Hall v. City of Fairfield

MARKUS M. HALL, MONIQUE G. RANKIN, LINDSEY K. SANDERS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FAIRFIELD, OFFICER NICK MCDOWELL,OFFICER CHRIS GRIMM, OFFICERS TOM SHACKFORD, OFFICER ZACK SANDOVAL,AND SERGEANT STEVE CRANE, Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-0508 DAD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: March 31, 2014

ORDER

This matter came before the court on July 12, 2013, for hearing of plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1988(b) and Local Rule 293. (Doc. No. 211.)¹ Attorney Garret Murai appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs and attorney Kevin Gilbert appeared on behalf of the defendants. Oral argument was heard and plaintiffs' motion was taken under submission. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees will be granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs commenced this civil rights action over four years ago by filing a complaint and paying the required filing fee on March 2, 2010. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs' complaint alleged causes of action against the City of Fairfield and Fairfield Police officers Nick McDowell, Chris Grimm, Tom Shackford, Zack Sandoval and Sergeant Steve Crane, stemming from plaintiffs' arrest.²

Through various pre-trial motions and rulings the action was eventually narrowed so that the case proceeded to trial on April 29, 2013 with respect to the following claims: false arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment against defendant McDowell; excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against defendant Crane; and interference with plaintiffs' Constitutional or statutory rights in violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against all defendants.

Following the receipt of all evidence, the jury was instructed and began its deliberations on May 7, 2013. (Doc. No. 195.) On May 9, 2013, the jury returned its verdict. (Doc. No. 207.) The jury found that defendants violated plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment by falsely arresting them without probable cause. (Id. at 2.) However, the jury did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Crane used excessive force in arresting plaintiff Sanders and did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants violated California Civil Code § 52.1. (Id.) The jury awarded plaintiff Hall $2,650, plaintiff Sanders $3,850 and plaintiff Rankin $5,650 for a total damages award of $12,150 and judgment was entered on May 13, 2013. (Doc. No. 209.)

On May 31, 2013, plaintiffs' counsel filed the motion for attorneys' fees now pending before the court.³ (Pls.' Mot. (Doc. No. 211)). Defendants filed an opposition on June 28, 2013, (Defs.' Opp.'n. (Doc. No. 218)), and plaintiffs filed a reply on July 3, 2013. (Pls.' Reply (Doc.No. 219)). As updated by plaintiffs' reply, plaintiffs seek an attorneys' fee award in the amount of $692,870.⁴ (Pls.' Reply (Doc. No. 219) at 10-11.⁵)

STANDARD GOVERNING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has explained the historical underpinnings and purpose of § 1988(b) as follows:

In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), this Court reaffirmed the "American Rule" that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney's fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. In response Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing the district courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure "effective access to the judicial process" for persons with civil rights grievances. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff "'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (parallel citations omitted). See also Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) ("'[A] court's discretion to deny fees under § 1988 is very narrow and . . . fee awards should be the rule rather than the exception.'"); Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008); Sable Commc'ns v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 890 F.2d 184, 193 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Plaintiffs prevailing in a civil rights action should ordinarily receive attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.").

A prevailing party is one who succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation, resulting in a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties." Texas State Teacher's Ass'n v.Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989). Given the jury's verdict in plaintiffs favor on their claim that their rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated by their arrest without probable cause, the plaintiffs are clearly a prevailing party. It is the size of the fee award to which plaintiffs' counsel are entitled that is disputed by defendants here.

"[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. See also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The prevailing party has the burden of submitting billing records to establish that the number of hours it has requested are reasonable."); Carson v. Billings Police Dept., 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006).⁶

"The Supreme Court has stated that the lodestar is the 'guiding light' of its fee-shifting jurisprudence, a standard that is the fundamental starting point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee." Van Skike v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Burlingtion v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Accordingly, a district court is required "to calculate an award of attorneys' fees by first calculating the 'lodestar' before departing from it." Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co. Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). "The 'lodestar' is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (quoting Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001)). See also Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The number of hours to be compensated is calculated by considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to a private client."); Caudle, 224 F.3d at 1028; Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Applying these standards, "a district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonablyexpended because they are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). See also McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); Tahara v. Matson Terminals, Inc., 511 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2007).

As noted, the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 ("We have established a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar represents the 'reasonable' fee[.]"); Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 ("The product of this computation - the "lodestar figure" - is a "presumptively reasonable" fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988."); see also Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1129; Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In the Ninth Circuit, the customary method of determining the permissible amount of attorneys' fees under § 1988 is the 'lodestar' method."). However, "in rare cases, a district court may make upward or downward adjustments to the presumptively reasonable lodestar on the basis of those factors set out in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 982. Those factors to be considered in making any adjustment to the presumptively reasonable lodestar include:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 'undesirability' of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70. See also Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1129; Ballen, 466 F.3d at 746 ("After making that computation, courts then assess whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of twelve factors.").

Finally, in applying these legal standards the court is cognizant of the following overarching guidance provided by the Ninth Circuit:

Lawyers must eat, so they generally won't take cases without a reasonable prospect of getting paid. Congress thus recognized that private enforcement of civil rights legislation relies on theavailability of fee awards: "If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation['s] fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to

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