Hammonds v. Montgomery Children's Specialty Ctr.

681 F.Supp.3d 1234

Frankie HAMMONDS, Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY CHILDREN'S SPECIALTY CENTER, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:21cv448-MHT

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

Signed July 11, 2023

James Michael Comer, Patterson Comer Law Firm, Northport, AL, for Plaintiff.

Dennis Oscar Vann, Jr., Lea Richmond, IV, Thomas Lee Oliver, II, Carr Allison, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This litigation involves a dispute between plaintiff Frankie Hammonds, who has paraplegia and a traumatic brain injury, and defendant Montgomery Children's Specialty Center, LLC ("MCSC"). Hammonds alleges that MCSC failed to protect him from abuse and neglect at the hands of its staff, resulting in a wide range of mental and physical injuries. He further alleges that MCSC failed to report his complaints of mistreatment to the Alabama Department of Human Resources, as required by the Alabama Department of Mental Health. In an amended complaint, he asserts two state-law claims against MCSC: first, for negligence or wantonness with regard to state regulations applicable to group-home facilities; and, second, for negligent or wanton hiring, retention, training, or supervision of staff. MCSC denies all allegations of wrongdoing.¹

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity).²

This lawsuit is now before the court on MCSC's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 2. For the reasons below, the court will grant MCSC's motion and stay these proceedings pending arbitration.

A. Legal Standard

The FAA provides that:

"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon any such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."

9 U.S.C. § 2. It is, at its core, "a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements," Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), requiring that courts "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate," Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). "Accordingly, the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346.

In order to answer this question, the court must make two preliminary determinations: first, whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and, second, whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that agreement. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McDonald, 758 So. 2d 539, 542 (Ala. 1999). For purposes of this inquiry, the court applies regular Alabama contract principles, construed through the lens of federal policy favoring arbitration. See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987).

If the court finds that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and that the claim at issue falls within the scope of the arbitration clause, it must determine whether the underlying contract is one that "evidence[es] a transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of the FAA. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 53, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA need show only "that the transaction turns out, in fact, to have involved interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection" when entering the agreement. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 874 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this context, Alabama law provides that a motion to compel arbitration is "analogous to a motion for summary judgment," in that the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the above elements (that is, the existence of a binding arbitration agreement, its applicability to the claim at issue, and a sufficient connection to interstate commerce). Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277, 280 (Ala. 2000). If the moving party makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that the arbitration agreement is invalid or inapplicable to the dispute in question. See id.

Finally, if the court finds that there is a binding and enforceable arbitration clause pursuant to the FAA, it is required to order the parties to submit to arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4. Additionally, if one of the parties to the agreement requests a stay of litigation pending said arbitration, the court is statutorily bound to grant the stay. See 9 U.S.C. § 3.

B. Factual Background

Because, as stated, motions to compel arbitration are treated similarly to motions for summary judgment, the factual allegations should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hearn v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 992 F. 3d 1209, 1215 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021).

In February 2017, when Hammonds was 16, he suffered severe injuries to his brain and spinal cord in a car accident, which left him partially paralyzed. As a result, he has limited use of motor skills and bodily functions, requires a wheelchair and a catheter for daily functioning, and must be turned every two hours in order to prevent decubitus ulcers (injuries to skin and tissue more commonly known as bedsores).

In May or June 2018, while Hammonds was a minor, he was removed from his home and taken into the custody of the Alabama Department of Human Resources.³ The department placed Hammonds at the MCSC, a long-term-care nursing facility incorporated in the State of Missouri that operates facilities in Montgomery County, Alabama, through an agent.

On May 24, 2018, an official with the Department of Human Resources signed an arbitration rider. The rider provides that: "The parties agree that any and all disputes between [the resident and MCSC] . . . except for an action for eviction, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with this Rider." Arbitration Rider (Doc. 29-1) at 6. It also provides that:

"Therefore, all claims or controversies arising out of or in any way relating to the Agreement or the Resident's stay in the facility, including disputes regarding the interpretation of this Rider, whether arising out of State or Federal Law, whether existing or arising in the future, whether for statutory, compensatory or punitive damages and whether sounding in breach of contract, tort or breach of statutory duties, irrespective of the basis for the duty or the legal theories upon which the claim is asserted, shall be submitted to binding arbitration, as provided below, and shall not be filed in a court of law[ ]."

Id. Although Hammonds did not sign the rider himself, an official with the Department of Human Resources signed it as a "resident representative" on its own behalf and on behalf of Hammonds. Id. at 9.

Hammonds resided at MCSC for approximately five months. He alleges that during his time as a resident, the facility was not properly staffed; the existing staff were not properly trained; and the staff subjected him to neglect, abuse, and other forms of mistreatment. The allegations are described in more comprehensive detail in an earlier opinion dismissing some of the claims in this case. See Hammonds v. Montgomery Child.'s Specialty Ctr., LLC, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1284-85 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (Thompson, J.).

In December 2019, Hammonds was admitted to Children's Hospital in Birmingham and given a primary diagnosis of a stage IV decubitus ulcer in the lower part of his pelvis, which reached the underlying bone, as well as mild chronic malnutrition. He received two operations involving the ulcer and was discharged from the hospital in January 2020. In May 2021, he initiated this lawsuit.

C. Discussion

As the party seeking to compel arbitration, MCSC has the burden of demonstrating the existence of a binding arbitration agreement, its applicability to the claims at issue, and a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to make the agreement enforceable under the FAA. The court finds that MCSC successfully meets each respective requirement.

This court begins its analysis by examining the validity of the contract containing the arbitration agreement. See Ex parte Perry, 744 So. 2d 859, 865 (Ala. 1999). Neither party disputes the existence of the arbitration rider, which was signed by an MCSC representative and a member of the Department of Human Resources who represented Hammonds. MCSC argues that the arbitration rider is valid--and binds Hammonds. Hammonds disagrees, arguing that he lacked "the capacity and competence" to enter into a contract on his own behalf and adding that "there is no proof" the State had the capacity to contract on his behalf. Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 33) at 8. However, Hammonds does concede that he was a minor in the State's care at the time of his admission to MCSC. Amended Compl. (Doc. 21) at 4.

As stated, when deciding whether a contract to arbitrate a dispute exists, a court should apply state law. Because "arbitration is a matter of contract," a party "cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit." AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986).

In Alabama, the general rule is that "a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement cannot be forced to arbitrate [his] claims." SCC Montgomery Cedar Crest Operating Co., LLC v. Bolding, 130 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Ala. 2013). However, there are exceptions to this rule. The Supreme Court of Alabama has, for example, created "a distinct body of caselaw...