Halim v. Donovan

AHMAD HALIM and SHARIF ABDELHALIM, Plaintiffs,

v.SHAUN DONOVAN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-00384 (CKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Date: February 15, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ahmad Halim ("Halim") and his son Sharif Abdelhalim ("Abdelhalim") (together "Plaintiffs"), each proceeding pro se, bring this action against various defendants, alleging discrimination based on nationality and religion in relation to contracts for various properties owned or desired to be owned by Plaintiffs. Defendants are Shaun Donovan, Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); Ray Griffin, City Manager of the City of Henderson, North Carolina ("Griffin"); and Members of the City Council of the City of Henderson, North Carolina (the "City Defendants"). Presently before the Court are [28] Griffin's Motion to Dismiss and [30] the City Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.¹ Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,² the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, theCourt shall GRANT Defendants' [28], [30] motions to dismiss and shall accordingly DISMISS-WITHOUT-PREJUDICE all claims against Griffin and the City Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

This action was commenced by Halim on March 9, 2012. On May 15, 2012, because it was unclear from the pleadings whether Halim was proceeding alone in this action, or whether he had intended to join his son, Abdelhalim, whose name appears on the deed of one of the properties at issue in this suit, the Court ordered Halim and Abdelhalim to each file a separate, signed Notice with the Court indicating whether they wanted to be considered plaintiffs in this action. See Mem. Order at 3, ECF No. [16]. Ultimately, both Halim and Abdelhalim filed the required Notice, and both Halim and Abdelhalim stated that they wanted to be considered plaintiffs in this matter. See Notice of Sharif Abdelhalim, ECF No. [17]; Notice of Ahmad Halim, ECF No. [19]. It being clear that Halim and Abdelhalim assert a right to relief arising out the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and that common questions of law or fact would arise, the Court found that Halim and Abdelhalim could be joined as plaintiffs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). The Court found, in light of Abdelhalim's joinder inthe action, that the then operative complaint, the [15] Amended Complaint, which referred to a singular "plaintiff" and made no effort to distinguish between Halim and Abdelhalim, would need to be amended before Defendants could render a meaningful response. Accordingly, the Court ordered Halim and Abdelhalim to file a Second Amended Complaint, setting forth, at a minimum, a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court's jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of each and every claim showing an entitlement to relief, and a demand for all the relief sought. The Court also ordered Plaintiffs to make a good faith effort to distinguish factual allegations and claims relating to Halim and factual allegations and claims relating to Abdelhalim and purposely explained to Plaintiffs that Halim could not represent Abdelhalim's interests before this Court, and Abdelhalim could not represent Halim's interests, but rather, that each must personally and individually prosecute their claims unless and until they secure a duly authorized attorney to appear on their behalf. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the [25] Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this action.

Preliminarily, the Court pauses to observe that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is vaguely worded and, by any reasonable measure, difficult to decipher. The Court finds particularly troublesome Plaintiffs' failure to relate their several factual allegations to any clearly articulated legal claims; indeed the only reference to potential legal bases for any of Plaintiffs' claims may be found within the section titled "Grounds for the Court[']s Jurisdiction" wherein Plaintiffs cursorily ground jurisdiction over "all of the defendants" in the action on 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and inexplicably, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 19 and Capital Medical Center, LLC v. Amerigroup Maryland, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D.D.C. 2010). As Plaintiffs' submissions in connection with the instant motions clarify, Plaintiffs assert that "all of the defendants discriminated against [them] based on religionand national origin" and "violated Plaintiffs civil rights" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, with respect to HUD, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs' citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 19 and Capital Medical Center, LLC v. Amerigroup Maryland, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D.D.C. 2010) appears to be an attempt - misguided as it may be - to ground subject matter jurisdiction in the purported need to join Griffin, the City Defendants, and HUD in the same action. See Pl.'s Opp'n to City Defs' Mot. at 4 ("For this Court to properly dispose the claims of discrimination ... the [City] [D]efendants must be a party of the litigation, in accordance of Federal rules of civil procedure 12b(7) and Rule 19[.]"). It is well-established, however, that while Rule 19 supplies a mechanism by which interested parties can be joined, it is not a source of federal jurisdiction. To the contrary, the Rule presumes the preexistence of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), and in fact even directs that in cases where a party who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined (for example, where subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., diversity) would be destroyed by joinder of the "required" party), the court must determine whether the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).

As for Plaintiffs' factual allegations, the Second Amended Complaint makes allegations of misconduct by officials of the City of Henderson, North Carolina relating to an apartment complex owned by Halim and/or Abdelhalim in Henderson, North Carolina (the "Henderson property").³ Specifically, Plaintiffs appear to claim that Griffin and the City Defendantsdiscriminated against them on the basis of their religion and national origin by requesting Halim to "put his hand on the Bible" while he was before the planning commission in connection with his request for a permit to rehabilitate the Henderson property, and by ultimately denying Plaintiffs the permit. 2d Am. Compl. at 5-6, ¶ XXVI. Plaintiffs also allege that Griffin publicly "insulted" Plaintiffs' religion and national origin and "implicitly call[ed] them [t]errorists" by telling a local newspaper that the property "looks like Beirut," which statement Plaintiffs assert "ignited three consecutive fires at the property" a "few weeks later[.]" Id. at 5, ¶¶ XXIV-XXV. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Griffin, at some unspecified time stated that he "is committed to remove the property from the plate [sic]"; that Griffin "kept his promise and removed the property from the plate [sic]"; and that Griffin's "attitude ignited another fire at the property as a prerequisite for his promise." Id. at 6, ¶¶ XXVI, XXVII. The Second Amended Complaint provides no further information regarding source, timing, or other circumstances surrounding the alleged fires, nor about the circumstances surrounding Griffin's alleged comments. By way of relief, Plaintiffs request the Court to order Griffin and the City Defendants to pay five million dollars for the damages caused to the Henderson property and one million dollars to compensate Plaintiffs for their emotional distress and humiliation. 2d Am. Compl. at 7, ¶¶2-3.⁴

On August 2, 2012, Griffin filed a [28] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Under Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure, Rule] 12(b)(1)(2) [sic] & (6), which Plaintiffs have opposed. Also on August 2, 2012, the City Defendants filed a [30] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Under Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure, Rule] 12(b)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) [sic] & (6), which Plaintiffs have opposed. Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

As noted above, Defendant Griffin moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to timely and properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City Defendants likewise move pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), and have additionally moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue, Rule 12(b)(4) for insufficient process, and Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process.

Generally, courts must evaluate a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction prior to considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[C]ourts should ordinarily satisfy jurisdictional concerns before addressing the merits of a civil action."); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.3d 673, 675 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding the district court's decision to first address defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion "awkward" and that the "proper course of review" required defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) motion to be considered first). Although this rule need not be mechanically applied, as this Court has previously observed:

Not only does logic compel initial consideration of the issue of jurisdiction over the defendant - a court without such jurisdiction lacks power to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim - but the functional difference that flows from the ground selected for dismissal likewise compels considering jurisdictionaland venue questions first. A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue does not

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