Hall v. Childers

DON HALL, DANA HALL, JIM KEYES, representing WHOLESALE MOTORS, Plaintiff, v. C. CHILDERS, et al, Defendants.

Case No.2:16-cv-00106-REB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

February 6, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER STAYING CASE

This case involves claims for violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various state law claims. Pending before the Court are two motions. First, a Motion for Alternative Service (Dkt. 4), filed by Plaintiffs Wholesale Motors, Don Hall, Dana Hall and Jim Keyes. Second, a Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 14) in which Defendants C. Childers, Dave Marshall, Scot Haug, the Post Falls Police Department and the City of Post Falls ("the City Defendants") seek dismissal of all claims against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Court now enters the following Report and Recommendation.

BACKGROUND

The primary allegations of Plaintiff, drawn directly from the Complaint (Dkt. 1), are summarized here.

Trace Hall lived with her boyfriend, Dusty Thomas, in Post Falls Idaho. Though not a plaintiff herself, Trace Hall is the daughter of Plaintiff Don Hall and owned the residence at which she and Dusty Thomas lived.

Dusty Thomas owned motor vehicles and other machinery that was located on Trace Hall's property. Most of the property was purchased on credit from Plaintiff Wholesale Motors, and was subject to liens.

Dusty Thomas became ill with cancer and was hospitalized on January 15, 2015. During this hospital stay, Wholesale Motors notified Mr. Thomas that his account with Wholesale Motors was in arrears, and that it would be repossessing the vehicles that Mr. Thomas had purchased from Wholesale Motors. However, due to Mr. Thomas's illness, Wholesale Motors elected to wait to proceed with the physical relocation of the vehicles.

While Dusty Thomas was still in the hospital, his brother Benjamin Thomas went to Trace Hall's residence and removed some personal property belonging to Dusty Thomas. These included a tire changing machine that is alleged to have belonged to Wholesale Motors, and certain vehicle titles.

Dusty Thomas died on April 12, 2015.

On April 13, 2015 Trace Hall contacted the Post Falls Police Department to report the theft of various items from her home, including the property mentioned above as wellas several firearms that were missing. The Post Falls Police Department declined to investigate, as it considered the matter to be a civil dispute.

That same afternoon, two of Dusty Thomas's relatives (Melissa Gillespie and Benjamin Thomas) came to Trace Hall's home with a police officer, Defendant C. Childers. Officer Childers had no warrant, but because Ms. Hall was intimidated by his presence she allowed him to enter her property along with Mr. Thomas and Ms. Gillespie. While on the premises, Mr. Thomas and Ms. Gillespie said that they had the right as heirs of Dusty Thomas to remove any remaining personal property from the premises, including several motor vehicles which were subject to liens on behalf of Wholesale Motors.¹ Because neither Mr. Thomas nor Ms. Gillespie were authorized representatives of Dusty Thomas's estate, the Complaint alleges that Officer Childers should have known that they had no legal authority to trespass or remove any property. However, Officer Childers helped effectuate the removal of property by Mr. Thomas and Ms. Gillespie by his intimidating presence and by his demand that Trace Hall hand over the keys to the motor vehicles.

The Complaint alleges that as Dusty Thomas's brother, Benjamin Thomas had no status as an heir, but is silent as to Ms. Gillespie's status as heir or any other relation to Dusty Thomas.

After this incident, a member of the Hall Family contacted the Post Falls Police Department and spoke to Sergeant Dave Marshall, also a named defendant in this case. Sergeant Marshall said he fully supported the actions of Officer Childers in giving Thomas and Gillespie permission to remove the vehicles, and said that this was done under his orders.

Subsequently, plaintiffs sought and obtained return of the motor vehicles through the state probate court. They incurred attorney fees during this process and the vehicles were in a state of disrepair when returned, which diminished their value as collateral.

The City Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They also argue that both the individual Plaintiffs and Wholesale Motors lack standing to bring a claim, and challenge the sufficiency of service of process. Finally, the City Defendants argue that allowing Wholesale Motors to proceed on its own behalf, without an attorney to represent it, would be a violation of Local Rule 83.4(d).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

To survive summary dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In any case, and more so in pro se cases, the law requires that plaintiffs be given an opportunity to amend their pleadings to remedy any deficiencies that were identified during a motion to dismiss. See Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) ("...in the normal course district courts should freelygrant leave to amend when a viable case may be presented."); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1128-30 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Pro Se Representation

The Court first takes up the question of whether Wholesale Motors may properly proceed as a pro se litigant. Local Civil Rule 83.4(d) provides:

Appearance by Entities Other Than an Individual. Whenever an entity other than an individual desires or is required to make an appearance in this Court, the appearance shall be made only by an attorney of the bar of this Court or an attorney permitted to practice under these rules.

Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 83.4. This rule codifies a long-standing practice in federal courts. See, e.g., Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 113 S.Ct. 716 (1993) (noting that the privilege of self-representation has never applied to entities like corporations, partnerships, and other associations); Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc. 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9^th Cir. 2008) (it is "well-established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se . . . is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other party or entities"). See also, In re America West Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058 (1994); Breinholt v. Popular Warehouse Lender, 2011 WL 722265 (D. Idaho 2011).² The logic behind this rule is simple - becausepartnerships, corporations, and other business entities are not individuals, it is impossible for them to literally represent themselves. Nor is it any less problematic to have one or more of the individual partners represent such an entity - by law, and as further discussed below, a partnership is a legal entity separate and apart from its owners. RCW 25.05.050 & 25.05.060. Accordingly, the Court will stay this matter for twenty-one days, during which time Wholesale Motors may seek the assistance of an attorney licensed to appear before the Idaho federal courts. If such an appearance is not entered within such time frame, the case should be dismissed.

C. Standing

The Court next considers the question of standing, which is the question of whether a party has a right to bring a particular claim against another party. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that precedes analysis of the merits. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must establish (1) a legally recognized injury, (2) caused by the named defendant that is (3) capable of legal or equitable redress. Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002). "Injury in fact," as required for federal court standing, is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical," where "particularized" means simply that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. U.S. Const. Art. 3, §2, cl. 1. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing at each and every stage of the litigation, Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1141, and is required to establish "standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought." Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n., 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008).

1. Individual Defendants

As to the individual Plaintiffs (Don Hall, Dana Hall, and Jim Keyes) Defendants' standing arguments are persuasive. The Complaint indicates that these Defendants seek to plead the alleged injuries to Wholesale Motors as their own injuries. However, under Washington's Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership is an entity distinct from its partners. RCW 25.05.050. Property acquired by a partnership is property of the partnership and not of the partners individually. RCW 25.05.060. For these reasons, whatever property interest Wholesale Motors maintained in the vehicles that were seized, this was not the property interest of any of the individual Plaintiffs. Therefore, none of the individual Plaintiffs has suffered a particularized injury, and so to the extent that the claims are pled on their own behalf, they should be dismissed.

Defendants also assert that Wholesale Motors as a stand-alone entity lacks standing. The argument here is that Wholesale Motors' status was that of a lien-holder and that it lacked an actual ownership interest in the vehicles at issue. Defendants' argument is misplaced. The law of standing does not require an actual "ownership interest" in the property that is the subject of the deprivation; rather, standing requires an actual injury that is concrete and particularized as...