Hague v. Kent Cnty.

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JANNAH HAGUE, Plaintiff, v. KENT COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:24-cv-9

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

September 9, 2024

OPINION

HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Jannah Hague brings this civil rights action against Kent County, the Kent County Sheriff's Office, and Kent County Sheriff Michelle LaJoye-Young. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 10). For the reasons herein, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

According to the complaint, Hague and her husband were arrested on April 8, 2023, and taken to Kenty County Jail for processing. (Compl. ¶¶ 52-53, ECF No. 1.) Hague wears a hijab, i.e., a headscarf that covers her hair, ears, and neck, in accordance with her Muslim faith. (Id. ¶ 16.) In observance of her religious beliefs, she wears it whenever she is in the presence of men who are not part of her immediate family. (Id. ¶ 17.) Her faith dictates that men outside her immediate family should not see her uncovered hair, head, or neck. (Id. ¶ 19.)

At the time of her arrest, the Kent County Sheriff's Office had a policy (enacted in April 2022) requiring detainees wearing religious head coverings to remove them for the purpose of having their booking photograph taken. (Id. ¶ 21.) The sheriff's office would take two photographs: one of the individual wearing the head covering and one without the head covering. (Id. ¶ 22.) The image with the head covering would be released to the public via the sheriff's public detainee website. The image without the head covering would be held by the Kent County Sheriff's Office and uploaded to the Michigan State Police (“MSP”) database where it would become a “public record” viewable by any MSP employee with access to the database. (Id. ¶ 25.) The image could also be disclosed to a member of the public pursuant to a FOIA request or to other law enforcement agencies. The policy also allowed multiple officers to be present when the booking photographs were being taken, and it allowed officers to force the detainee to remove their head covering for the photograph. (Id.)

At the jail, officers told Hague that she had to remove her hijab for a booking photograph and that she had no choice in the matter, even though the officers were aware that she was wearing it for religious reasons. (Id. ¶ 54.) Hague complied with the request to remove her hijab while two male officers were allegedly present in the same room. (Id. ¶ 56.) An officer took two booking photographs of Hague, one with her wearing her hijab and one without.

The Kent County Sheriff's Office subsequently published the photograph of Hague without her hijab on its publicly accessible website. (Id. ¶ 58.) In addition, that photograph was uploaded to the MSP database, where it allegedly remains. (Id. ¶ 49.)

Hague was later released without charge. She contends that requiring her to remove her hijab in the presence of men who were not part of her immediate family, and then disseminating the photograph of her without the hijab to the public and to the MSP database, violated her religious beliefs and her right to the free exercise of her religion.

B. Plaintiff's Claims

Based on the foregoing allegations, Hague asserts six enumerated causes of action in her complaint, which the Court will refer to as Counts I to VI. In Count I, she contends that Defendants violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., by imposing a substantial burden on her right to exercise her religion.

In Count II, she pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that Defendants violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of her religion.

In Count III, she contends that Defendants denied her the right to exercise her religion, in violation of Article 1, Section 4 of the Michigan Constitution.

In Count IV, she seeks declaratory relief against the sheriff's office, the county, and Defendant LaJoye-Young in her official capacity. In particular, Hague seeks a declaration that Defendants “infringed upon and substantially burdened [her] religious free exercise and continue to substantially burden the religious free exercise of other, similarly-situated Muslim women and religious adherents in violation of federal and state law and the United States Constitution.” (Compl. ¶ 109.)

Count V asserts a claim for “gross negligence” against the sheriff's office, the county, and Defendant LaJoye-Young in her official capacity. (Id. at 25.)

Count VI, asserts that Defendants acted with recklessness or deliberate indifference by practicing or permitting policies that resulted in the violation of Hague's constitutional rights.

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A plaintiff's complaint must make a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The statement must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “[t]he plausibility standard . . . is not akin to a probability requirement . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility” that the alleged misconduct occurred. Id. “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017). The Court need not accept “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or “formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Courts are generally bound to consider only the complaint when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the Court converts the motion to one for summary judgment. Wysocki v. IBM Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010). “However, a court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion depends on the nature of the “attack” on subject matter jurisdiction. A “facial attack” on subject matter jurisdiction “merely questions the sufficiency of the [complaint].” Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks are reviewed under the same standard as applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: the Court accepts the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true and asks whether subject matter jurisdiction exists based on the complaint. Id. No presumption of truth applies in a “factual attack” on subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

Factual attacks challenge the existence of jurisdiction based on facts outside the pleadings. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). To resolve a factual attack, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case....[T]he existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id. (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1977)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof of jurisdiction when a factual attack is made. Id. And the Court has “broad discretion with respect to what evidence to consider in deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists[.]” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standing for Injunctive / Declaratory Relief

Defendants argue that Hague lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief. “Standing ensures that the plaintiff has a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' at the outset of litigation.” Williams v. City of Cleveland, 907 F.3d 924, 933 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). “Importantly, plaintiffs must establish standing for each form of relief they seek, and the type of harm alleged impacts the available relief.” Simpson-Vlach v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 22-1724, 2023 WL 3347497, at *4 (6th Cir. May 10, 2023). The requirements necessary to obtain standing for damages relief are different from those necessary to obtain standing for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Past harm allows a plaintiff to seek damages, but it does not entitle a plaintiff to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. This is because the fact that a harm occurred in the past “does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that” it will occur in the future, as is required for injunctive relief. Obtaining standing for declaratory relief has the same requirements as obtaining standing for injunctive relief. Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983) (internal citation omitted)). To obtain standing for declaratory or injunctive...