Hall v. Braun

546 F.Supp.3d 553

Christopher HALL as Administratrix of the Estate of William Allen Young, Jr., Plaintiff

v.Russell BRAUN, et al., Defendants

No. 3:17-cv-481-BJB-RSE

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division.

Signed July 1, 2021

Andrew C. Weeks, Lawrence & Lawrence, Louisville, KY, Camille A. Bathurst, Gregory A. Belzley, Belzley Bathurst & Bentley, Prospect, KY, for Plaintiff.

Kristie Babbitt Walker, Jefferson County Attorney, Louisville, KY, for Defendants Russell Braun, Randall Richardson, Paige Young.

OPINION AND ORDER

Benjamin Beaton, District Judge

While responding to a suspected break-in in southern Louisville, police officers noticed an individual hiding in an abandoned house next door. The officers failed to coax the individual outside, so they removed plywood from the front door and entered, announcing themselves as police. Minutes later, when the officers reached the second floor, they spotted William Young crouched in a corner. Young immediately lunged at the first officer with a metal skewer. Three officers responded by shooting Young at very close range. Young died soon after. Practically all of this is captured on body-camera footage.

Young's Estate sued Louisville Metro Government, the then-Chief of Police, and the three officers who shot him, claiming that the officers violated Young's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The Estate hinges its excessive-force claim against the officers—the only defendants left in the case—on the officers’ allegedly unreasonable actions before the shooting: their warrantless entry and subsequent walk up the stairway. But binding precedent confines the analysis to the use of force itself, not to previous actions that might have violated different constitutional rights earlier in the chain of causation. And the use of force here was indisputably reasonable; the Estate agrees that the officers’ reactions protected themselves after Young attacked. Given these undisputed facts and the Circuit's binding precedent, the Court grants the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I. The Record Evidence

The parties largely agree on what happened. A police body camera recorded the most relevant events. To the extent the parties dispute those events, the Court "view[s] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). For all disputed facts not captured on camera, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the Estate. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ("[O]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." (cleaned up)).At 10:30 p.m., the Louisville Metro Police Department received a 911 call reporting a potential break-in at a house on Oleanda Avenue in southern Louisville. Officer Richardson Deposition (68-7) at 7:14–15 (describing the February 11, 2017 incident). LMPD officers responded, interviewed the residents of that house, and searched the area. Id. at 10:5–11:16. The residents told the police that the person they suspected of breaking in had fled to a vacant house next door. Id. at 11:9–13. This house was long abandoned; it had a boarded-up front door, broken windows, and a decrepit exterior. The responding officers called for back-up and began scouring the area in search of the suspect. Id. at 11:16–19. An officer saw someone look out from the second-floor window of the abandoned house. Id. at 13:1–2. Police officers attempted to call to the person from outside, but heard no response. Officer Braun Deposition (DN 68-1) at 24:6–9; LMPD Investigation Report (DN 69-3) at 129:474–479; Officer Braun Bodycam (DN 65-2) at 7:20–27.

For reasons that aren't entirely clear from the record (perhaps to arrest the person for trespassing, perhaps to question him about the alleged burglary), the officers decided to enter the abandoned house.¹ At least two of the responding officers, Russell Braun and Paige Young, strongly suspected that William Young was the individual hiding in the abandoned house, though they did not know him by name. Young was 32 years old, homeless, and mentally ill. He often stayed in the abandoned house without permission. Christopher Hall Deposition (DN 68-3) at 26:13–27:7. The same two officers had previously encountered Young in the second floor of the same abandoned house a few months earlier. On that occasion, the officers entered the house in response to a complaint, found Young on the second floor, and asked him to leave. Young complied. Braun Dep. at 15:3–16:4. Both officers remembered that prior interaction as they entered the abandoned home on the evening in question. LMPD Investigation at 140:139–140, 159:315–160:324; Braun Bodycam at 14:27 (asking Officer Young "You remember where he was last time, right?").

The officers’ entry into the house was noisy and lengthy. Officer Braun unscrewed the boarded-up front door. Braun Bodycam at 1:30–13:12 While Braun unscrewed the door, which took several minutes, he told another officer that Young "used to live here, apparently. Before it got condemned." Id. at 2:05. He also wondered aloud "how this guy keeps getting in." Id. at 5:35.

After he removed the door, Braun asked another officer if a K-9 dog could sniff the abandoned home for the suspect. Id. at 13:28. The K-9 officer, following Department policy, did not allow Braun to use the dog.² So the officers drew their weapons and entered the home. Officer Braun, the first officer to enter, immediately shouted out "Police! If you're in here, let us know!" Id. at 13:49. Ten seconds later, he again shouted "Police!" Id. at 14:00. He then positioned himself at the foot of the staircase leading to the second floor while the other officers searched the first floor. After three minutes of searching, the officers determined the individual was not hiding on the first floor. Id. at 16:30.

The officers then lined up at the foot of the stairs and began walking up to the second floor in a single-file line with guns drawn. Id. at 16:39. Officer Braun walked up first. Several other officers, two of whom are defendants in this case along with Braun, followed just behind.

Officer Braun had a flashlight in one hand and a gun in the other. As he started up the stairs, he yelled "Police Department!" Id. at 16:41. Halfway up the staircase, he again yelled "Police!" Id. at 16:44. When he reached the top of the staircase, he stepped onto a small landing and scanned the dark room with his flashlight beam, moving from left to right. Id. at 16:50.

The officers’ fatal encounter with Young lasted less than three seconds. As the beam reached the right side of the room, the light revealed Young crouched in the corner. Id. at 16:51. Young was—at most—ten feet away from Officer Braun. Young immediately stood up, holding a long, shiny object that both sides describe as a "metal skewer." Motion (DN 65-1) at 1; Response (DN 69) at 1; see also Officer Young Bodycam (DN 65-2) at 3:06, 4:07 ("metal rod"). He stepped aggressively toward Braun, skewer outstretched. Braun Bodycam at 16:53. The officers began to shout and Braun thrust out a hand to stop Young. But Young continued forward until he was inches away and then lunged at the officer's upper torso with the skewer. Id. ; Young Bodycam at 3:07. When Young lunged, the three Defendant officers opened fire. Braun Bodycam at 16:54. Young was hit by the gunfire and collapsed backward. Id. Two officers immediately handcuffed him and searched the remainder of the second floor. Young died moments later. Braun shot himself in the hand during the commotion and quickly ran out of the house to receive treatment. Braun Dep. at 59:18.³

II. This Lawsuit

Young's Estate⁴ brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Louisville Metro Government, then-Chief of Police Steve Conrad, and the three officers involved in the shooting. The Amended Complaint asserts violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as state-law claims of negligence, battery, and wrongful death. See Amended Complaint (DN 12). This Court previously dismissed the claims against Louisville Metro Government and Conrad for failure to make out a plausible claim for municipal or supervisory liability. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (DN 27). Only the three individual officers remain as defendants. They have moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims against them on the ground that the record establishes, beyond any genuine dispute, that the officers acted reasonably in responding to the attack with lethal force. See Summary Judgment Motion (DN 65).⁵

III. Legal Standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a court grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." No "genuine dispute" exists if a reasonable fact-finder could not accept the nonmoving party's version of the facts, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, or if, even on the nonmoving party's version of the facts, the law would still require a judgment for the movant, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

IV. The Record Warrants Summary Judgment for the Defendants

Young's Estate asserts both federal and state claims against the officers. Its federal claim asserts Young's right under the Fourth Amendment (as applied through the Fourteenth) to be protected from excessive force,⁶ while its state-law claims assert battery and negligence torts.

A. Fourth Amendment

1. Use of force. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." The law treats the sort of force used against Young as a seizure....