Hanington v. Multnomah Cnty.

593 F.Supp.3d 1022

Robert Dale HANINGTON, in his personal capacity and in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of William B. Hanington, Robin Hanington, in her personal capacity and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of William B. Hanington, and A.H., by and through Guardian ad Litem, Robin Hanington, Plaintiffs,

v.MULTNOMAH COUNTY, a municipality, Michael Reese, in his personal capacity, Rachel Schneider, in her personal capacity, Brian Epifano, in his personal capacity, Cynthia McKnight, in her personal capacity, Trudy Kame, in her personal capacity, Steven J. Alexander, in his personal capacity, John and Jane Does 1–17, in their personal capacities, Michael Shults, in his personal capacity, Curtis Sanders, in his personal capacity, Rai Adgers, in his personal capacity, and Charlotte Hasson, in her personal capacity, Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-01533-MO

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed March 23, 2022

Mark K. Kramer, Kramer & Associates, Portland, OR, Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Pro Hac Vice, Galanda Broadman, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs Robert Dale Hanington, Robin Hanington, A.H.

Andrew T. Weiner, B. Andrew Jones, Christopher A. Gilmore, Multnomah County Attorney's Office, Nathan D. Sramek, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland, OR, for Defendants Multnomah County, Michael Reese, Rachel Schneider, Brian Epifano, Cynthia McKnight, Angelina Platas, Trudy Kame, Steven J. Alexander, Michael Shults, Curtis Sanders, Rai Adgers, Charlotte Hasson.

OPINION & ORDER

MOSMAN, Senior United States District Judge

The plaintiffs in this case are family members of William Hanington and the personal representatives of his estate. William Hanington died by suicide after being held at Multnomah County Inverness Jail. The Haningtons allege that Defendants—Multnomah County and a slew of its employees—are responsible for Mr. Hanington's death. They contend Defendants’ policies, actions, and inactions violated Mr. Hanington's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted negligence under Oregon common law. Am. Compl. [ECF 23] ¶¶ 130–74.

This matter comes before me on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF 53]. Defendants seek to dismiss the Haningtons’ entire case. Though I dismiss most of the Haningtons’ claims, I find they have identified a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Nurse McKnight acted negligently in her evaluation of Mr. Hanington. As a result, I grant and deny the motion in part.

BACKGROUND

In August 2017, Mr. Hanington was arrested on a warrant for failing to register as a sex offender. Pedro Decl. [ECF 55] Ex. 1. The arresting marshal took him to Multnomah County Detention Center (MCDC). Weiner Decl. [ECF 54] Ex. 1 at 2. Evidence indicates that the marshal filled out only part of the jail intake assessment. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 2 at 2 (stating "Not Filled In"). MCDC's system ostensibly populated the form automatically, answering all questions with "No." Id. ; see also Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. G at 34:20–21 (discussing auto-population).

At MCDC, Mr. Hanington met with Deputy Rachel Schneider, who conducted an initial booking interview. Deputy Schneider had started working for MCDC earlier that year. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 7 at 11:14–17. At the time of Mr. Hanington's arrest, she had completed several months of field training and had received suicide prevention training. Id. at 10:12–11:17; Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. A at 7:6–14. However, she had yet to receive full-time academy training. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 7 at 11:1–2. As part of her initial booking interview, Deputy Schneider asked Mr. Hanington whether he had been having suicidal thoughts. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 2 at 2. He said that he had not. Id.

Mr. Hanington then proceeded to an interview with Deputy Brian Epifano. Deputy Epifano had received suicide intervention training in May 2017. Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. G at 13:4–18. The purpose of this interview was to determine what kind of dorm classification would best fit Mr. Hanington's needs. Id. at 7:5–11. Deputy Epifano asked Mr. Hanington whether he had ever attempted suicide. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 2 at 3. Mr. Hanington said that he had not. Id. He also denied having suicidal thoughts or a serious mental health disorder. Id. Based on Mr. Hanington's disclosure that he was diabetic and his request to be placed in a single cell, Deputy Epifano recommended he be assigned to a single-cell dormitory in Multnomah County Inverness Jail (MCIJ). Id. at 2–3; Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. G at 10:1–11:1.

Deputy Epifano described Mr. Hanington's demeanor throughout the interview as "jovial," "respectful," "polite," and "forthcoming." Id. at 3:4–6. Unfortunately, Mr. Hanington had not been forthcoming about everything: he did not disclose that he had attempted suicide as a teenager or that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 2 at 3; id. Ex. 27 at 2.

Following the classification interview, Mr. Hanington received a medical assessment from Nurse Cynthia McKnight. Relying in part on Mr. Hanington's self-reported answers, Nurse McKnight recommended that Mr. Hanington not be placed on suicide watch. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 17 at 2; Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. H at 5:8–11, 8:5–9. Nurse McKnight noted Mr. Hanington had high blood sugar, which she treated with insulin. Weiner Decl. [ECF 54] Ex. 5 at 10. Concerned about Mr. Hanington's insulin levels, Nurse McKnight recommended transfer to the medical dorm at MCIJ for observation. Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. H at 15:20–16:10.

When Mr. Hanington arrived at MCIJ, he received a quick screening from a sergeant, and a nurse on duty reviewed his file. Id. Ex. J at 5:9–23; id. Ex. K at 2:4–21. At 8:45 p.m., he was placed into his medical observation cell. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 23 at 3.

Deputy Trudy Kame was on security duty for the second half of the night. Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. L at 2:2–20. Twice per hour, Deputy Kame checked on Mr. Hanington's dormitory. Id. at 2:19–20. She noted he was awake the whole night. Id. at 2:20–24. At one point, Deputy Kame asked Mr. Hanington whether he was okay; he nodded. Id. at 3:2–6. When Deputy Kame conducted her security check at approximately 5:37 a.m., Mr. Hanington was alive and well. Id. at 4:9–12; Weiner Decl. [ECF 72] Ex. 4 at 1.

At 6:18 a.m., Deputy Kame checked Mr. Hanington's cell again. Weiner Decl. [ECF 72] Ex. 4 at 2. She saw Mr. Hanington sitting motionless on the floor, with a sheet tied around his neck. Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. L at 4:22–5:2. Deputy Kame called for backup, which arrived roughly 30 seconds later. Id. at 5:3–15; Weiner Decl. [ECF 72] Ex. 4 at 3. Deputy Kame and her backup entered the cell and cut Mr. Hanington down. Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF 53] Ex. L at 5:16–19. Despite the efforts of the deputies and medical personnel, Mr. Hanington died several days later from the injuries he sustained from his hanging. Dreveskracht Decl. [ECF 64] Ex. 46.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. , 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis of its motion and providing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If that burden is met, the nonmoving party must "present significant probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense." Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. , 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation omitted). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the truth of matters in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The § 1983 Claims

A. Which Amendment Applies

In the Haningtons’ amended complaint, they allege Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Am. Compl. [ECF 23] ¶¶ 127, 147, 173. In their motion, Defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment applies here because Mr. Hanington was "in custody on a parole warrant stemming from a judicially imposed sentence." Mot. Summ. J. [ECF 53] at 17–18 (citing Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego , 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021) ).

Which amendment applies is a critical question. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson , the Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment need not show that the officers were subjectively aware they had used excessive force. 576 U.S. 389, 395, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015). Instead, a pretrial detainee need only show that the officers’ use of force was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 396–97, 135 S.Ct. 2466. The Ninth Circuit has applied this standard in similar contexts, including inadequate medical care. Castro v. Cnty. of L.A. , 833 F.3d 1060, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2016) ; Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange (Gordon I) , 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018). At bottom, if the Fourteenth Amendment applies, the Haningtons must show that Defendants acted with objective deliberate indifference. Gordon I , 888 F.3d at 1124–25. But if the Eighth Amendment applies, the Haningtons must meet the higher standard of subjective...