Haas v. Saul

Matthew Adam HAAS, Plaintiff, v. Andrew SAUL, Defendant.

Case No.: 19-CV-02189-BGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 17, 2021

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 17];

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 20]; AND

(3) REMANDING FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff Matthew Adam Haas ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's ("Commissioner" or "Defendant") denial of his disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1.)¹ On March 9, 2020, the Commissioner filed the Administrative Record. (ECF No. 13.) On May 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking reversal of the final decision denying benefits and a remand for further administrative proceedings. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff argues the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") committed reversible error in rejecting the treating physician's opinion, rejecting Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony, and failing to properly support his residual functional capacity determination with substantial evidence. (Id.) On June 12, 2020, the Commissioner filed his Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. (ECF No. 20.) The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly rejected the treating physician's opinion, properly rejected Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and properly supported his residual functional capacity determination with substantial evidence. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Reply on June 25, 2020. (ECF No. 21.)

After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the administrative record and the applicable law and for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, the Commissioner's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on June 9, 2015, with an alleged onset date of March 23, 2015. (AR 126, 133-34.) Plaintiff's application was denied, (AR 146-49) and his subsequent request for reconsideration was also denied (AR 157-61). At Plaintiff's request, a hearing before an ALJ was held on March 15, 2018 at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel andtestified, along with a Medical and Vocational Expert. (AR 63-124 [hearing transcript]; 162-65 [request for hearing].) On August 24, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denied Plaintiff's application for benefits. (AR 20-38.) The Appeals Council denied review on March 8, 2019. (AR 9-13.)

III. SUMMARY OF FIVE STEPS

The ALJ's decision explains and then goes through each potentially dispositive step of the familiar five-step evaluation process for determining whether an individual has established eligibility for disability benefits.² (AR 23-37); see Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of his alleged onset date of March 23, 2015 through the date of last insured on September 30, 2017. (AR 25-26.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had "generalized anxiety disorder with panic disorder [. . .], depression, not otherwise specified; [. . .] and history of alcohol dependence and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) abuse [. . .] as medically determinable impairments that significantly limit the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities[.]" (AR 26-28.) At step three the ALJ considers whether the claimant's impairments "meet or equal" one or more of the specific impairments or combination of impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the listings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not meet a listing. (AR 28-30.)

If the claimant does not meet a listing, the ALJ "assess[es] and makes a finding about [the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant's] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is the "maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(c). The RFC is used at the fourth and fifth steps to determine whether the claimant can do their past work (step four) or adjust to other available work (step five). Id.

Here, the ALJ found the following RFC for Plaintiff:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he is limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions for simple repetitive tasks with no interaction with the general public, occasional interaction with coworkers, no teamwork, and no production-based or quota-based performance.

(AR 31.)

As discussed more fully below, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's RFC finding. Plaintiff argues that in arriving at this RFC, the ALJ erred in rejecting his treating physician's opinion that found he was more limited than this RFC, rejecting his testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms, and not fully including or rejecting the state consultant's opinion into his RFC determination. (ECF No. 17 at 10-14 ("[T]he ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Watkins' opinion, because he failed to set forth and specific, legitimate reasons for discounting his opined limitations. Dr. Watkins' opinion is supported by his regular assessments of Plaintiff's functional status and mental status evaluation findings throughout the relevant period, and is consistent with the longitudinal treatment notes. His opinion was therefore entitled to deference"), 14-20 ("[T]he ALJ committed prejudicial error by failing to develop the record and obtain treatment notes for the portion of the relevant period form February 2016 through the Plaintiff's date last insured[.] [Further,]the ALJ failed to identify any clear and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective complaints [and] rejected Plaintiff's subjective complaints based upon isolated pieces of the records, and failed to consider the context of Plaintiff's treatment records as a whole"), 20-21 ("[T]he ALJ failed to support [his residual functional capacity determination] with substantial evidence in the record, and failed to explain why evidence of greater limitations was rejected").) Defendant maintains that the ALJ properly weighed the treating physician's opinion, while providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in discounting additional limitations; that the ALJ properly found that the record did not adequately support Plaintiff's allegations of disabling limitations; and that the ALJ properly accounted for Dr. Thibodeau's opinion in Plaintiff's RFC. (See ECF No. 20 at 3-6, 7-11, 12-13.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not do his past relevant work as a payroll bill specialist. (AR 36.) At step five, the ALJ considers whether the claimant can do other work, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and the limitations in the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); see also (AR 37). If the claimant can do other available work, then the claimant is found not disabled; but if the claimant cannot do any other available work, then the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g); see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ heard and relied on a vocational expert's testimony that opined that work existed in significant numbers in the national economy for a person of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and with the RFC found by the ALJ. (AR 38, 110-111, 113-18.)

IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner's decision. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5). The matter may also be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

If the Court determines that the ALJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence or are based on legal error, the Court may reject the findings and set aside the decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court "must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court may "review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). "When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ." Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in three respects: (1) rejecting the treating physician's opinion (ECF No. 17 at 10-14); (2) failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints (Id. at 14-20); and (3) failing to properly support his residual functional capacity determination with substantial evidence (Id. at 20-21).

A. Rejection of the Treating Physician's Opinion

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff's treating physician's opinion, that of...