Halliwell v. N. White Sch. Corp.

MICHAEL HALLIWELL, Plaintiff, v. NORTH WHITE SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No. 4:13-CV-084 JD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

March 1, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

In this case Plaintiff Michael Halliwell (Halliwell) claims that Defendant North White School Corporation (the School) terminated him on the basis of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Discovery has now closed in this matter and the School has filed a motion for summary judgment [DE 21] which is ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the party with the burden of proof "must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007).

FACTS

For the purposes of this motion for summary judgment, the Court will construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Halliwell. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (at the summary judgment stage the "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").

Michael Halliwell began teaching high school English at North White School Corporation in 2002. Several years later, in 2011, the Indiana General Assembly passed legislation that required the School to alter how it evaluated teachers. While teachers had been evaluated based on procedures and standards negotiated between the School and the teachers union, the legislative reforms required the School to independently devise an evaluation system that satisfied certain statutory criteria. The School developed such a system patterned off of an Indiana Department of Education exemplar. It required at least three classroom evaluations of each teacher per school year. The School began implementing it in 2011-2012 and it was fully implemented by 2012-2013.

Around this time—from 2010 continuing through 2014—the School offered older teachers an early retirement buyout consistent with the agreement of the teachers union. To be eligible for the buyout, a teacher had to have at least five years of experience at the School and be at least fifty years old. Halliwell was offered such a buyout on February 13, 2012, but elected not to accept it. In total, twenty-nine teachers were eligible for the 2012 buyout, nine of whom accepted it.

Halliwell was evaluated under the transition to the new evaluation system on February 27, 2012. While the School's principal typically conducted teacher evaluations, Curriculum Director Michelle Hay evaluated Halliwell. She also evaluated five other teachers, each overforty years old. Hay's evaluation concluded that Halliwell needed improvement, though also noted several areas where his performance was satisfactory.

In June 2012, Roderick McKee, at that time the School's principal, made a preliminary decision to terminate Halliwell, subject to confirmation by Nicholas Eccles, the School's superintendent, and the Board of School Trustees of the North White School Corporation (the School Board). McKee based this decision on numerous asserted deficiencies in Halliwell's performance, including unprofessional behavior and a failure to rectify problems identified in the February 2012 evaluation (such as not teaching and assessing in conformity with state standards). Halliwell then met with Eccles who decided against terminating him. Eccles believed that Halliwell and McKee had a personality conflict, which would become unimportant since McKee planned to retire.

A new principal, Curtis Craig, then started the following school year (2012-2013). He evaluated Halliwell several times throughout that year, noting both strengths and deficiencies in his performance. In April 2013, Craig placed Halliwell on a teacher improvement plan. That plan required Halliwell, among other things, to more comprehensively incorporate state standards into his teaching. In May 2013, Craig found that Halliwell had failed to comply with a variety of the plan's provisions and made a preliminary decision to terminate him for insubordination, neglect of duty and other good or just cause under Indiana Code § 20-28-7.5-1. Halliwell then met with Superintendent Eccles, who also determined there was sufficient evidence to terminate him. The School Board held a hearing on June 28, 2013 where Craig, Eccles and Hay presented evidence in support of Halliwell's termination. Two union representatives represented Halliwell and presented evidence in opposition. The School Board voted 4-1 to terminate Halliwell for insubordination, neglect of duty and other good and justcause.

Halliwell then filed this lawsuit. He contends that he was a victim of a scheme by the School administration to remove older teachers from the School. The School responds that Halliwell was fired for poor performance, not out of any discriminatory animus.

ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Strike

Prior to addressing the School's motion for summary judgment, it is necessary to resolve its motion to strike [DE 31]. That motion presents a "threshold question because a court may consider only admissible evidence in assessing a motion for summary judgment." Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is within the discretion of the trial court. Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/Executive Health Spa, Inc., 301 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2002). The School argues that parts of Halliwell's affidavit and some of the exhibits that accompany it are inadmissible.

First, the School challenges Halliwell's 2007 and 2010 performance evaluations [DE 29-6 at 3-10] and the second and third paragraphs of his affidavit [DE 29-6 at 1] which refer to them. It argues that these evaluations preceded Halliwell's termination by two years and thus are not relevant to Halliwell's performance at the time he was terminated. Halliwell responds that they show that he performed well until he refused the School's retirement buyout offer, at which point the School abruptly altered its characterization of his performance. So, he says, they are relevant to the pretext inquiry.

The Court agrees. Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). Asthe Seventh Circuit has indicated, a "party faces a significant obstacle in arguing that evidence should be barred because it is not relevant, given that the Supreme Court has stated that there is a 'low threshold' for establishing that evidence is relevant." United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004)).

In this case, there is a dispute as to the honesty of the School's proffered justification for terminating Halliwell. One way for Halliwell to demonstrate pretext would be to show that the School abruptly changed its characterization of his performance. See Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that inconsistencies or contradictions in an employer's rationale can demonstrate pretext); Testerman v. EDS Tech. Products Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 305 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing cases where an unprecedentedly unfavorable post-termination evaluation supported a finding of pretext). Halliwell's positive past performance evaluations could help show that (though as discussed below, their probative value is minimal and insufficient for Halliwell to survive summary judgment), which is all that is necessary to meet the minimal hurdle imposed by Rule 402. Accordingly, the Court denies the School's motion to strike as to Halliwell's 2007 and 2010 performance evaluations [DE 29-6 at 3-10] and the second and third paragraphs of his affidavit [DE 29-6 at 1].

Next, the School seeks to strike a student gradebook entry from fall 2013 [DE 29-6 at 11-15] and the fourth paragraph of Halliwell's affidavit [DE 29-6 at 1] which references it. The School contends that the gradebook is irrelevant since it postdates Halliwell's termination. Halliwell responds that it shows how the School subjected him to harsher standards than other teachers. He notes that the gradebook does not contain references to state standards, which he believes demonstrates that the School did not require teachers other than him to provide state standards with student grades.

The Court finds that the gradebook is not relevant. Information from fall 2013 does not shed any light on the School's expectations of Halliwell "at the time of [his] termination" several months earlier. Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 329 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, even if the gradebook were from a time immediately before Halliwell's termination, it is a student grade printout. Halliwell has provided no evidence that such a document would typically contain the grade information the School requires teachers to provide. As such, the student gradebook entry is not even minimally probative of any fact of consequence in this action. The Court thus strikes it [DE 29-6 at 11-15] and the corresponding fourth paragraph of Halliwell's affidavit [DE 29-6 at 1] pursuant to Rule 402. Given this conclusion, the Court need not resolve the Defendant's inadmissibility arguments under Rules 801, 802, 601 and 901.

Finally, the School seeks to strike the seventh paragraph of Halliwell's affidavit [DE 29-6 at 2]. Therein, Halliwell asserts that he spoke with several teachers at the School who informed him that the School...