Hancock v. I.C. System, Inc.

592 F.Supp.3d 250

Roxanne HANCOCK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.I.C. SYSTEM, INC. ; and John Does 1-25, Defendants.

21-CV-7085 (RA) (RWL)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 18, 2022

Benjamin Jarret Wolf, Joseph Karl Jones, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph Proulx, Golden Scaz Gagain, Tampa, FL, for Defendant IC System, Inc.

DECISION AND ORDER: ATTORNEY'S FEES

ROBERT W. LEHRBURGER, United States Magistrate Judge.

This decision addresses Plaintiff's application for attorney's fees and costs following acceptance of an offer of judgment in this action brought pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"). As set forth below, the Court awards Plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $11,297 and costs in the amount of $495.76.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roxanne Hancock ("Hancock" or "Plaintiff") filed this case after having received a letter from Defendant I.C. System, Inc. ("ICS") seeking to collect a debt of $59.00 owed to Spectrum for unreturned equipment. Hancock claimed that she owed Spectrum an amount less than $59.00 and that ICS's letter failed to properly inform her of consequences of disputing the debt. As revealed in discovery, Hancock had documentation showing that she had returned the equipment to Spectrum before the account was referred to ICS for collection. Although Hancock could have provided the same documentation to ICS or Spectrum after receiving ICS's letter but before filing suit, she did not do so.

Hancock filed her case as a class action on August 22, 2021. ICS answered the complaint, and the parties proceeded to discovery. Hancock served interrogatories, document requests, and requests to admit. A substantial number of the requests focused on class discovery. Hancock also insisted on receiving class related information from ICS as a condition to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations. (Dkt. 11-1.)

On January 18, 2022, ICS served an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Specifically, ICS offered to have judgment entered against it in the amount of $1,050.00 "arising from Plaintiff's individual claims against Defendant" and an "additional amount for reasonable attorney's fees and taxable costs incurred by Plaintiff in an amount to be determined by agreement of the parties, and if the parties cannot agree, by the Court upon Motion by Plaintiff." (Dkt. 19, Ex. A.) Hancock accepted the offer on January 26, 2022, and the Court entered judgment the next day. The parties could not agree on the amount of attorney's fees. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, seeking attorney's fees in the amount of $16,004.32, which is now fully briefed. ICS asserts that a reasonable attorney's fees award in this case should be $4,370.99.

The matter was referred to me for resolution of a non-dispositive motion on February 3, 2022. (Dkt. 23.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

The plain language of the FDCPA authorizes an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the Court. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (party prevailing in FDCPA action is entitled to "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court"); accord Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc. , 516 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The FDCPA provides for fee-shifting as a matter of course to successful plaintiffs....").

A. The Lodestar Calculation

Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court "have held that the lodestar – the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case – creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’ " Millea v. Metro-North Railroad Co. , 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill v. County Of Albany And Albany County Board. Of Elections , 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) ). "The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay." Arbor Hill , 522 F.3d at 190.

In determining a fee award, courts consider case-specific factors to help determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates and the number of hours expended. Such factors include:

the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and capacity of the client's other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the representation.

Arbor Hill , 522 F.3d at 184. To arrive at a lodestar calculation, "[t]he party seeking an award of [attorneys’] fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Hancock has done so here, through the certifications of her attorney, Joseph K. Jones. See Certification of Joseph K. Jones dated Jan. 31, 2022 ("Jones Cert.") and Reply Certification of Joseph K. Jones dated February 21, 2022 ("Jones Reply Cert."). (Dkts. 32, 34.)

B. Adjustment For Partial Success

The Supreme Court has held "that the extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at 1943 ; accord Chabad Lubavitch Of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission , 934 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming 50% reduction of fee award on the basis that "[w]hen a plaintiff has achieved partial success, the most important factor in determining a reasonable fee for a prevailing plaintiff is the degree of success obtained") (internal quotation marks, modifications, and citations omitted); Kassim v. City Of Schenectady , 415 F.3d 246, 256 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Our circuit has thus clearly adopted the view ... that a district judge's authority to reduce the fee awarded to a prevailing plaintiff below the lodestar by reason of the plaintiff's ‘partial or limited success’ is not restricted either to cases of multiple discrete theories or to cases in which the plaintiff won only a nominal or technical victory"); Rivera v. Corporate Receivables, Inc. , 540 F. Supp.2d 329, 333 (D. Conn. 2008) (reducing legal fees by 70% in FDCPA case where plaintiff succeeded on only one of seven FDCPA claims at trial).

If a court chooses to make downward adjustments, it may either reduce the overall award or attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated.

Hensley , 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S. Ct. at 1941. The law also requires a court to exclude claimed hours from the lodestar calculation that it finds to be "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Reiter v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Of State Of New York , No. 01-CV-2762, 2007 WL 2775144 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007) (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1933 ). There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, and, because "it is unrealistic to expect a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry in an application," a court may apply an across-the-board percentage cut "as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application." New York State Association For Retarded Children v. Carey , 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983).

C. Proportionality

Although the lodestar may be adjusted for limited success, it should not be adjusted based on "lack of proportion between the amount of attorney's fees requested and the size of the award attained, as the FDCPA, like many other consumer protection and civil rights statutes, ‘was enacted in part to secure legal representation for plaintiffs whose ... injury was too small, in terms of expected monetary recovery, to create an incentive for attorneys to take the case under conventional fee arrangements.’ " Rivera , 540 F. Supp.2d at 338 (quoting Kassim , 415 F.3d at 252 ); accord Millea, 658 F.3d at 169. Accordingly, the Court has not considered proportionality at all in arriving at its decision.

DISCUSSION

A. Hourly Rates

The Court begins with assessment of the hourly rates sought by Hancock. Courts assess the reasonableness of a proposed hourly rate by considering the prevailing market rate for lawyers in the district in which the ruling court sits. Polk v. New York State Department of Correctional Services , 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983). "The rates used by the court should be current rather than historic hourly rates." Reiter v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Of New York , 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[C]ourts may conduct an empirical inquiry based on the parties’ evidence or may rely on the court's own familiarity with the rates if no such evidence is submitted." Wong v. Hunda Glass Corp. , No. 09-CV-4402, 2010 WL 3452417, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "the range of rates that plaintiff's counsel actually charges their clients ... is obviously strong evidence of what the market will bear." Rozell v. Ross-Holst , 576 F. Supp. 2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ; see also Lilly v. County Of Orange , 910 F. Supp. 945, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The actual rate that counsel can command in the market place is evidence of the prevailing market rate").

Hancock was represented in this action by Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC and seeks reimbursement of fees for the work of two attorneys from that firm: Joseph K. Jones, who billed at an hourly rate of $575, and Benjamin J. Wolf, who billed at an hourly rate of $475. The billing records submitted reflect no tasks performed by other attorneys, paralegals, or administrative...