Hall v. Cnty. of Lancaster

287 Neb. 969

846 N.W.2d 107

Jeff Hall, appellee and cross–appellee,

v. County of Lancaster, appellant and cross–appellee,andNorris School District No. 160, appellee and cross–appellant.

No. S–13–724.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed April 18, 2014.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Steven D. Burns, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Richard C. Grabow for appellant.

Jeanelle R. Lust, of Knudsen, Berkheimer, Richardson & Endacott, L.L.P., Lincoln, for appellee Norris School District No. 160.

Terry R. Wittler, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., Lincoln, and Vincent M. Powers, of Vincent M. Powers & Associates, Lincoln, for appellee Jeff Hall.

Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller–Lerman, and Cassel, JJ., and Bishop, Judge.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Tort Claims Act. Whether the allegations made by a plaintiff present a claim that is precluded by exemptions set forth in the State Tort Claims Act is a question of law.

2. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Tort Claims Act. The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act includes a discretionary function exception similar to that contained in the State Tort Claims Act, and thus, cases construing the State Tort Claims Act exception are equally applicable to the discretionary function exception in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.

3. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Appeal and Error. An appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusion on whether a claim is precluded by exemptions set forth in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act independent from the conclusion reached by the trial court.

4. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Immunity: Waiver. The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act provides limited waivers of sovereign immunity which are subject to statutory exceptions.

5. Pretrial Procedure: Parties. A pretrial order is binding upon the parties.

6. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings. The issues set out in a pretrial order supplant those raised in the pleadings.

7. Immunity: Waiver. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that can be waived.

8. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Appeal and Error. In actions brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, an appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.

9. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's judgment, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party; every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of such party, and it is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can be deduced from the evidence.

10. Negligence: Proof. In order to recover in a negligence action, a plaintiff must show a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of such duty, causation, and damages.

11. Trial: Negligence: Proximate Cause. Determination of causation is ordinarily a matter for the trier of fact.

12. Proximate Cause: Words and Phrases. A proximate cause is a cause that produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence and without which the result would not have occurred.

13. Negligence: Proximate Cause: Proof. To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must meet three basic requirements: (1) Without the negligent action, the injury would not have occurred, commonly known as the “but for” rule; (2) the injury was a natural and probable result of the negligence; and (3) there was no efficient intervening cause.

14. Trial: Judgments: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Where neither party requests that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, if there is a conflict in the evidence, the appellate court in reviewing the judgment rendered will presume that the controverted facts were decided in favor of the successful party, and the findings will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

15. Judgments. In the absence of a request by a party for specific findings, a trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact and need only make its findings generally for the prevailing party.

16. Trial: Negligence: Damages: Appeal and Error. Because the purpose of comparative negligence is to allow triers of fact to compare relative negligence and to apportion damages on that basis, the determination of apportionment is solely a matter for the fact finder, and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by credible evidence and bears a reasonable relationship to the respective elements of negligence proved at trial.

17. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

A pickup truck and a schoolbus collided at a rural “blind intersection,” where a stop sign facing the truck was missing. The district court determined that both drivers were negligent. But the court also found that the county was liable, reasoning that it would have discovered the sign was missing if it had conducted regular sign inspections. Because there was no evidence to support that premise, the court was clearly wrong in determining that the county's lack of a sign-inspection policy was a proximate cause of the accident. We reverse the judgment finding the county liable and remand the cause for a reallocation of liability between the driver of the pickup truck and the school district based upon the existing record.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

On August 24, 2009, a pickup truck operated by Jeff Hall collided with a bus owned by Norris School District No. 160 (Norris) and operated by Ronny Aden. The collision occurred at the intersection of South 25th Street and Gage Road in Lancaster County, Nebraska. South 25th Street and Gage Road are gravel country roads with a speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Neither vehicle was exceeding the speed limit. Hall was proceeding south on South 25th Street, while the bus was eastbound on Gage Road. The bus was on Hall's right. A diagram from an exhibit in evidence illustrates the intersection and the direction of travel of each vehicle.

IMAGE

The intersection had limited visibility and was “blind” for both drivers. Corn planted near the road obstructed Hall's view to the right and Aden's view to the left. The stop sign for southbound traffic on South 25th Street was missing at the time of the collision. There was no evidence that the County of Lancaster (County) had actual notice of the missing stop sign prior to the accident. Aden, who had driven the same bus route hundreds of times since 2007, had seen a vehicle at the intersection only once or twice a year. He did not believe there was a stop sign at the intersection, but, rather, believed it to be an “open intersection.” Hall had not previously traveled on South 25th Street, and he assumed there would be a stop sign for east and west traffic, because he did not have one.

Hall testified that his rate of speed as he approached the intersection was between 45 and 50 miles per hour and that he slowed as he got closer to the intersection because he always slowed as he approached an intersection on a “county road.” He estimated his speed to be 40 miles per hour as he entered the intersection. Aden accelerated as he approached the intersection, but the bus did not increase in speed, because it was traveling up an incline. Aden told an investigating officer that he was driving 47 to 48 miles per hour. Aden testified that a safe speed for the bus going into the blind intersection would have been 20 to 25 miles per hour.

Ted Sokol, Ph.D., an engineer performing accident reconstruction, concluded that there was not enough time for either driver to react once the vehicles became visible to one another. According to Sokol, Hall entered the intersection first, but the vehicles entered at approximately the same time. Sokol opined that Aden should have been more cautious as he approached or entered the intersection and that Aden could have avoided the accident by not assuming traffic on South 25th Street was going to stop and by approaching at a much lower speed so that he could have stopped before entering the intersection. According to Sokol, the bus' maximum speed would have needed to be about 23 miles per hour in order for Aden to perceive and react in time to stop before getting to the west edge of South 25th Street. Sokol testified that Hall could have stopped without entering the intersection if Hall had slowed to 18 miles per hour.

Benjamin Railsback, a mechanical engineer, concluded that the speed of the vehicles was not a contributing factor in the accident. He testified that due to the sight obstruction created by the corn, neither vehicle was visible to the other at a point in time where either driver had the opportunity to perceive and react in order to avoid the accident. He testified that the vehicles would have entered the intersection within a fraction of a second of one another. Railsback did not have any criticism of Aden's driving, because Aden “acted reasonably and drove reasonably through the intersection.”

Hall suffered substantial injuries as a result of the accident. Aden and the children who were being transported in the bus also suffered personal injuries. Additionally, Norris incurred property damage.

2. Procedural Background

Hall sued the County and Norris, alleging that the collision was proximately caused by the negligence of the County and of Aden. Hall alleged that Aden was negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way, operating the schoolbus too fast for the conditions, failing to keep proper control of the bus, and failing to keep a proper lookout. He alleged that the County was negligent in failing to have a traffic control device in place, failing to maintain the stop sign that had been...