Hackett v. Jones

1

PATRICK M. HACKETT, Petitioner, v. GERARD JONES, Superintendent of Cayuga Correctional Facility, Respondent.

No. 1:19-CV-00901 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York

January 18, 2024

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Patrick M. Hackett (“Petitioner”) has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. 1). Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the judgment entered against him on November 13, 2014, in Genesee County Court of New York State (Moran, J.), following a jury verdict convicting him of third-degree rape (New York Penal Law (“P.L.”) § 130.25(2)). (Id. at 1).^[1] For the reasons below, the request for a writ of habeas corpus is denied, and the petition is dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Indictment

On October 18, 2013, a Genesee County grand jury returned indictment number 5653 charging Petitioner with one count of third-degree rape, a class E felony, in violation - of P.L. § 130.25(2) (sexual intercourse between a defendant who is 21 years old or more and a victim who is less than 17 years old). The charge was based on allegations that on April 15, 2013, Petitioner, who was 44 years old at the time, had sexual intercourse with H.O., who was then 15 years old. (SR: 45-46).^[2]

B. Pre-Trial Proceedings

Respondent indicates that Petitioner was arraigned on October 24, 2013,^[3] at which time defense counsel requested an extension of time to file motions. (Dkt. 16 at 2). The trial court's clerk indicated that defense motions would be due on December 9, 2013; the prosecution's response would be due on December 16, 2013; and oral argument would be held on January 3, 2014. (Id.).

Defense counsel filed an omnibus motion on November 22, 2013, seeking, among other things, discovery pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“C.P.L.”) Article 240^[4] and disclosure of information within the ambit of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (SR: 50-68). In response, the prosecution argued that Petitioner failed to make a timely demand to produce pursuant to C.P.L. § 240.80(1)^[5] and therefore was not entitled - to court-ordered discovery pursuant to C.P.L. § 240.40(1)(a).^[6] (SR: 69). Nevertheless, the prosecution provided the defense with the following items of discovery: Petitioner's Division of Criminal Justice Services printout; the search warrant, search warrant application and search warrant return; two Genesee County Sheriff's Office evidence/property records; and photos of text messages. (SR: 70). The prosecution indicated that it was not aware of, or in possession of, any Brady material. (Id.).

In papers dated January 16, 2014, defense counsel moved for supplemental discovery, a Sandoval hearing, and to suppress physical evidence. (SR: 77-82). Defense counsel conceded that his motion for discovery was untimely under former C.P.L. § 240.80(1) but noted that the prosecution voluntarily had provided him with “various materials related to the requests for discovery and inspection.” (SR: 79). Defense counsel requested that the prosecution be compelled “to provide, as requested in the original [o]mnibus [m]otion, complete copies of all search warrants, together with all supporting affidavits and any other documents in support of any warrants which resulted in the seizure of property in this case.” (SR: 80).

In particular, defense counsel requested (1) “a complete list and/or photographs of all messages reviewed as a result of the search warrant;” and (2) “what purports to be a report from the Batavia Police Department 13-4659, which is referenced in the application of said warrant” but was not “provided with the voluntary discovery material.” (SR: 81). Defense counsel was referring to search warrant applications for Petitioner's journal and text messages from his cell phone, respectively. (SR: 85, 91). In the warrant applications, Genesee County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Erion (“Deputy Erion”) stated:

On April 15[], 2013 City of Batavia Police Department, Officer A.C. Perkins took a report of a missing 15[-]year[-]old female, who left her mother's care and supervision without permission on 04-14-2013, and went to an unknown location. See attached report from Batavia Police Department 13-4659.

(SR: 85; see also SR: 91 (same)).

The trial court issued a decision and order dated February 20, 2014, resolving the various outstanding requests by the defense. (SR: 128-30). In relevant part, the trial court stated:

The People represent that they have responded to defendant's demand for discovery to the limited extent required by [former] CPL § 240.20; and deny possession of any further information or materials for which disclosure is required on demand. It cannot be concluded from the defendant's papers that the People have made an untimely or unjustifiable refusal to disclose any demanded materials, or that good cause exists for additional discretionary discovery ([former] CPL § 240.40(1)). ...

The People submit that they are unaware of any items which would constitute Brady material (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83), and defendant's papers reveal no basis to believe that there exists any exculpatory information, of the types specifically demanded, for which disclosure is required. The People are reminded of their continuing duty to disclose any such material as it comes into their possession. Beyond that, defendant's motion is granted only to the extent that the People otherwise would be required to make a unilateral disclosure, based upon the substantial exculpatory character of the information.

(SR: 129-30 (citation omitted)).

On April 1, 2014, defense counsel filed a motion to controvert the search warrants (SR: 131-37), which the prosecutor opposed (SR: 147). In a decision and order dated May 13, 2014, the trial court granted suppression of Petitioner's journal. (SR: 149). The trial court denied the motion to suppress what it referred to as the “photo warrant,” finding that H.O.'s supporting deposition (SR: 145-46) “provided reasonable cause to believe that photographs of the scene would verify and confirm her description of premises to which she would not ordinarily be privy, and thereby ‘tend[] to demonstrate that an offense was committed' at that location.” (SR: 150 (brackets in original)).

On June 30, 2014, defense counsel moved to suppress the text messages, arguing that prior to the issuance of the search warrant, the police conducted an illegal search and seizure of Petitioner's cell phone and used the fruits of that search in their application for the warrant. (SR: 153-55). Defense counsel relied on a recent Supreme Court decision, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), decided five days earlier. (SR: 153). The trial court denied the motion. (SR: 165-66). The trial court found that since Petitioner had not previously moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone, the motion was not a proper motion to reargue or renew but rather was “a (second) supplemental motion for suppression, contrary to the single motion rule of CPL § 255.20(2).” (Id.). The trial court further determined to the extent Deputy Erion obtained a warrant before searching Petitioner's cell phone, “it cannot be concluded that the United States Supreme Court's Decision in Riley v. California, requiring same, provides good cause for the supplemental motion.” (SR: 166). Alternatively, the trial court held that even assuming Deputy Erion's “preliminary calls to [Petitioner]'s seized cell phone, which were essentially confirmatory in nature, constituted unwarranted searches which must be disregarded in determining probable cause, the balance of the information provided in the search warrant application established probable cause....” (Id.). Therefore, the trial court held that suppression of the text messages was not required.

C. Trial

1. Prosecution's Case

H.O. testified that she was in foster care in April 2013, and was 15 years old at the time. (TT: 212-13).^[7] She met Petitioner through her biological mother, H.F., at a laundromat in Batavia. (TT: 213-14). She described Petitioner as just an acquaintance and said Petitioner and her mother were “friendly.” (TT: 214-15).

On the weekend of April 13-14, 2013, H.O. was having scheduled visitation at H.F.'s house; she was supposed to go back to foster care on Sunday, April 14, 2013. (TT: - 215). However, H.O. did not want to go back to her foster mother's house. (TT: 215-16). Using H.F.'s cell phone, H.O. texted numerous people in an effort to find a place to stay. (TT: 216-17). She was unsuccessful until she tried texting Petitioner, who said she could stay with him. (TT: 217-18). Petitioner lived in a second-floor apartment on Main Street in East Pembroke; H.O. had never been there before. (TT: 218-19).

H.O. got a ride from a friend to Petitioner's apartment. Once she arrived, they talked for a while and watched a movie. (TT: 219). Petitioner gave her some cans of beer to drink. (TT: 220). After the movie, Petitioner asked H.O. if she wanted a hug before going to bed; H.O. declined. (TT: 220-21). Petitioner went to his bedroom, and H.O. went to bed on the pullout couch. (TT: 220). H.O. slept in the clothes she had been wearing that day (sweater, jeans, bra, and underwear). (TT: 221).

Just as H.O. was dozing off, Petitioner came out of his room, sat down next to her, and said, “This isn't right.” (Id.). When H.O. asked what he meant, Petitioner replied that “if [she] was at his house that [she] had to have sex with him.” (TT: 221-22). At first, H.O. thought he “was joking” but he then said, more than once, “I'm waiting. I'm serious.” (TT: 222). Petitioner also said that if she did not have sex with him, he would “kick [her] out.” (TT: 222-23).

H.O “eventually gave in” to Petitioner's...