Halvorsen v. Commonwealth

671 S.W.3d 68

Leif HALVORSEN, Appellant

v.COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee

Johnathan Wayne GoForth, Appellant

v.Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellee

Virginia Susan Caudill, Appellant

v.Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellee

2022-SC-0048-TG, 2022-SC-0095-TG, 2022-SC-0039-MR, 2022-SC-0040-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

March 23, 2023

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS, LEIF HALVORSEN AND JOHNATHAN WAYNE GOFORTH: David Michael Barron, Assistant Public Advocate.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT. VIRGINA SUSAN CAUDILL: J. Robert Linneman, Santen & Hughes, Dennis James Burke, Assistant Public Advocate, Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt, Assistant Public Advocate.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Daniel J. Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky, Matthew R. Krygiel, Assistant Attorney General.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

This case came before the Fayette Circuit Court upon the filing of three post-conviction collateral attack motions seeking to vacate the murder convictions of Virginia Caudill, Johnathan Goforth and Leif Halvorsen (collectively, "Appellants") pursuant to RCr ¹ 11.42(10), CR ² 60.02, and CR 60.03. Appellants requested post-conviction relief on grounds that the "combination" jury instructions rendered their verdicts non-unanimous, in violation of their constitutional right to a unanimous jury and ran afoul of the unanimity requirement recently announced in Ramos v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020). Concluding that Ramos does not apply retroactively to these cases and further, that Appellants’ claims were time-barred, the trial court denied them relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Caudill and Goforth were tried together in 2000 and were both convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, arson in the second degree, and tampering with physical evidence. Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003). Each received a death sentence for the murder conviction and the maximum authorized penalties for the other four convictions. Id. In a separate case, years before Caudill and Goforth's convictions, Halverson was found guilty of three counts of murder and sentenced to death on two counts, and life imprisonment on the third count. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth , 730 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1986).³ Each of the Appellants was convicted under a combination jury instruction, which permitted the jury to convict if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she was guilty of either murder or complicity to murder, but was unable to ascertain from the evidence whether each committed the crime as the principal or as an accomplice.

Appellants challenged their convictions on direct appeal as non-unanimous verdicts under the principal-accomplice combination instruction. This Court rejected that claim across the board, noting that the unanimity requirement was not violated because both the principal and accomplice theories were supported by the evidence. Caudill , 120 S.W.3d at 648 ; Halvorsen , 730 S.W.2d at 925. Following our affirmance of their convictions on direct appeal, each Appellant received additional state and federal collateral review of their case, none of which bore any fruit.

In 2020, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ramos , which addressed the issue of juror unanimity – unanimity in numerical count. 140 S. Ct. at 1393. Specifically, the Court examined the criminal justice systems of Oregon and Louisiana, both of which allowed a defendant to be convicted of a serious crime based on a jury verdict in which at least 10 of 12 jurors found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury implicitly included the right to a unanimous verdict in criminal trials, as applied equally to federal and state criminal trials (via the Fourteenth Amendment). Id. In addressing concerns that its decision would spawn a "tsunami" of litigation, the Ramos majority emphasized that "prior convictions in only two States [Oregon and Louisiana] are potentially affected by our judgment." Id. at 1406.

Thereafter, Appellants each filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court consolidated. While their motions were being litigated, the United States Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Vannoy , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021), which clarified that Ramos was not to be retroactively applied in federal collateral attacks, pursuant to Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Resultingly, prisoners who were convicted by non-unanimous juries and whose cases were final in state court before rendition of Ramos cannot rely on Ramos as support for federal collateral relief.

Based on the holding of Edwards and application of the Teague standard, adopted by this Court with regard to state collateral attacks in Leonard v. Commonwealth , 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009), the trial court held that the Ramos did not apply retroactively to Appellants’ claims. The trial court further observed that the underlying basis for Appellants’ motions - a lack of unanimity - had been previously rejected by this Court on direct appeal.

The trial court determined that even if this Court were to now decide that the combination jury instruction did not satisfy the requirement of unanimity, absent a finding of retroactivity, the cases at bar are final and the postconviction motions untimely. The trial court noted that Halvorsen's murder convictions were final 33 years before, and Goforth and Caudill's convictions were final 16 years ago. Moreover, Appellants’ RCr 11.42 motions had been denied and affirmed on appeal. Caudill v. Commonwealth , No. 2006-SC-000457-MR, 2009 WL 1110398 (Ky. Apr. 23, 2009) ; Halvorsen v. Commonwealth , 258 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2007). Thus, the trial court concluded that Appellants’ RCr 11.42 motions were untimely and must be dismissed. The trial court likewise dismissed the motions under CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, noting that those rules do not allow a defendant to circumvent the time limitations of a RCr 11.42 motion. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

In Kentucky, the structure for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case "is not haphazard and overlapping but is organized and complete." Gross v. Commonwealth , 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). The structure "is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.... [which] is for relief that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42." Id. In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant must establish that he was deprived of some substantial right that would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968).

Likewise, CR 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy and "[t]o justify relief, the movant must specifically present facts which render the original trial tantamount to none at all." Foley v. Commonwealth , 425 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted). To warrant reversal of a lower court's ruling on a CR 60.02 motion, the appellant must demonstrate some "flagrant miscarriage of justice." Id. at 886 (quoting Gross , 648 S.W.2d at 858 ). As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington , "[t]he presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judgment." 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). With retroactivity being an issue that is purely a matter of law, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. See Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard , 37 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ky. 2000) (applying de novo standard of review to matters of law in cases in which no facts are in dispute).

The relevant portion of RCr 11.42(10) provides that a motion must be filed within three years after the judgment is final unless it presents new facts, or the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the three-year period and has been held to apply retroactively. Appellants argue that Ramos announced a new constitutional right and urges us to apply its holding retroactively. Alternatively, they request relief under CR 60.02 on equitable grounds.

In Leonard , Kentucky adopted Teague's proscription against applying new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure retroactively once a judgment is final on direct review. 279 S.W.3d at 160. The Leonard court reasoned, " Teague's proscription against applying new rules retroactively once a judgment has become final on direct review makes sense, given the interest in finality of judgments." Id. The Court noted this was especially so in cases that have been final for a significant amount of time. Id. Thus, "[u]nder Teague , once a conviction becomes final, that is, it has gone through the direct appeal process and been affirmed, the new rule is not applicable, even if the collateral attack is pending when, or has begun after, the new decision is rendered." Id. at 159. See also Caspari v. Bohlen , 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994) ("A state conviction and sentence become final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied[ ]"). The Teague doctrine has been consistently and repeatedly applied in Kentucky jurisprudence. See, e.g. , Phon v. Commonwealth , 545 S.W.3d 284, 300-01 (Ky. 2018) ; Commonwealth v. Lawson , 454 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Ky. 2014) ; Hallum v. Commonwealth , 347 S.W.3d 55, 57 (Ky. 2011).

In Edwards , the Supreme Court expressly held that the rule announced in Ramos could not be applied retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal habeas corpus review. 141 S. Ct. at 1551. Citing Teague , the Edwards Court noted that "a decision announcing a...