Ham v. Padula

Angelo Ham, a/k/a Angelo Bernard Ham, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. Padula; Bruce Oberman; Ronnie Cribb; Darrell Cain; John J. Brooks, Associate Warden at LCI;Sandra Bracey-Simon, Mail Room Staff at LCI; Debra Whitney, Mail Room Staff at LCI;Ms. White, IGB at SCDC Headquarters; Ann Hallman, IGB at SCDC;David Tatarsky, General Counsel at SCDC Headquarters; Robert Peele,Assistant General Counsel at SCDC Headquarters;and Ms. Johnson, IGC at LCI, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6:12-cv-00937-JMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

Dated: September 5, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is now before the court upon the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("Report") [Dkt. No. 90], filed July 15, 2013, recommending the court grant Defendants Anthony Padula, Bruce Oberman, Darrell Cain, John J. Brooks, Sandra Bracey-Simon, and Debra Whitney (collectively referred to as "Defendants") Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 47, 80], regarding pro se Plaintiff Angelo Ham's ("Plaintiff") claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and denial of his constitutional right of access to the courts.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The court concludes upon its own careful review of the record that the procedural summation in the Magistrate Judge's Report is accurate, and the court adopts this summary as its own. However, a recitation of the relevant facts, in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, is warranted.

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Special Management Unit ("SMU") at Lee Correctional Institution ("LCI"), a facility managed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that on October 22, 2010, LCI Officer Cain was "pulling showers" with LCI Officer Thompson. [Dkt. No. 1 at 3]. After filling up both the top and bottom tier showers of the south side of the SMU, Officer Cain yelled to the top tier, where Plaintiff was showering, that the time for showering was up. Id. Officer Cain continued to yell as he moved to the top tier showers. Id. at 4, 9. When Officer Cain reached Plaintiff's shower, he allegedly yelled at Plaintiff, "Get your snitching ass out of the shower before I gas you Sir." Id. at 4; See also id. at 8, 9, 13. This outburst from Officer Cain was unexpected and was for no apparent reason. Id. at 9. Plaintiff asked Officer Cain what the officer was referring to. Id. at 4. Officer Cain told Plaintiff that Plaintiff knew what he was talking about, that Plaintiff was a "snitch", and that it was his first and last directive that Plaintiff exit the shower or else the officer would gas him. Id.

Despite another inmate's request to be taken back to his cell because he was ready, Officer Cain remained by Plaintiff's shower as Plaintiff was drying off. Id. While he was still drying off, Plaintiff told Officer Cain, "You got me fucked up with somebody else but I'm not gone follow you up though." Id. at 4, 10. It was at this moment that Officer Cain gassed Plaintiff. Id. at 4. Plaintiff began cursing at Officer Cain who allegedly stated to Plaintiff, "Nowgo tell the judge that shit." Id. at 4; See also id. at 8, 10. Officer Cain proceeded to escort another inmate from the shower back to his cell. Id. at 4. Officer Cain then returned to Plaintiff, ordered him to exit the shower, and returned Plaintiff to his cell. Id. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff alleges he suffered from severe acid reflux pain in the thoracic inlet. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report, this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the courtmust construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. See Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

DISCUSSION

Excessive Force

Plaintiff filed several specific objections [Dkt. No. 92] to the Magistrate Judge's findings that no genuine issue of material fact existed for Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. The Magistrate Judge stated the relevant law for this claim as follows:

To succeed on any Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must prove: (1) objectively, the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-304 (1991); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), the United States Supreme Courtheld that whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections officers are required to balance the need to restore discipline through the use of force against the risk of injury to inmates. The Court held that "whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is...whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at 6-7.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the following factors when analyzing whether a prison official used force in good faith and not maliciously or sadistically: (1) [t]he need for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used: (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, and (5) the absence of serious injury. Williams, 77 F.3d at 762 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). In Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. Id. at 36-40 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4). However, the Court noted that the absence of serious injury may be one factor to consider in the Eighth Amendment inquiry as it may suggest "'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation'" and may indicate the amount of force applied. Id. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).

[Dkt. No. 90 at 4-5].

In applying the law to the facts of this action, the Magistrate Judge focused on the subjective portion of the analysis, finding there was no genuine dispute as to whether Officer Cain acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-304. The Magistrate Judge found that the facts established Plaintiff refused to comply with Officer Cain's order to exit the shower and that Plaintiff was at that time unrestrained. [Dkt. No. 90 at 6]. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's refusal "to comply with Officer Cain's directive created a potentially dangerous situation, and Officer Cain's use of mace to gain compliance and restore order was appropriate." Id. The Report stated that an excessive amount of spray was not used as only 14 grams of chemical munitions were deployed. Id. The Report also mentionedthat Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to establish the injury of a "burning sensation" in his chest, where medical reports indicated Plaintiff had complained of a "burning sensation" at a time before this incident as well.

Plaintiff makes several...