Hall & Assocs. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency

HALL & ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 19-1095 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

August 12, 2020

Re Document Nos.: 8, 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and concerns requests for email distribution lists in the possession of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Plaintiff filed FOIA requests for electronic copies of the email distribution lists used for communications sent by EPA in July 2018 and February 2019. EPA has withheld the email distribution lists pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6, which exempts matters that are "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). In their motions for summary judgment, the parties disagree about the scope of the "similar files" portion of Exemption 6 and about the private and public interests at stake in withholding or disclosing the email distribution lists. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Exemption 6 properly applies to the email distribution lists in question and, therefore, grants EPA's motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2018, the Water Security Division of EPA sent an email through an online platform called Constant Contact with the subject line "Prepare for Harmful Algal Blooms." EPA Statement of Material Facts ("EPA's SMF") ¶ 2, ECF No. 8-2; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ("Pl.'s SMF") ¶ 2, ECF No. 9-3. On February 14, 2019, EPA's Office of Water sent an email, also through the Constant Contact platform, with the subject line "Conestoga River Watershed." EPA's SMF ¶ 21; Pl.'s SMF ¶ 22. Through two separate FOIA requests, Plaintiff requested an electronic copy of the email distribution lists used for each of these email communications. EPA's SMF ¶¶ 1, 20; Pl's SMF ¶¶ 2, 22.

Each distribution list is constructed primarily by individual users voluntarily signing up to receive periodic updates from the respective EPA offices. EPA explains that individuals can be put on the Water Security Division distribution list by self-registering via text, being a registered attendee of a conference where the Water Security Division is an exhibitor, or by self-registering through the Water Security Division's webpage. EPA's SMF ¶ 3. Similarly, individuals can be put on the Office of Water's distribution list by self-registering online and selecting from various topic areas of interest. Id. ¶ 22. When signing up through the online portal for either distribution list, the following language appears at the bottom of the webpage:

By submitting this form, you are consenting to receive marketing emails from: US EPA [Water Security Division or Office of Water], 1200 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC, 20460 United States . . . You can revoke your consent to receive emails at any time by using the SafeUnsubscribe® link, found at the bottom of every email.

Id. ¶¶ 4, 23; Pl.'s SMF at 10, 17. The Water Security Division email distribution list associated with the "Prepare for Harmful Algal Blooms" email contains approximately 19,000 email addresses and includes the names of individuals or organizations associated with the addresses.

EPA's SMF ¶¶ 5, 13. The Office of Water distribution list associated with the "Conestoga River Watershed" email contains approximately 47,000 email addresses but does not include the names of individuals associated with the addresses. Id. ¶ 25.

In response to the request for the "Prepare for Harmful Algal Blooms" email, EPA eventually produced the email distribution list with all email addresses redacted while leaving the names associated with the addresses. Id. ¶ 13. EPA had initially considered attempting to identify which email addresses are associated with private individuals and which addresses are associated with business or public-facing organizations but estimated the cost of such an approach would exceed $1000. Travers Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 8-3. In contrast, EPA has determined that the cost for producing the list with the emails redacted totaled $98—which Plaintiff has not paid. EPA's SMF ¶ 15. With respect to the request for the "Conestoga River Watershed" email, EPA withheld in full the distribution list—which does not include names of individuals or organizations associated with the email addresses. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

FOIA requires agencies to disclose records located in response to a valid FOIA request, unless material in the records falls within one of FOIA's nine statutory exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 847 F.3d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2017); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975). "FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment." Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 236 F. Supp. 3d 338, 352 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009)). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In a FOIA suit, summary judgment is appropriate "if nomaterial facts are genuinely in dispute and the agency demonstrates 'that its search for responsive records was adequate, that any exemptions claimed actually apply, and that any reasonably segregable non-exempt parts of records have been disclosed after redaction of exempt information.'" Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, 330 F. Supp. 3d 373, 380 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 232 F. Supp. 3d 172, 181 (D.D.C. 2017)).

The reviewing court may grant summary judgment based on the record and agency declarations if "the agency's supporting declarations and exhibits describe the requested documents and 'the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.'" Pronin v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 17-cv-1807, 2019 WL 1003598, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2019) (quoting Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted)). "Ultimately, an agency's justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears 'logical' or 'plausible.'" Scudder v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 254 F. Supp. 3d 135, 140 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 715 F.3d 937, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted)). But exemptions are to be "narrowly construed." Bloche v. Dep't of Defense, 370 F. Supp. 3d 40, 50 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Morley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 508 F.3d 1108, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). An agency must do more than provide "summary statements that merely reiterate legal standards or offer 'far-ranging category definitions for information.'" Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 955 F. Supp. 2d 4, 13 (D.D.C 2013) (quoting King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

IV. ANALYSIS¹

A. Exemption 6

FOIA Exemption 6 applies to information included in "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Courts in this District have framed Exemption 6 as having two requirements: (1) the information must be contained in personnel, medical, or similar files; and (2) the information must be of such a nature that its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 405 F. Supp. 3d 127, 143 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing U.S. Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 598 (1982)).

The Supreme Court has held that Exemption 6 is not limited "to a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information" but rather should be broadly applied "to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual." Washington Post, 456 U.S. at 602. The Court also embraced the legislative history on the exemption stating that "'the balancing of private interest against public interest, not the nature of the files in which the information was contained, should limit the scope of the exemption.'" Id. at 599. For this reason, the D.C. Circuit has found that "similar files" should be read to include "bits of personal information, such as names and addresses, the release of which would 'create[] a palpable threat to privacy.'" Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Based on this precedent, courts in this District have held that Exemption 6 applies to email addresses. See Baldwin v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, No. 18-cv-1872,2020 WL 376563, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2020) (finding Exemption 6 applies to emails); Shurtleff v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2013) ("Exemption 6 allows an agency to withhold personal identifying information, such as email addresses . . . ."); Prechtel v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 3d 320, 329 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the definition for similar files "encompasses email addresses.") (citing Bayala v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 264 F. Supp. 3d 165, 178 (D.D.C. 2017)).

To determine whether disclosure of information "would constitute a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' the Court must balance the 'privacy...