Haisley v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs. Inc.

BEVERLY A. HAISLEY Plaintiff,

v. SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.,and the PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 08-1463

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: September 29, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTI, District Judge.

I. Introduction

On March 2, 2011, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion (ECF No. 112) granting in part the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff Beverly A. Haisley ("plaintiff or "Haisley"). The court entered judgment against defendants Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. ("Sedgwick"), PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. ("PNC"), and the PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., Long Term Disability Plan (the "Plan," together with Sedgwick and PNC, "defendants") with respect to plaintiff's claims alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. Pending before the court is plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and interest ("Motion") (ECF No. 115). Plaintiff requests the court, pursuant to ERISA, to award her attorneys' fees in the amount of$171,250.00, costs in the amount of $3,381.63, and interest in the amount of $6,228.29, plus an additional $4,360.00 in attorneys' fees for time spent replying to defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. (Pl.'s Reply (ECF No. 121) at 9.) After considering the Motion, the briefs, and the exhibits submitted by the parties, the court will grant the Motion in part and deny it in part. For the reasons that follow, the court will award plaintiff attorneys' fees, costs and interest in the aggregate amount of $128,159.92. This award reflects the exclusion of the hours the court concludes were not reasonably expended, or were clerical in nature, and one-hundred percent of the interest and reasonable costs.

II. Procedural History

On October 16, 2008, Haisley filed a complaint seeking two remedies: 1) an order requiring defendants to pay long term disability ("LTD") benefits owed to her under the terms of the Plan commencing on October 3, 2007, and ending October 2, 2009; and 2) a declaration clarifying her entitlement to future benefits under the Plan. On January 16, 2009, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court denied without prejudice on June 23, 2009. On July 1, 2009, the court ordered the case be referred to mediation. On August 13, 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions against defendants for failure to comply with ADR policies and procedures. On August 27, 2009, the court granted the motion for sanctions against defendants and ordered defendants to pay the full cost of mediation. On November 18, 2009, defendants filed a motion to compel discovery, which was denied on December 8, 2009. On January 29, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to augment the record to include Dr. White's "missing" letter and on May 24, 2010, the court ruled that plaintiff was permitted to make argument with respect to the letter in moving for summary judgment.

On July, 7, 2010, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On March 2, 2011, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in part, denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for determination whether plaintiff was entitled to benefits after October 2, 2009. On March 16, 2011, plaintiff filed the Motion currently before the court.¹

III. Background

Haisley argues that in order to seek attorneys' fees she must show she achieved some degree of success on the merits of her claim and that the fees requested are reasonable. Plaintiff is seeking an aggregate award of $171,250.00 for attorneys' fees, including $141,200.00 for fees submitted by Tybe A. Brett ("Attorney Brett"), with respect to 358.3 hours of work at an hourly rate of $400.00; $1,300.00 for fees submitted by Attorney Brett for 6.5 hours of travel time at an hourly rate of $200; $26,250 for fees submitted for the work of Janice M. Pintar ("Attorney Pintar"), with respect to 96.4 hours of work at an hourly rate of $300.00. (Pl.'s Mot. (ECF No. 115) at 12.) Plaintiff requests $2,500.00 in fees for 22.25 hours submitted by Stember, Feinstein, Doyle & Payne, LLC for work completed by paralegals and law clerks at an hourly rate of $125.00. (Id.) Plaintiff is seeking an award for costs in the amount of $3,381.63, interest in the amount of $6,228.29, and $4,360.00 in fees with respect to 10.9 hours of work performed by her counsel at an hourly rate of $400.00 regarding plaintiff's reply to defendants' opposition memorandum. (Pl.'s Reply (ECF No. 121) at 8.)

Haisley argues that she is a prevailing party for the purpose of receiving attorneys' fees because the court granted summary judgment in her favor. Plaintiff notes that the court denieddefendants' motion for summary judgment, ordered the Plan to pay LTD benefits owed to her from October 3, 2007, to October 2, 2009, and remanded the case for defendants to determine whether she is entitled to benefits after October 2, 2009. Plaintiff argues that her attorneys' fees are reasonable because considerable time was spent preparing for and litigating this case. Plaintiff contends that counsel for defendants "aggressively" defended this case and the hours worked by her attorneys were necessary in order to litigate successfully her claim. (Pl.'s Mot. (ECF No. 115) at 12.)

To meet her burden of proving that her request for attorneys' fees, costs, and interest was reasonable, plaintiff submitted affidavits from her attorneys swearing to the hours worked and the rates charged. (Pl.'s Mot. (ECF No. 115), Exs. 1, 2.) Additionally, plaintiff submitted affidavits from four attorneys practicing in the area of employment litigation swearing to the market rate attorneys in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania charge for similar legal services. (Id., Exs. 3-6.) Plaintiff argues that unless defendants object to the requested rates and amount of time spent with sufficient specificity, the court must rely upon the record when awarding attorneys' fees.

Defendants oppose the Motion on several grounds. First, defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to any award of attorneys' fees. In support, defendants' argue that there is no presumption that a successful litigant in an ERISA suit should receive an award of attorneys' fees. Defendants contend plaintiff's Motion fails to meet her burden to advance beyond this threshold requirement. Second, defendants argue that, if the court decides to award attorneys' fees, the court should reduce the amount of fees recoverable and reduce the hourly rates to $250.00 for partners, $160.00 for associates, and $90.00 for paralegals and law clerks. (Def.'s Opp. (ECF No. 118) at 10.) Finally, defendants argue that the amount of hours worked byplaintiff's attorneys is excessive, repetitive, duplicative, and clerical in nature, and the fees should be reduced on that basis alone.

The court will address each of defendants' grounds in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for attorneys' fees within the applicable framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

IV. Standard of Review

A district court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs of an ERISA action to a claimant who achieves "'some degree of success on the merits'" under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Hardt v. Reliance Stand. Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). Accordingly, the threshold issue is whether the ERISA fee claimant achieved some degree of success on the merits. See Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158. After the court determines that a claimant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, "'[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable [attorney's] fee' is the lodestar calculation." United Auto. Workers Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dept. v. Metro Auto Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

V. Discussion

A. Plaintiff Achieved Some Degree of Success on the Merits

The United States Supreme Court has held that "a fees claimant must show 'some degree of success on the merits' before a court may award attorney's fees under § 1132(g)(1)." Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694). "A claimant does not satisfy thatrequirement by achieving 'trivial success on the merits' or a 'purely procedural victor[y][.]'" Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus, 462 U.S. at 688). On the other hand, "if the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a 'lengthy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party's success was 'substantial' or occurred on a 'central issue,'" then the requirement is satisfied and the court may award attorney's fees. Id.

Defendants challenge Haisley's Motion for attorneys' fees on the bases that she is not entitled to any award of fees and that there is no presumption a successful plaintiff in an ERISA suit is entitled to fees, absent exceptional circumstances. Defendants, however, ignore the United States Supreme Court's recent holding that district courts have discretion to award fees to an ERISA claimant who achieves some degree of success on the merits. See Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158. Although this court remanded the case for PNC and Sedgwick to determine whether Haisley was entitled to benefits after October 2, 2009, the court granted Haisley's motion for summary judgment in part, and ordered the Plan to pay her LTD benefits for the period between October 3, 2007 and October 2, 2009. The court does not need to conduct a lengthy inquiry here. It is readily evident that Haisley achieved some degree of success on the merits and is eligible for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. See Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2159 (p...