Haley v. Clarksville-Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Sys.

353 F.Supp.3d 724

Angela HALEY, Plaintiff,

v.CLARKSVILLE-MONTGOMERY COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM, Defendant.

NO. 3:18-cv-00400

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed December 17, 2018

Melissa A. Morris, Nashville Vanguard Law PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Mark Nolan, Jamie K. Durrett, Kathryn W. Olita, Batson Nolan PLC, Clarksville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Angela Haley, the former wrestling coach at Northeast High School, in Clarksville, Tennessee, brings this action arising out of (1) the Clarksville-Montgomery County School System's ("CMCSS") decision to replace her in that position with a male coach, and (2) dissatisfaction with CMCSS's treatment of female student-athletes. Haley brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"). Before the Court is CMCSS' Motion to Dismiss certain claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 8.) Haley has responded in opposition (Doc. Nos. 13-14), and CMCSS has replied (Doc. No. 19). For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted.

I. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, " ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).¹ The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "If the plaintiffs do not nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation and brackets omitted). Dismissal is likewise appropriate where the complaint, however factually detailed, fails to state a claim as a matter of law. Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not required to accept summary allegations, legal conclusions, or unwarranted factual inferences. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) ; Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).

II. Factual Allegations

CMCSS operates the public school system in Montgomery County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 13.) Haley, a resident of Stewart County, Tennessee, is employed by CMCSS at Northeast High School ("Northeast") in Clarksville, Tennessee.

(Id. at ¶ 12.) According to the Complaint, CMCSS hired Haley as the Northeast wrestling coach, and Haley "was instrumental in getting wrestling sanctioned as a state sport within Tennessee." (Id. at ¶ 38.) According to Haley, she "had a very good track record" as a wrestling coach with CMCSS. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Haley sat on the board of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association ("TSSAA"). (Id. at ¶ 40.) However, Haley alleges that CMCSS did not allow her to attend TSSAA meetings unless she did so "on her own personal time" and without "reimbursement or supplement." (Id. at ¶ 42.) Haley also alleges that CMCSS "subjected [her] to a moldy closet as her coach office." (Id. at ¶ 41.)

According to the Complaint, CMCSS removed Haley from the position of head wrestling coach in March 2016, after the completion of "a very good season."² (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 43.) Haley alleges that she repeatedly requested reinstatement, but CMCSS refused "to engage in any discussions, interviews, or restatement." (Id. at ¶ 44.) Haley alleges that she was replaced by a "less-qualified" male coach in August 2016, "in violation of [ ] school and [TSSAA] policies." (Id. at ¶ 37, 45.) Based upon these occurrences, Haley alleges that CMCSS failed "to provide female coaches with the same treatment and benefits as the male coaches" and failed "to provide equal athletic coaching instruction opportunities for female faculty." (Id. at ¶ 48.)

Haley also alleges that CMCSS has intentionally and consciously discriminated against female students at Northeast by failing to provide them with "treatment and benefits that are comparable to the treatment and benefits provided to male student athletes in areas including but not limited to: practice and competitive facilities, training facilities, locker rooms, coaches and coaching facilities, scheduling of games and practice times, publicity and funding." (Id. at ¶ 25.) The Complaint states that Haley "informed [CMCSS] that its actions constitute violations of Plaintiff's [ ] rights[,]" but "CMCSS has failed to remedy or address its violations." (Id. at ¶ 27.)

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 Claim Pursuant to Equal Protection Clause

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allows a constitutional claim to be brought under Section 1983 even if that claim runs parallel to a claim brought under an analogous statute on similar facts. See Bullington v. Bedford Cty., 905 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases). This specifically includes caes involving alleged employment discrimination where a plaintiff advances a Section 1983 claim based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution either "concurrently with, or independent of, a Title VII violation." Day v. Wayne Cty. Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984) ; see also Russell v. Moore, 714 F.Supp. 883, 886 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) ("The plaintiff ‘may sue her state government employer for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment through [ Section] 1983 and escape Title VII's comprehensive remedial scheme, even if the same facts would suggest a violation of Title VII.’ ") (quoting Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 766 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining the Day decision) ).³ Here, Haley seeks to bring such a Section 1983 claim in parallel to her Title VII claim.⁴

CMCSS argues that Haley's Section 1983 claim must be dismissed as untimely under the relevant statute of limitations. When a motion to dismiss is made on the ground of a statute of limitations, the Court must decide whether "it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the limit for bringing the claim[s] has passed." Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assocs., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 744 (6th Cir. 1992) ). "The statute of limitations applicable to a [ Section] 1983 action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the [ Section] 1983 claim arises." Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court of Appeals has specifically noted that this applicable limitations period in Tennessee is one year, based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 28–3–104(a). Howell v. Farris, 655 F. App'x 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000) ). Here, all of the events alleged in the Complaint occurred in Tennessee. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Haley's Section 1983 claim is one year.

Haley's only response is that her Section 1983 claim is saved by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in the federal "catch-all" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). (Doc. No. 14 at 6-7.) That provision, however, is only relevant to claims made possible by a post-1990 enactment of Congress. Id.; see also Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (explaining when an Act of Congress implicates Section 1658's four-year statute of limitations). Section 1983, however, is a law passed by the United States Congress in 1871, under the original moniker of the Enforcement Act of 1871 (also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871). See 17 Stat. 13 (1871). It was the last of three "force bills" passed by the United States Congress during the Reconstruction Era to combat attacks, led in significant part by the Ku Klux Klan, upon the rights of African-Americans. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ("This Act ... was passed by a Congress that had the Klan particularly in mind. The debates are replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in 1871. It was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain [s]tates to enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum behind this ‘force bill.’ "), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Accordingly, Haley's Section 1983 claim is not entitled to a four-year statute of limitations.

Although the applicable time period is borrowed from state law, the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run in a Section 1983 action is a question of federal law.

Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635. "Ordinarily, the limitation period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Id. In determining when the cause of action accrues in Section 1983 actions, courts look to "what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her right." Howell, 655 F. App'x at 351 (quoting Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635 ). Haley alleges that she was removed as wrestling coach in March 2016. This very arguably was the day that Haley became aware of a need to protect her rights. But, giving Haley the benefit of the doubt, there is a later date by which she certainly had reason to know of her alleged injury. According to the Complaint, after being removed Haley sought reinstatement for several months, only to be stonewalled and, in August 2016, to be replaced by an...