Hancock v. City of Greenwood, 4:12CV00055–M.

942 F.Supp.2d 624

John HANCOCK, Plaintiff

v.CITY OF GREENWOOD, MISSISSIPPI, Officer Byron Granderson, in his individual and official capacity, and Officer Jesse Amos, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

No. 4:12CV00055–M.

United States District Court,

N.D. Mississippi,

Greenville Division.

May 1, 2013.

Carlos Eugene Moore, Tangala Laniece Hollis, Moore Law Office PLLC, Grenada, MS, for Plaintiff.

Gary E. Friedman, Mark D. Fijman, Phelps Dunbar LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

ORDER

MICHAEL P. MILLS, Chief Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the motions of defendants for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiff John Hancock has responded in opposition to the motion, and the court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that the motion is well taken and should be granted.

This is, inter alia, a § 1983 excessive force case arising out injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff during his arrest for a May 20, 2009 domestic violence incident. On that night, Greenwood's police dispatchers received a call from Lisa Chandler, the sister of plaintiff's former girlfriend Carol Silas, stating that plaintiff had beaten Silas and had fired a gun at Chandler's son. Believing that a potential hostage situation existed, Greenwood Police Officers Byron Granderson and Jesse Amos responded to the emergency call. After initially being denied entry into the house, the defendant officers entered the residence and, according to plaintiff, engaged in an aggressive arrest of him which included the use of pepper spray, a taser, and stepping on his hand. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a broken wrist as a result of the arrest, for which he seeks recovery in the instant lawsuit. ¹

The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff's claims in this case clearly lack merit and most of them warrant little discussion. Plaintiff seeks recovery for false arrest, but the court concludes that this claim is barred by the fact that he was convicted on two counts of domestic violence relating to the May 2009 incident. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus....” Heck at 486–87, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383. In this case, plaintiff's false arrest claim arising out of his May 20, 2009 arrest is clearly inconsistent with the fact that he was convicted of domestic violence charges arising out of the events that night.

In arguing that Heck is inapplicable, plaintiff emphasizes that he was acquitted on kidnapping charges arising out of the incident, but the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that such a partial acquittal does not render Heck inapplicable. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit has stated that:

[t]he claim for false arrest does not cast its primary focus on the validity of each individual charge; instead, we focus on the validity of the arrest. If there was probable cause for any of the charges made-here either disorderly conduct or resisting a search-then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails. (emphasis added)

Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir.1995). See also Cormier v. Lafayette City–Parish Consol. Government, 493 Fed.Appx. 578, 583 (5th Cir.2012)(same). Plaintiff was convicted on domestic violence charges arising out of the incident for which he was arrested, and it would clearly be contrary to Heck to allow him to pursue false arrest charges under these circumstances. Plaintiff's false arrest claim will therefore be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Heck, and that claim may only be re-asserted if he is successful in having his domestic violence convictions reversed or otherwise expunged from his record.

Plaintiff's conviction on domestic violence charges is also fatal to his attempts to recover against defendants under Mississippi state law, since the Mississippi Tort Claims Act bars recovery “unless the [officer] acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(c). Thus, to recover in tort from a police officer or municipality, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he was not committing a crime; and (2) that police acted with reckless disregard for his safety. See, e.g. Chapman v. City of Quitman, 954 So.2d 468, 474 (Miss.Ct.App.2007). A criminal conviction for an activity that shares some “causal nexus” with the plaintiff's arrest will trigger police immunity and bar recovery. See Giles v. Brown, 962 So.2d 612, 614–15 (2006). The court concludes that such a causal connection exists in this case, and it finds without merit plaintiff's argument that his supposed “intentional infliction of emotional distress” claim against the defendant officers somehow survives this bar. Plaintiff has presented no summary judgment evidence establishing fact issues regarding any such IIED claim, and, even if he had, he cites no authority suggesting that such a claim would be exempted from § 11–46–9(1)(c). Moreover, the court finds that the substantive merits of plaintiff's MTCA claims is moot, since he has not responded to defendants' argument that he failed to comply with the procedural requisites for an MTCA claim. Finally, plaintiff has submitted no facts or arguments which would allow him to assert claims against the officers individually under Mississippi state law, outside the scope of the MTCA. Plaintiff's state law claims will therefore be dismissed.

The court notes that plaintiff's complaint includes language alleging federal Fourteenth Amendment “due process” and “equal protection” violations, but the complaint fails to even present a plausible theory as to how either of these constitutional provisions might be applicable. The U.S. Supreme Court made it clear in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) that excessive force claims are to be analyzed under a Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard, rather than under a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis. Moreover, plaintiff does not even allege a coherent theory as to how his arrest was the result of an equal protection violation. The court therefore finds plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims to be completely without merit.

The court now turns to the only claim asserted by plaintiff which merits some discussion: his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the defendant officers individually.² Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a broken wrist, and he contends that he suffered it as a result of the arrest in this case. Defendants contest this assertion, arguing that “[t]he reality is that immediately before the hostage standoff, Plaintiff was beaten up on the street by two of his former girlfriend's nephews, who have attested that they caused the injuries Plaintiff now blames on Police, because they were tired of plaintiff abusing their aunt.” ³ Even accepting plaintiff's version of how he suffered his injuries as accurate, this is still insufficient to establish fact issues regarding his Fourth Amendment claim.

To succeed on an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffered an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need and (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court emphasized in Graham v. Connor that the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and must account for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessaryin a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Plaintiff's attempts to recover against the individual officers are made more difficult by the fact that his Fourth Amendment claims against them are subject to the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields a governmental official from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the official's acts did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory law of which a reasonable person would have known. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir.2006). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court engages in a two-pronged analysis, inquiring (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the defendant's behavior was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time the conduct occurred. Easter, 467 F.3d at 462. If the plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim or if the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law, then the governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

The court concludes that, with regard to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims and defendants' related qualified immunity defense, the crucial and dispositive fact is that the defendant police officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in responding to what they believed was a dangerous hostage situation. Indeed, the sole exhibit submitted by plaintiff buttresses this conclusion. That exhibit is a one-page affidavit from plaintiff's former girlfriend Silas, and the court does not find it to be at all helpful in establishing fact issues regarding ...