereafter filed a notice of removal.^[3](ECF 1). The parties then stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice as to several of Plaintiffs' claims, including negligence based on vicarious liability for the actions of A.R. and John Doe 21 through 30; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims with respect to Gruccio, Demarchi, and Provenzano as individual Defendants; and H.V. and F.J.'s per quod claims, with the exception of medical expenses for A.T.V.'s treatment. (ECF 4 at 2-3).

Vineland Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims, (ECF 5; ECF 5-2 at 5), consisting of alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and Title IX as well as common-law negligence. Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief, (ECF 8), to which Vineland Defendants replied, (ECF 9).

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The Court possesses original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims stemming from 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and Title IX. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' common-law negligence claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may assert by motion a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,'” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 34142 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), and -accepting the plaintiff's factual assertions, but not legal conclusions, as true - “‘plausibly suggest[]' facts sufficient to ‘draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,'” id. at 342 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The sufficiency of a complaint is determined by “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

Courts considering motions to dismiss are “bound not to ‘go beyond the facts alleged in the Complaint and the documents on which the claims made therein [are] based.'” Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)). Though a motion to dismiss necessarily “deprives a plaintiff of the benefit of the court's adjudication of the merits of its claim before the court considers any evidence,” Sweda v. Univ. of Pa., 923 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 2019),“Rule 12(b)(6) is meant to allow those claims that are facially plausible to proceed, while not permitting expensive discovery to commence for claims that are merely ‘possible,'” Pickett v. Ocean-Monmouth Legal Servs., Inc., No. 11-6980, 2012 WL 254132, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2012) (citing Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)).

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C § 1983 Claim

The Court will first analyze Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, representing Count 3 of the Amended Complaint. To succeed in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff “must establish that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution.” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “Local governments, such as school districts, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of their employees. Instead, local governments may be found liable under § 1983 for ‘their own illegal acts.'” Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). A plaintiff must show that the government itself caused the constitutional violation through its policy or custom. Id. at 175.

Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not impose an affirmative duty upon the state to protect citizens from the acts of private individuals,” § 1983 actions centering on the sexual assault of a student by a fellow student are evaluated under the state-created danger doctrine. See Brown v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 456 Fed.Appx. 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Lockhart v. Willingboro High Sch., 170 F.Supp.3d 722, 731-32 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) (recognizing the state-created danger doctrine as an exception to the general rule that the Due Process Clause does not impose a duty to protect against harms caused by private actors).^[4] To assert a claim under the state-created danger doctrine, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the harm was “foreseeable and fairly direct,” (2) the “state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience,” (3) the plaintiff was not merely a member of the general public, but rather a relationship existed between the state and the plaintiff that made the plaintiff a foreseeable victim or a member of a discrete class of individuals subjected to the potential harm caused by the state's action, and (4) a state actor affirmatively used their authority in a way that created danger or made the plaintiff more vulnerable to danger than had the state actor not acted at all. Brown, 456 Fed.Appx. at 91 (citing Sanford, 456 F.3d at 304-05).

Here, Plaintiffs largely reiterate the Amended Complaint and assert that the Vineland Defendants were aware not of a threat of sexual assault specifically, but rather the danger caused by two students entering a school without any vetting. (ECF 8 at 14). School security was allegedly on notice of a dangerous condition by failing to vet and school officials were allegedly on actual notice of danger caused by the failure to follow vetting procedures. (Id. at 15). Discovery is necessary, according to Plaintiffs, to review policies and procedures, examine A.R.'s possible juvenile records, and determine whether similar incidents had taken place in the past. (Id. at 12-15). The Court holds that Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden in articulating facts sufficient to support a plausible § 1983 claim.

First, the Court cannot find that the harm of a sexual assault was foreseeable by a failure to vet and monitor students entering a school building. Cf. L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that common sense dictated that there was an inherent risk in releasing a kindergartener to an adult stranger). As noted by the Plaintiffs, school was in session at the time A.R. and A.T.V., both of high school age, entered the building, logically decreasing suspicion. In Lockhart, a case in which the defendants were allegedly on notice of a previous sexual assault committed against the plaintiff, the court concluded that “no reasonable inference may be drawn that Defendants were aware of a high likelihood that allowing [the plaintiff] momentarily to enter a classroom unsupervised to retrieve her belongings would have led to her being sexually assaulted.” 170 F.Supp.3d at 732.

Second the Court does not find that Vineland Defendants' behavior shocks the conscience. The Third Circuit has noted that the level of culpability required to shock the conscience depends on the...