Haralson v. United Airlines, Inc.

224 F.Supp.3d 928

James HARALSON, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No.16–cv–05226–JST

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed December 12, 2016

Chaim Shaun Setareh, Howard Scott Leviant, Thomas Alistair Segal, Setareh Law Group, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff.

Catherine M. Dacre, Michael Anderson Wahlander, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Brendan Dolan, Vedder Price (CA) LLP, San Francisco, CA, Gary Steven Kaplan, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 20

JON S. TIGAR, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant United's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 20. Defendant U.S. Aviation joined in that Motion. See Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Services Corp. , Case No. 16–cv–05226–JST (N.D. Cal.), ECF No. 18.¹ The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Haralson brings several claims under California wage and hour laws on behalf of himself and a putative class against Defendants United Airlines and U.S. Aviation Services. ECF No. 1–2 ¶ 1.

Haralson has worked as an aircraft cleaner for Defendants from June 2015 to the present. Id . ¶ 5. He alleges that during his employment he "was supervised and/or managed by United employees." Id . ¶ 8.

The gravamen of Haralson's complaint is that the Defendants had a policy or practice of requiring employees to be relieved—i.e., "released by a manager or supervisor"—before they could take meal or rest breaks. Id . ¶¶ 28, 31, 48, 49. As a result of this policy, Haralson alleges that employees had no control over their ability to take breaks or the timing of such breaks. Id . ¶¶ 29, 32, 49. Haralson further alleges that the Defendants failed to provide timely, uninterrupted meal and rest breaks as a result of this policy. Id . ¶¶ 20–52.

Based on this alleged conduct, Haralson brings the following six causes of action under California law: (1) failure to provide meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest periods; (3) failure to pay hourly and overtime wages; (4) failure to provide accurate written wage statements; (5) failure to timely pay all final wages (waiting time penalty claim); and (6) unfair competition. The last four causes of action are derivative of the underlying meal and rest break claims.

Haralson also seeks to certify the following classes and subclasses:

U.S. Aviation Class : All persons employed by Defendant U.S. Aviation Services Corp. in hourly or non-exempt positions in California during the Relevant Time Period.

United Airlines Sub–Class : All U.S. Aviation Class members who worked at or in a United Airlines facility during the Relevant Time Period.

Meal Break Sub–Class: All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members who worked a shift in excess of five hours during the Relevant Time Period.

Auto–Deduct Sub–Class : All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members who had a half hour or hour deducted from their timecards regardless of whether or not they took a meal period.

Rest Break Sub–Class : All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members who worked a shift of at least three and one-half (3.5) hours during the Relevant Time Period.

Wage Statement Penalties Sub–Class : All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members employed by Defendants in California during the period beginning one year before the filing of this action and ending when final judgment is entered.

Waiting Time Penalties Sub–Class : All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members who separated from their employment with Defendants during the period beginning three years before the filing of this action and ending when final judgment is entered.

UCL Class : All U.S. Aviation Class and United Airlines Sub–Class members employed by Defendants in California during the Relevant Time Period.

Id . ¶ 12.

Although Haralson initially filed this class action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, United removed it to federal court. See ECF No. 1. United has now filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 20. U.S. Aviation has joined in the motion. See Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Services Corp. , Case No. 16–cv–05226–JST (N.D. Cal.), ECF No. 18.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has original jurisdiction of this action under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") because the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, there is minimal diversity, and the number of class members exceeds 100. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

"A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer , 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

In resolving a facial attack, the court assumes that the allegations are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Wolfe v. Strankman , 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

"In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations. Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Safe Air , 373 F.3d at 1039 (citations omitted).

B. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, facts pleaded by a plaintiff must be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that, when accepted as true, states a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id . While this standard is not a probability requirement, "where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN , 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. DISCUSSION

United moves to dismiss Haralson's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that this action raises representation disputes that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") relegates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board ("NMB"). ECF No. 20 at 2. United also moves to dismiss Haralson's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. Id .

A. Preemption under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA")

The RLA provides a framework for efficiently resolving labor disputes between transportation carriers, including air carriers like United, and their employees. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151a, 181 ; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO , 243 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2001) ("United is a ‘carrier’ as defined by § 201 of the Railway Labor Act.") (internal citations omitted). To that end, the RLA addresses three kinds of labor disputes: major disputes, minor disputes, and representation disputes. See 45 U.S.C. § 181 ; Aircraft Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 779 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting W. Airlines, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 480 U.S. 1301, 1302, 107 S.Ct. 1515, 94 L.Ed.2d 744 (1987) ). Because the parties disagree as to the kind of dispute at issue here, the Court begins by briefly explaining each kind of dispute.

Major disputes relate to "the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them." Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n , 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley , 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945), adhered to on reh'g, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct. 721, 90 L.Ed. 928 (1946) ). "They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one." Id . In this way, major disputes "look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not the assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past." Id ."In the event of a major dispute, the RLA requires the parties to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation," and eventually arbitration. Id .

While "major disputes seek to create contractual rights," minor disputes seek to enforce existing contractual rights as embodied in existing collective bargaining agreements. Aircraft Serv. , 779 F.3d at 1081. Minor disputes thus "contemplate[ ] the existence of a collective bargaining agreement already concluded" and "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining...