Hackworth v. Arevalos

ROBERT HACKWORTH, Plaintiff, v. E. AREVALOS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-01362-ADA-CDB (PC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

December 30, 2022

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME NUNC PRO TUNC AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ADVANCE THE CASE (DOCS. 81, 85) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANTS BRAINARD AND STOHL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (DOC. 63) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY DEFENDANT AREVALOS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 77) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT (DOC. 79) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Robert Hackworth is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on First and Eighth Amendment claims raised against Defendants Arevalos, Brainard, and Stohl in Plaintiff's second amended complaint. (See Docs. 20, 26.) Defendants Brainard and Stohl (“Defendants”) have filed a motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this action. (Doc. 63.) Defendant Arevalos (“Defendant”) has filed a motion on the merits and asserting qualified immunity. (Doc. 77.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. (Doc 79.) These motions have been submitted on the record without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

For the following reasons, Court recommends that Defendant Brainard and Stohl's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 63) be granted; Defendant Arevalos's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 77) be denied; and Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Doc. 79) be denied.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party's assertion that a fact is disputed or cannot be disputed must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). The court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco UnifiedSch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying standard to § 1983 claim).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party may accomplish this by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Id. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim that must be proven at trial. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). “[C]omplete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

If the moving party meets this initial showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (citing Rule 56(e)); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. This requires Plaintiff to show more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The non-moving party cannot simply rely on the pleadings and conclusory allegations in an affidavit. Lujan v. Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Instead, the opposing party is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). In attempting to show a factual dispute, the opposing party need not prove a material fact conclusively in her favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T. W. Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting FirstNat'lBank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view any inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)). While prisoners are relieved from strict compliance, they still must “identify or submit some competent evidence” to support their claims. Soto, 882 F.3d at 872. Plaintiff's verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if based on personal knowledge and specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff's claims arose during his incarceration at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran, California. On March 1, 2018, Plaintiff was involved in a verbal altercation with CO Arevalos regarding a missing package, during which Plaintiff threatened to “602 your fat ass.” CO Arevalos allegedly responded, “Ok, I got something for you. Just wait” and “we see who has the last word.” (Doc. 63-4 at 12.) Later that day, CO Arevalos issued a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for indecent exposure, accusing Plaintiff of masturbating while looking at her. (Id.)

Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell in the program office, where Sgt. J. Brainard informed him of the RVR. Plaintiff responded that CO Arevalos lied and only said that because Plaintiff threatened to file a grievance against her. Sgt. Brainard claimed that Plaintiff admitted to the charge, saying, “[l]et a man be a man,” which Plaintiff denies. Plaintiff was then interviewed by Lt. Stohl; Plaintiff again denied the charge and said that CO Arevalos issued the RVR in retaliation for threatening to file a grievance against her. Lt. Stohl stated that other officers witnessed the incident and then placed Plaintiff in “the hole” (the Administrative Segregation Unit, or “ad-seg”) and referred the incident to the district attorney. Plaintiff states was cleared of the charge by Lt. Stohl on May 10, 2018.^[1]

On March 13, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred from SATF to California State Prison in Corcoran and required to participate in the illegal sex offender program (“IEX”). (Doc. 20 at 35). On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred back to SATF. (Id. at 56.)

On November 14, 2018, Plaintiff was attacked by two inmates, allegedly because CO Arevalos and Sgt. Brainerd told them about Plaintiff's masturbation charge and alleged “let a man be a man” statement. Plaintiff suffered a cut on the neck, a broken nose, and black eyes.

III. BRAINARD AND STOHL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants Brainard and Stohl filed a motion for summary judgment based on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, supported by the declaration of G. Lujan, Correctional Counselor II (“CC”) and Appeals Coordinator at SATF. (Docs. 63, 63-4.) According to CC Lujan, Plaintiff's appeal records at SATF reflect that Appeal 18-01390 was the only inmate grievance Plaintiff submitted concerning CO Arevalos's conduct raised in this action. (Lujan Decl., Doc. 63-4 at ¶ 8.) In this grievance, Plaintiff alleged that CO Arevalos issued a false RVR against him as retaliation for his threatening to file a 602 and to get other inmates to attack Plaintiff. (Id. at 10, Ex. B.)

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgement, to which Defendants filed a reply. (Docs. 65, 69.) The Court concludes that, because the grievance did not identify Defendants Brainard or Stohl, the claims against them were not exhausted at the administrative level and must be dismissed.

A. Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, and a prisoner may not file a complaint raising unexhausted claims. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies for the claims contained within his complaint before that complaint is tendered to the district court.”). The Ninth Circuit has “made clear that ‘ [e]xhaustion requirements apply based on when a plaintiff files the operative complaint, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Saddozai v. Davis, 35 F.4th 705, 708 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2017)). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits relating to prison life, Porter...