Hajiani v. Esha United States, Inc.

SALIM HAJIANI, Plaintiff, v. ESHA USA, INC., et al., Defendants.

No.: 3:14-CV-594-TAV-HBG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

November 7, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil action is before the Court on defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 36] and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 38], the latter of which the Court converted to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) because defendants attached and relied upon an exhibit [Doc. 46]. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, responded in opposition to these motions [Docs. 42-43]. Defendants then filed replies [Docs. 44-45], to which plaintiff responded yet again [Doc. 47]. Defendant's motions are thus fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant defendants' motions for summary judgment.

I.. Background

A. Factual Background

This case concerns allegations of unpaid overtime wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19, along with various other civil wrongs. Plaintiff Salim Hajiani alleges that defendants employed him in their gas-station convenience store from approximately October 10, 2011, to January 10, 2012 [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-13]. The store is owned by defendant ESHA USA, Inc. ("ESHA"), a Tennessee corporation, and plaintiff alleges that defendants Sameer Ramjee and Jamaludin Sayani own ESHA and control its operations [Id. ¶¶ 2, 25-28]. Plaintiff asserts that he routinely worked over forty hours per week as a cashier, but did not receive overtime pay for this work [Id. ¶¶ 15-16]. Plaintiff further alleges that he regularly sold goods moving in interstate commerce as part of his work [Id. ¶¶ 17-21]. Plaintiff submits that Ramjee and Sayani supervised and controlled his work schedule and activities [Id. ¶¶ 30-33].

In addition, plaintiff alleges that, after some time passed, he began to demand payment of unpaid regular and overtime wages from defendants [Id. ¶¶ 38-39]. Plaintiff claims that defendants terminated his employment on January 10, 2012, in retaliation for making these demands [Id. ¶ 40]. Further, plaintiff asserts that Ramjee and Sayani made derogatory remarks to other potential employers who called for a reference—specifically, that plaintiff was a "bad worker" who would sue them—and that these remarks have made it difficult for plaintiff to find other work [Id. ¶¶ 41-42]. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants denied him the rest and meal breaks mandated by Tennessee law and required him to live nearby and stay on-call from 6:00 a.m. to midnight, every day [Id. ¶¶ 32-54]. Plaintiff alleges that he generally worked five to six days per week [Id. ¶ 55].

All parties concede that they entered into a Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release (the "Settlement Agreement") relating to some or all of plaintiffs' allegations in February 2012 [See Doc. 38 p. 2; Doc. 43 p. 1]. Plaintiff was then represented by counsel,though he has represented himself in this litigation [Doc. 44 p. 2]. One provision of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows:

Hajiani hereby releases and forever discharges ESHA USA, Inc. and RAMJEE, their agents, employees, insurers, predecessors, successors, assigns, and all other persons or entities in any way related to or affiliated with ESHA USA, Inc. and RAMJEE of and from any and all complaints, claims, demands, causes of action, obligations, damages or any other fault or liability, in contract, by statute, or in tort, however, described, whether or not now known, suspected, or claimed, direct or indirect, which Hajiani has had, currently has or may have against ESHA USA, Inc. and RAMJEE arising from the payment of wages, including overtime wages, and all claims asserted or which could have been asserted under the FLSA.

[Doc. 37-1 ¶ 3]. Defendants argue that this Settlement Agreement should be dispositive of this action [Doc. 37 p. 2; Doc. 38 p. 2]. Plaintiff concedes that he signed the Settlement Agreement, but contends that this agreement did not fully compensate him for the violations of federal and state law defendants committed, and thus did not constitute a total release of his claims against them [Doc. 43 p. 1].

B. Procedural History

On December 22, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in this Court, seeking monetary relief for failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA, retaliatory discharge, defamation, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and other theories [Doc. 1]. After various case-administration and discovery disputes, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment and accompanying memorandum of law on May 4, 2017 [Docs. 36-37]. That same day, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, to which they attached an exhibit—a copy of the Settlement Agreement discussed above [Docs. 38,38-1]. Plaintiff filed responses to these motions on July 19, 2017 [Docs. 42-43], to which defendants then replied [Docs. 44-45].

Then, on July 26, 2017, the Court entered an order providing notice to the parties that, because defendants had attached an exhibit to their motion to dismiss and relied upon it therein [Docs. 38, 38-1], the Court would treat this motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) [Doc. 46]. In compliance with Sixth Circuit case law, see, e.g., Bruce v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 389 F. App'x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2010), the Court permitted the parties fourteen days from entry of that order to file any additional materials pertinent to the resolution of defendants' motion [Doc. 46 p. 2]. Plaintiff filed a short additional response on August 11, 2017 [Doc. 47], but the parties have not otherwise filed any supplemental materials pertaining to defendants' dispositive motions. Thus, the Court will resolve defendants' motions—treating both as motions for summary judgment—on the record as it currently stands.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). All facts and inferences to be drawn from the record before the Court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002).

Yet, "[o]nce the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations." Curtis Through Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the nonmoving party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.

The Court's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the factfinder. Id. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record "to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

III. Analysis

Defendants have raised various arguments as to why they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on plaintiff's claims against them [Docs. 36-38, 44-45]. The Court will address each of these arguments, along with plaintiff's responses [Docs. 42-43, 47], in turn. As explained below, the Court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all seven of plaintiff's claims.

A. The Settlement Agreement

First, defendants argue that Counts I, II, IV, and V of the complaint—those arising under the FLSA—are barred because plaintiff released these claims in the Settlement Agreement [Doc. 37 p. 2; Doc. 38 p. 2]. Defendants assert it is undisputed that plaintiff expressly agreed to release all of his claims "in contract, by statute, or in tort, . . . arising from the payment of wages, including overtime wages, and all claims asserted or which could have been asserted under the FLSA" [Doc. 37 p. 2; Doc. 37-1 ¶ 3]. Thus, defendants submit that there is no "genuine dispute as to any material fact" regarding their "entitle[ment] to judgment as a matter of law" on these claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Plaintiff responds that, although he did enter into the Settlement Agreement, he "was not fully compensated for his claims. Plaintiff was paid just $5350.00 (which included attorney fees)" [Doc. 42-1 p. 2]. Plaintiff asserts that, because this figure does not cover all of his FLSA claims, the release "should be deemed null and void at this stage" [Id.]. In a later brief, plaintiff further explains that the Settlement Agreement compensated him only for his regular-time work and corresponding overtime wages—not his on-calltime, corresponding overtime wages, or his other claims [Doc. 47 p. 1]. Plaintiff alleges that defense counsel originally drafted an agreement broadly releasing all of plaintiff's...