Habayeb v. Butler, Civil No. 15-5107

EDWARD HABAYEB Plaintiff, v. CORPORAL SHAUN BUTLER, et. al., Defendants.

Civil No. 15-5107

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 29, 2016

Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez

Opinion

This matter comes before the Court on Motion of the Defendants Chief Rodney Sawyer and Mantua Township for Judgment on the Pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (c). The Court has considered the written submissions of the parties, without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, Defendants Chief Rodney Sawyer's ("Sawyer") and Mantua Township's ("Mantua") motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend his Complaint consistent with this Opinion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Edward Hayabeb ("Hayabeb") was arrested by Mantua police officers on July 5, 2013 and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of N.J.S.A. 38:4-50, reckless driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, failure to give a proper turn signal, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, and failure to maintain a lane, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88b. A naturalized citizen of Palestinian descent, Hayabeb claims he was stopped by police after he diverted his car from road debris and wayward trashcans, causing him to navigate over the double yellow traffic line. Compl. ¶ 10. At some point during the stop, Hayabeb was in the presence of three Mantua police officers, who despite acknowledging the lack of alcohol odor, proceeded to conduct a field sobriety test. Id. at¶¶ 11-13, 15. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Shield was not properly trained to administer the field tests and that he was subjected to heightened scrutiny because one of the police officers declared that Hayabeb's drivers' license looked fake. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff was taken to the Mantua Police Department where he performed several sobriety tests. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21.

Plaintiff claims he had trouble reciting the "reverse alphabet" because English is not his native language. Id. at ¶ 22. Likewise, the "finger to the nose" test was challenging because Plaintiff had difficulty reading the written instructions. Id. Plaintiff claims that Officer Shield administered the first tests, but that the other officers had to intervene at various pointsto explain the tests and to retest. Id. at ¶ 22. Eventually, Defendant Hauss administered a breathalyzer test; the result was 0.00%. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff claims that on July 5, 2013, he was only charged with failure to give a proper signal and failure to maintain a lane. Id. at ¶24.

Afterwards, out of a concern for his alleged mistreatment, he made an appointment with Chief Sawyer for July 8, 2013. That meeting was cancelled and Plaintiff claims he was issued two more citations for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and for reckless driving. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff's proof of the ex post facto charges comes in the form of post marked envelopes, dated July 9, 2013 and received by Plaintiff on July 10, 2013, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff claims that the charges for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, reckless driving, and failure to give a proper signal were all dismissed voluntarily by Mantua. Id. at ¶ 27.

Hayabeb brings several causes of action against the Defendants, including false arrest, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and claims pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-64 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The claims are inartfully plead and each count is titled as against "all defendants" withoutan specification as to the individualized attachment of liability: Count I Malicious Prosecution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; Count II Equal Protection, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985; Count III Violation of the Fourth Amendment/Search and Seizure, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; Count IV False Arrest; Count V Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count VI Deliberate Indifference/ Gross Negligence, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; Count VII Harm, pursuant to the Restatement Second of Torts §870; Count VII Failure to Train, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; and Count IX Conspiracy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1985.

At issue here are the claims against Defendants Sawyer and Mantua. Sawyer and Mantua seeks judgment on the pleadings as to the claims plead under 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability (Counts I, II, III, VI and VII), the Monell claims (Counts II and VIII) and the conspiracy claim (Count IX) because such claims are insufficiently plead, and the intentional tort claims (Counts V and VII) as barred by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A., 52:2-10.

II. Standard on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. The movant under Rule 12(c) must showclearly that no material issue of fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rosenau v. Uniford Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 29091 (3d Cir. 1988)). A motion under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Turbe v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While a court must accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), a court is not required to accept sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, unwarranted inferences, or unsupported conclusions. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The complaint must state sufficient facts to show that the legal allegations are not simply possible, but plausible. Phillips, 515F.3d at 234. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

III. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim Against Mantua

In Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94, the Supreme Court stated that a municipality could not be held liable under Section 1983 pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior. Municipalities are only held responsible "for their own illegal acts." Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)).

A. 42 U.S.C.1983

Plaintiff's Constitutional claims are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language makes clear, Section 1983 is a remedial statute designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 "does not ... create substantive rights." Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n. 3).

To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a "deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate two essential elements to maintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a "right or privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States" and (2) that plaintiff was deprived of her rights by a person acting under the color of state law.Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989).

B. Municipal Liability

Mantua a municipality. A municipality is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. 691. However, a government entity may be liable for its agent's actions upon a demonstration that a policy or custom of the municipality caused, or was a "moving force" behind, the alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981)); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to prevail against the government entity, "[a] plaintiff must identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered." Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). Further, a plaintiff must show that the municipality acted with ...