Hamilton v. Paulson

542 F.Supp.2d 37

Gary HAMILTON, Plaintiff v. Henry M. PAULSON, Jr., Secretary for Department of Treasury, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-1549(RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 3, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anne J.A. Gbenjo, The Gbenjo Law Group, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

John C. Truong, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

Gary Hamilton, the plaintiff in this civil lawsuit, seeks compensatory damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against Henry M. Paulson, Jr., in his official capacity as the Secretary for the Department of Treasury,¹ for alleged unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff by the plaintiffs former employer, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), on the basis of race and sex pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). Civil Complaint (the "Compl.") ¶¶ 1, (i)-(iii). Currently before the Court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. After carefully considering the parties' pleadings, the defendant's motion, and all memoranda of law and exhibits with these filings,² the Court concludes that it must not only grant the defendant's motion in part and deny it in part, but also grant the plaintiff limited leave to file an amended complaint for the reasons that follow.³

I. Background

The following facts are either admitted or not in dispute.⁴ The plaintiff, "an African-American male, graduated from the University of North Alabama with a[b]achelor[']s degree in Industrial Hygiene in [1982], and shortly thereafter obtained a [m]aster[']s degree in Public Health from George Washington University." Pl.'s Facts ¶ 1. The "[p]laintiff worked with the Department of Defense ... as an [i]ndustrial [h]ygienist until about 2001, when he joined the [IRS] in the same position." Id. ¶ 3. Since joining the IRS, he has "worked within the Real Estate and Facilities Management" department. Id.

"On May 5, 2003," Compl. ¶ 13, "the IRS announced a vacancy for the position of ... Safety and Occupational Health Manager (`Safety Manager')," Pl.'s Facts ¶ 7. "Four candidates m[ade] the `best qualified' list[:] two females, a white male and [the p]laintiff." Compl. ¶ 15. Three of those four candidates, including the plaintiff, received a "ranking score" of 25 based on their responses to questions posed on a worksheet used to determine the applicants' knowledge, skills, and abilities (the "KSAs"); "[t]he fourth person, a white male, received a ranking score of 19." Pl.'s Facts ¶ 11.

The top four candidates "were interviewed by a panel of three ... members ...: Stuart Burns ([a] Caucasian male)[,] Mike Huston ([also a] Caucasian male)[,] and Tatika Mitchell (who [represents] that she is [of] ... Hispanic, African-American[,] and French [descent])." Id. ¶ 14. In addition to serving on the interview panel, Burns was the "selecting official" for the position. Compl. ¶ 15. "The panel members all took notes [during] the interview[s]," but "they did not rate [the applicants] or give the applicants any scores." Pl.'s Facts ¶ 15. Ultimately, Burns "selected Annette Burrell ..., a white female who has ... no college degree, no formal ... training ... in [s]afety[,] and no formal training in [s]ecurity," for the position of Safety Manager. Id. ¶ 20.

In October of 2003, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") regarding the selection of Burrell for the Safety Manager position. Id. ¶ 46. A few months later, in January of 2004, "Camille Carraway, a white female, informed [the p]laintiff that [Burns] had detailed her to a GS-14 Safety Manager position and had promised her that the position would become permanent." Id. ¶ 50. "Immediately thereafter," in February of 2004, the plaintiff "filed another EEO [complaint] claiming discrimination based on race and gender." Id. ¶ 51.

The plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on August 1, 2005. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that "his gender and race were motivating factors in [Burns's] decision not to promote him to the Safety [Manager] position." Compl. ¶ 23. Further, he alleges that the IRS retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint based on his non-selection for the Safety Manager position when Carraway was selected for a detail as a Safety Manager. Id. ¶¶ 26-29.

The defendant filed his motion for summary judgment on August 14, 2007. In support of his motion, the defendant argues that the IRS had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for selecting Burrell over the plaintiff for the Safety Manager position. Def.'s Mem. at 1, 7-11. He also asserts that the plaintiffs retaliation claim is untimely, id. at 12-15, that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, id. at 15-17, and that even if the plaintiff "c[ould] establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [the d]efendant ha[d] legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for giving ... Car[r]away the 120-day detail," id. at 17.

The plaintiff counters that the reason advanced by the defendant for the selection of Burrell over the plaintiff for the Safety Manager position is a pretext for race- and sex-based discrimination. Pl.'s Opp'n at 8, 11-24; Pl.'s Suppl. Opp'n at 1-2. He contests the defendant's description of his retaliation claim as untimely, id. at 31-33, asserts that he has established a prima facie case of retaliation, id. at 33-37, and disputes the legitimacy of the defendant's proffered reasons for selecting Carraway for the Safety Manager detail, id. at 38-42; Pl.'s Suppl. Mem. at 2. Finally, the plaintiff introduces an entirely new claim for race- and sex-based discrimination based on the selection of Burrell for a detail in the National Office Safety Program in August of 2002. Id. at 25-30.

In addition to reiterating his arguments from his initial memorandum of law, the defendant argues in reply that the Court should grant him summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to properly dispute his statement of material facts not in genuine dispute as required by this Court's local rules. The defendant also asserts that the Court should not consider the plaintiffs claims based on the selection of Burrell for a Safety Manager detail in 2002 because that claim was not asserted in the plaintiffs EEO complaints or in his complaint in this Court and is untimely in any event. Pl.'s Reply at 2-5.

II. Standard of Review

The defendant seeks summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Under that rule, summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. When ruling on a Rule 56 motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). The Court must also draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-moving party's favor and accept the non-moving party's evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party, however, cannot rely on "mere allegations or denials," Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (internal quotation and citation omitted), for "conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact." Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 908 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). If the Court concludes that "the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of h[is] case with respect to which []he has the burden of proof," then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. Legal Analysis

Title VII provides that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in executive agencies ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination on one of these impermissible categories, the Court assesses the plaintiffs claim under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, "the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination" in the first instance, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, after which "the burden shifts to the defendant, who must `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the adverse action.'" Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817).

Assuming that the defendant can satisfy that burden, "the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens-disappear[s]," Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation and citation omitted), and "the plaintiff must show that a reasonable jury could conclude from all of the evidence that the adverse employment decision was made for a discriminatory reason," Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C.Cir.2003). In this context, the phrase "all of the evidence" refers to "any combination of (1) evidence establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case[,] (2) evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its actions[,] and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff." Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897 (internal...