Haney-Filippone v. Agora Cyber Charter Sch.

538 F.Supp.3d 490

Heather HANEY-FILIPPONE, Plaintiff,

v.AGORA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-5303

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed May 10, 2021

Claire Blewitt, David Rodkey, Katharine Virginia Hartman, Marjorie M. Obod, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Carolyn Naylor Flynn, McKenna Snyder LLC, James J. Munnelly, Latsha Davis & McKenna, Exton, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Kenney, JUDGE

Plaintiff Heather Haney-Filippone sued her employer, Agora Cyber Charter School, following its decision not to allow her to take leave under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act ("FFCRA"), Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178. Defendant is a cyber charter school operating pursuant to a grant of authority from the Pennsylvania Department of Education. The FFCRA is an act passed by Congress requiring certain employers to provide emergency family leave and paid sick leave for employees unable to work because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Two divisions of the FFCRA are relevant there: Division C, which is the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act ("EFMLEA"), and Division E, which is the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act ("EPSLA"). Before the Court are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings on the sole issue of whether Agora is a covered employer under the FFCRA provisions cited by Plaintiff.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

Plaintiff Heather Haney-Filippone works as a third grade English Language Arts and Special Education teacher for Agora. ECF No. 1 ¶ 8-9, ¶ 16. Agora Cyber Charter School ("Agora" or "Defendant") is a Pennsylvania nonprofit organization operating a cyber charter school. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10-11. For her position at Agora, Plaintiff is required to remotely co-teach live classes throughout the day, monitor and track individual student goals, meet with individual students one-on-one, and attend meetings and calls with parents. ECF No. 1 ¶ 17.

After the COVID-19 pandemic shut down the traditional public schools her children attended and her youngest child's daycare, Plaintiff's four children (ages 4, 9, 12, and 17) were suddenly home full-time. ECF No. 1 ¶ 3, ¶ 25. ¶ 38. Agora's operations were not impacted by the COVID-19 shutdown orders. ECF No. 1 ¶ 40. In the Spring of 2020, Agora accommodated the scheduling needs of employees like Plaintiff by limiting the number of classes Plaintiff was required to teach. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4, ¶ 43-47. However, at the beginning of the 2020-2021 school year, Agora went back to "business as usual" and nearly doubled the number of students Plaintiff was required to teach. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. Faced with the daunting task of supervising her own children and managing a full teaching schedule, Plaintiff inquired several times about taking leave under the FFCRA. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5, ¶ 49-51, ¶ 55-62, ¶ 64-66. Agora did not allow Plaintiff to take leave and instead took the position that it is a "private entity" employing over 500 people, and therefore it is not subject to the paid and unpaid leave provisions of the FFCRA. ECF No. 1 ¶ 6, ¶ 58, ¶ 63. Unable to take leave, Plaintiff used vacations days to supervise her children during the day as much as possible and worked on weekends and evenings to complete her professional obligations. ECF No. 1 ¶ 72-73.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Agora on October 23, 2020, seeking a judgment declaring that Agora is a "covered employer" under the FFCRA (specifically the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act ("EFMLEA") and the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act ("EPSLA")) (Count I) and relief for Agora's alleged violations of the FFCRA, the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") (Counts II and III). ECF No. 1. On November 25, 2020, Defendant filed its Answer, arguing, inter alia , that it has not violated any federal law, that it did not violate Plaintiff's rights under the FFCRA, the FMLA, or the FLSA, and that the FFCRA is not applicable. ECF No. 15 at 15. On February 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on the issue of whether Defendant Agora Cyber Charter School is a covered employer under the FFCRA's EFMLEA and EPSLA (ECF No. 21). Defendant then filed a Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim since Defendant is not a covered employer under the EFMLEA and EPSLA. ECF No. 23. The Court held oral arguments on April 21, 2021 on the cross-motions, which are now before the Court for resolution.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because it arises under the laws of the United States and raises a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion "if, on the basis of the pleadings, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed Cetera, LLC v. Nat'l Credit Servs., Inc. , 938 F.3d 466, 470 n.7 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). A Rule 12(c) motion is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, construing all allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC , 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019). Judgment on the pleadings should be granted when "the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease Holding Co. , 903 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2018). Parties may move for partial judgment on the pleadings on discrete issues. United States v. Brace , 2018 WL 9815251 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 2018).

IV. RELEVANT LAW

Congress passed the Families First Coronavirus Response Act ("FFCRA") on March 18, 2020 to address the challenges facing employees and the general public as a result of the emergent COVID-19 pandemic. The FFCRA was the second major legislative initiative to remediate pandemic-related problems. The two divisions of the FFCRA relevant here, Division C (the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act ("EFMLEA")) and Division E (the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act ("EPSLA")), created two new requirements for certain employers to provide emergency family leave and paid sick leave for employees unable to work because of the coronavirus. Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178. These new paid sick leave and expanded family and medical leave requirements became effective on April 2, 2020 and expired on December 31, 2020. An employee denied leave under either provision can sue his or her employer.²

A. The Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act

Division C of the FFCRA is the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act ("EFMLEA," FFCRA §§ 3101-3106), which temporarily expanded the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA," 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ) to provide for certain COVID-19-related family leave. See FFCRA § 3102(a)(1). Specifically, the EFMLEA requires certain employers to provide up to twelve weeks of leave for employees who have been on the job for at least thirty days and who are unable to work or telework because they have to care for a child due to the coronavirus. See FFCRA §§ 3102(a)(2); 3102(b) (adding FMLA §§ 110(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)). While the first ten days for which an employee takes emergency family leave may be unpaid, after ten days, employees are entitled to job-protected paid emergency family leave at two-thirds of their regular wages, up to a statutory cap, for the remaining ten weeks of the FMLA period. See FFCRA § 3102(b) (adding FMLA §§ 110(b)(1)(A)-110(b)(2)).

The EFMLEA applies to a slightly narrower set of employers and employees than other sections of the FMLA.³ See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19326-01 (April 6, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826). Only private employers with fewer than 500 employees and public agencies must comply with the EFMLEA. Compare FFCRA § 3102(b) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) to effectively read "the term ‘employer’ means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs fewer than 500 employees and includes any ‘public agency’, as defined in Section 203(x) of the FLSA") with 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(4)(A)-(B). As Plaintiff has not disputed that Agora employs more than 500 employees, Agora is only subject to EFMLEA if it is a "public agency." The EFMLEA adopts the definition of "public agency" from Section 203(x) of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2620, 2611(4)(A)(iii). Section 203(x) of the FLSA defines "public agency" as "the Government of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States ..., a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). It is important to note that the FFCRA amendment to the FMLA is not written on a blank slate; the FMLA and the rest of the federal Labor Code are a detailed and heavily regulated area of law. The EFMLEA therefore must be read against this background of extensive federal statutory law, case law, regulations, and administrative decisions.

As a general matter, the FMLA applies to educational institutions so long as the other requirements are met. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.600(b) ("Educational institutions are covered by FMLA"); 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) ("Public as well as private elementary and secondary schools are [ ] covered employers."); see also Kobielnik v. W. Cape May Bd. of Educ. , No. CV 13-03805 (RMB/JS), 2015 WL 12743598, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2015) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.600(b) in applying FMLA rules in suit against school board); Kordistos v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist. , No. CV 16-615, 2017...