Hall v. Petro Holdings, LLC

JAYSON HALL Plaintiff, v. PETRO HOLDINGS, LLC Defendant.

3:17-CV-02109 (KAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

AUGUST 21, 2019

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge

This employment discrimination action arises out of the termination of plaintiff Jayson Hall ("Hall") from his brief employment with defendant Petro Holdings, LLC ("Petro"). Pending before the Court is Petro's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 36.) For the reasons set forth below, Petro's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Facts¹ and Procedural History

Petro is a retail distributor of home heating oil. (Def.'s SMF at ¶ 1.) Hall began work for Petro as an oil tank truck driver in November 2014.² (Id. at ¶ 5.) On February 23, 2015, Hall reported to Petro that he injured himself in a slip-and-fall while delivering oil. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Thereafter, Hall was unable to return to work because of his injuries, and he began receiving worker's compensation benefits. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Hall was not cleared to return to work for almost a year. (Def.'s Ex. E, ECF No. 39-5.)

On February 15, 2016, Hall's treating physician approved him for "a light level of work activity." (Id.) On February 16, 2016, Hall returned to Petro and spoke with Jeff Owens, the On Road Delivery Supervisor. (Def.'s SMF at ¶¶ 8, 20.) Hall showed Owen's his doctor's note and asked to return to work.³ (Id. at ¶ 8.) Owens informed Hall that he had already been terminated after a meeting between management and the union. More specifically, Hall testified at his deposition that he and Owens had the following exchange:

I said to Jeff, I have a light-duty document from the doctor. He says, step outside. . . . He said, you were fired. I said how come I wasn't notified by a phone call, the union, anybody, management, letter? No one contacted me. I still, to this day, I never knew the termination date. . . .

(Def.'s Ex. A ("Hall Depo.") at 88, ECF No. 39-1.)⁴ Hall alleges, and Owens denies, that Owens further said that Hall was fired because of his "work ethic" and told him, "look at you; you cannot work." (Hall Depo. at 88.)

Hall initiated this action in Connecticut state court in November 2017. On December 19, 2017, Petro removed this action to federal court. Hall subsequently challenged the removal. OnJanuary 29, 2018, the Court (Meyer, J.)⁵ remanded Count Two of the Complaint, which asserted a claim for retaliatory discharge under the Workers Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a, back to state court, but the Court retained jurisdiction over Count One, which asserted multiple claims of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. St. § 46a-60(a) ("CFEPA"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 28 U.S.C. § 791, et seq. ("Rehabilitation Act"). (ECF No. 17.) On March 2, 2018, Hall filed the Amended Complaint, which removed Count Two. On February 15, 2019, Petro filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Neither party requested oral argument on the motion. Additional facts will be included as necessary.

Standard of Review

The standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary judgment is well-established. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," while a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Significantly, the inquiry being conducted by the court when reviewing of a motion for summary judgment focuses on "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. As a result, the moving party satisfies his burden under Rule 56 "by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to supportthe nonmoving party's case" at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets his burden, the nonmoving party must set forth "'specific facts' demonstrating that there is 'a genuine issue for trial.'" Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading" to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Id.; accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). "[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts" will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly implausible claims or bald assertions that are unsupported by evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court's function is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party." Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002).

Discussion

Petro contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Hall's claims under the ADA and CFEPA.⁶ In his complaint, Hall alleges that Petro violated the ADA and CFEPA by terminating him based on his actual or perceived disability and by failing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his physical disability.

ADA and CFEPA claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Clark v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., No. 3:15-cv-00304 (JCH), 2016 WL 4408983, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2016); see Feliciano v. Autozone. Inc., 316 Conn. 65, 73 (2015) ("We look to federal law for guidance on interpreting state employment discrimination law, and the analysis is the same under both."). "Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010). "The burden of proof that must be met to permit an employment discrimination plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion at the prima facie stage is de minimis." Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (alterations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). "Once a plaintiff meets this initial burden,the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination." Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492. If the defendant offers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination, "the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the real reason for plaintiff's termination was" unlawful discrimination. Id.

"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability." Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir.1998)).

Additional facts are needed to address Hall's claims under the ADA and CFEPA. Petro's oil tank truck drivers belong to a labor union and their employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"). (Def.'s Ex. C ("CBA"), ECF No. 39-3.) The CBA distinguishes between new employees (those on the job for 90 days or less) and employees on the seniority list (those on the job for greater than 90 days). Employees on the seniority list have greater rights with respect to termination than new employees.

Specifically, with respect to new employees, the CBA provides in relevant part:

Any man newly employed shall be so employed only on a ninety (90) day trial basis during which time he shall either be dismissed without further recourse, or placed on the seniority list.

(Id. at Art. 11(B)(3).) With respect to employees on the seniority list, the CBA provides in relevant part:

In the event an employee is unable to perform his customary work due to occupational injury, his employment shall be consideredterminated if the absence continues for the following specified periods:

Employees with less than 3 years of service — 1 year or length of service, whichever is less. . . .

(Id. at Art. 11(B)(6)(p) (emphasis added).)

As noted above, the Court's analysis assumes that Hall had obtained seniority list status at the time of his injury on February 23, 2015. By operation of the CBA, his employment was "considered terminated" when his absence surpassed his length of service, in approximately June of 2015. Accordingly, Hall cannot establish that he was terminated "because of" his...