Halveland v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.

273 So.3d 227

Elizabeth HALVELAND, individually and as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Halveland, deceased, Appellant,

v.FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an Agency of the State of Florida, Isaac Andrews, both in his individual and official capacity as a Correctional Officer of Florida Department of Corrections, Carlton Spooner, both in his individual and official capacity as an Officer of Florida Department of Corrections, Jennifer Reeves, both in her individual and official capacity as an Officer of Florida Department of Corrections, Patrick Jason William, in his individual capacity, Appellees.

No. 1D18-1822

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 21, 2019

Megan Cunningham and Ann Finnell of Finnell, McGuinness, Nezami & Andux, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Elizabeth M. van den Berg and Anthony Dean Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Wolf, J. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing her to amend her complaint to add a cruel and unusual punishment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 3 correctional officers. We have jurisdiction because appellant voluntarily dismissed all other counts against the officers; thus, the effect of the order was to completely dispose of the action as to them. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k).

The trial court refused to allow appellant to amend her complaint because it found (1) the statute of limitations had run on the federal cause of action, and the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint; and (2) it lacked the authority to permit appellant to amend her complaint because doing so would exceed the court's specific instructions on remand of an earlier appeal in this case. We find the trial court erred in both determinations and reverse and remand to allow appellant to file her third amended complaint.

FACTS

Appellant was the mother and personal representative of the estate of an inmate who died while incarcerated. In August 2015, she brought a cause of action against several defendants including the Department of Corrections, the inmate who was responsible for the death, and 3 correctional officers.

Appellant filed her original complaint in August 2015. Pertinent to this appeal, she brought claims for wrongful death and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers and the Department, as well a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers. The complaint included the following general factual allegations:

20. On or about August 10, 2013, one of the officers was conducting showers in G1 Dormitory when inmate Williams advised him that [the decedent] needed assistance. Later, the other 2 officers responded to the call for assistance of [the decedent].

21. Officers of [the prison], including but not limited to [appellees], found [the decedent] down on the floor and unresponsive in his prison cell.

22. On or about 9:00 p.m. on August 10, 2013, [the decedent], in critical condition was intubated by EMS and taken to Bay Medical Center.

The complaint alleged that the inmate passed away on August 12. An autopsy determined he had multiple contusions and abrasions on his face, head, and abdominal area, and he died of "blunt force head trauma as a result of the assault by another." The doctor "noted that a period of time passed between sustaining head trauma and [the decedent's] subsequent presentation for medical care." The decedent's cellmate was later charged with manslaughter perpetrated by beating the decedent "on or about August 8, 2013 through August 10, 2013."

Specifically as to the wrongful death count against the officers, the complaint alleged that the decedent had "noticeable injuries," yet the officers failed to timely "investigate ... inspect ... [or] adequately respond to" these injuries, and they failed to "provide or ensure that [the decedent] receive[d] proper medical care and assistance." Similarly, as to the count for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint alleged the officers "could have investigated the cause of [the decedent's] injuries and seek [sic] for [the decedent] to be provided with immediate medical assistance ... during the span of at least (2) days," but instead "disregard[ed] the presence of any injuries."

The trial court dismissed with prejudice the wrongful death claims against the Department and the officers, finding they were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations pursuant to this court's decision in Green v. Cottrell , 172 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). The court also dismissed with prejudice the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the officers. Appellant filed an appeal to this court.

While the appeal was pending, the supreme court reversed this court's decision in Green , 172 So.3d 1009, finding a 4-year statute of limitations applied to this type of wrongful death action. Green v. Cottrell , 204 So.3d 22, 29 (Fla. 2016). This court remanded, stating: "In light of Green , we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with that decision." Halveland v. Florida Dep't of Corr. , 219 So.3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

On remand, there was apparently no dispute that the wrongful death actions were timely filed pursuant to the 4-year statute of limitations set forth in Green . However, the officers moved to dismiss that count as it pertained to them, arguing they were protected by sovereign immunity.

Before the court ruled on that motion, appellant moved to file a third amended complaint. This complaint did not include a wrongful death claim against the officers, and appellant confirmed she intended to abandon that count as to them. The third amended complaint sought to add counts against the officers and the Department for cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This federal cause of action contained additional allegations against the Department, including that they failed to prevent the attack; failed for over a week to investigate the cause of the decedent's injuries and to obtain medical care for them; failed to review the decedent's medical records, which would have shown he had pre-existing conditions that put him at a greater risk of harm; and intentionally failed to provide access to emergency medical care.

During a hearing, the officers argued that the motion to amend should be denied because the statute of limitations period to bring the federal action had run, and the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint.

The trial court entered a written order denying appellant's motion for leave to amend the complaint to the extent that she sought to add a 1983 action against appellees or the Department. The court found the amended complaint did not relate back because it contained factually distinct allegations that did not relate back to the "sparse" allegations in the original complaint. Alternatively, the court found it lacked the authority to permit appellant to amend her complaint with a new cause of action because doing so would exceed the specific directions in this court's opinion remanding for "further proceedings consistent with [ Green ]."

THE AMENDED COMPLAINT RELATED BACK TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

"The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure encourage a policy of liberality in allowing litigants to amend their pleadings, especially prior to trial; this policy exists so that cases will be tried on their merits."

Morgan v. Bank of New York Mellon , 200 So.3d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) ; Hatcher v. Chandler, 589 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ).

However, this policy does not apply where the statute of limitations has run. "Although amendments should be permitted liberally, one cannot defeat the bar of the statute of limitations by filing a new cause of action labelled as an amended complaint. The rule of liberality does not authorize a new cause of action." Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. v. Surette , 394 So.2d 147, 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citing Cox v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. , 360 So.2d 8 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978) ; Versen v. Versen , 347 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) ).

Here, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations has run on the federal claim. The trial court denied the motion to amend because the court found the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint and exceeded the scope of remand.¹

We review the determination of whether an amended complaint relates back to the filing of the original complaint de novo. Kopel v. Kopel , 229 So.3d 812, 815 (Fla. 2017).

"An amended complaint raising claims for which the statute of limitations has expired can survive a motion to dismiss if the claims relate back to the timely filed initial pleading." Id. An amendment relates back "[w]hen the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading ...." ’ Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) (emphasis added).

Even if two complaints allege slightly different facts or theories of recovery, a finding of relation back is not automatically precluded. Kopel , 229 So.3d at 818. "[A]s long as the initial complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the general factual scenario or factual underpinning of the claim, amendments stating new legal theories can relate back.... This is true even where the legal theory of recovery has changed or where the original and amended claims require the assertion of different elements." Id. at 816 (approving Fabbiano v. Demings , 91 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) ; Flores v. Riscomp Indus. , 35 So.3d 146, 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ; Kiehl v. Brown , 546 So.2d 18, 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ).

The supreme court qualified this general rule by stating, "a newly added claim could fail to meet the...