Hardie v. City of Albany

THOMAS HARDIE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALBANY et al., Defendants.

1:18-CV-470 (GLS/CFH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 25, 2019

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Thomas Hardie

Pro Se

Woodbourne Correctional Facility

99 Prison Road

PO Box 1000

Woodbourne, NY 12788

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

The Rehfuss Law Firm, P.C.

40 British American Blvd.

Latham, NY 12110

OF COUNSEL:

STEPHEN J. REHFUSS, ESQ.

Gary L. Sharpe Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff pro se Thomas Hardie brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants the City of Albany and City of Albany Police Officers Jarrod Jourdin, Raven Dixon, and John Buhner. (2d Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 17.) Pending before the court are (1) Hardie's motion to strike, (Dkt. No. 29), (2) defendants' cross-motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 34), (3) Hardie's motion for sanctions, (Dkt. No. 48), (4) Hardie's motion for partial summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 50), and (5) Hardie's request for a stay, (Dkt. No. 56). For the reasons stated below, defendants' cross-motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and all other motions are denied.

II. Background

A. Facts¹

Hardie generally alleges that three City of Albany Police Officers (defendants officers Jourdin, Dixon, and Buhner) used excessive force on him during the course of an arrest, and that those same officers repeatedly denied Hardie's request for medical care. (See generally 2d Am. Compl, Dkt. No. 17.)

On the evening of April 28, 2017, Hardie was approached by defendant police officers near his home in Albany, New York who, according to Hardie, "forcefully push[ed]" him, "pull[ed]" him, "physicallyassault[ed]" him, and "knock[ed] [him] to the ground." (Id. at 14.) And while defendant police officers were handcuffing Hardie, officer Jourdin "stepped" and "stomped" on his right hand with "hard bottom footwear," which caused Hardie to suffer an injury to the fourth digit finger of his right hand. (Id.) Officer Dixon then transported Hardie to the police station, during which Hardie had a "noticeable bleeding right hand" and during which Hardie informed officer Dixon that he was in pain. (Id. at 15.)

Upon arriving at the station, Hardie made a request for medical attention and showed officer Dixon his injury. (Id. at 16.) Officer Dixon did not comply with Hardie's request, and instead attempted to "interrogate" him. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, officer Jourdin arrived at the Albany Police Station and—with notice of Hardie's injury—aggravated the injury further with an "agonizing twist" and by "tightly applying handcuffs." (Id.) Officer Jourdin also "grabbed the center chain of the handcuff" and "yanked, pulled and raised [Hardie's] cuffed hands above [his back]," while he "pushed and shoved [Hardie] into a jail holding cell," which aggravated the injury even further. (Id. at 18.) Hardie stayed in that holding cell for approximately six and a half hours without being provided medical attention. (Id.)

Hardie was eventually transported to the Albany County Correctional Facility, where a correction officer documented an injury to Hardie's right hand and sent him to the facility's medical staff. (Id. at 19.) The medical staff cleaned Hardie's injured hand and wrapped it in gauze. (Id.) Approximately one week later, Hardie reported back to the facility's medical staff, where a doctor informed him that he had fractured the fourth digit finger on his right hand. (Id. at 20.) This injury was later confirmed by an orthopedic surgeon. (Id.) Hardie was in a cast for nearly two months as a result of his injury. (Id. at 20-21.)

Hardie seeks compensatory and punitive damages from each individual defendant in his or her individual capacity, but seeks no damages against the City of Albany. (Id. at 22-23.)

B. Procedural History²

Hardie filed his initial complaint on April 16, 2018. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) The court later adopted Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel'sReport-Recommendation and Order and—to the extent Hardie alleged them—dismissed with prejudice any claims against defendant police officers in their official capacities, and dismissed without prejudice claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 16.) At the time, Hardie's remaining claims were: (1) claims against individual officers in their individual capacities, (2) a Monell claim against the City of Albany, (3) a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the individual officers,³ and (4) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual officers. (Dkt. No. 16.) Hardie subsequently filed the operative complaint, (2d Am. Compl.), which further amended his amended complaint, (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 10).

Defendants asserted thirty-three affirmative defenses in their answer, (Dkt. No. 28), four of which served as the subject of Hardie's motion to strike, (Dkt. No. 29). In response to Hardie's, motion to strike, defendantsfiled a cross-motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 34), and moved to dismiss (1) Hardie's Monell claims against the City of Albany, (2) any request for punitive damages against the City of Albany, and (3) any claims alleged against the individual defendants sued in their official capacities, (Dkt. No. 34, Attach. 2 at 3.) Defendants included certain police reports as an exhibit to their cross-motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 34, Attach. 1).

On June 10, 2019, Hardie notified the court that he intended to move for sanctions against officers Jourdin and Dixon, and their counsel, Stephen Rehfuss. (Dkt. No. 47 at 1-2.) Hardie then moved, on August 15, 2019, for sanctions to be imposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against those parties, alleging that the police reports included in defendants' cross-motion to dismiss constituted "manufactured" and "falsifi[ed]" evidence. (Dkt. No. 48 at 2-3.) Hardie also requested entry of summary judgment in this same motion. (See id. at 9.)

Shortly thereafter, Hardie filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment as to his claim against officers Jourdin and Dixon for deliberate indifference to medical care. (Dkt. No. 50.) In Hardie's reply in support of his motion for partial summary judgment, he—in the event of an unfavorable decision by the court—requests a stay so that he can conductdiscovery, and amend his complaint again to include new claims and new defendants. (Dkt. No. 56 at 9-10.)

III. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits the court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion." Jennison v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-CV-164, 2011 WL 3352449, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011) (citations omitted). And "[m]otions to strike affirmative defenses are generally disfavored." Tardif v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation omitted).

Indeed, "[t]he standard to prevail on a motion to strike an affirmative defense is demanding." Cent. N.Y. Laborers' Health v. JWJ Indus., Inc., No. 5:12-CV-1319, 2015 WL 12564221, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2015) (citation omitted). "[T]o prevail on a motion to strike: (1) there may be no question of fact which might allow the defense to succeed; (2) there may be no substantial question of law, a resolution of which could allow the defense to succeed; and (3) the moving party must show that it isprejudiced by the inclusion of the defense." Id. (quoting Cognex Corp. v. Microscan Sys., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 408, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a cause of action shall be dismissed if a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a full discussion of the governing standard for Rule 12(b)(6), the court refers the parties to its prior decision in Ellis v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).

C. Motion for Sanctions

A court has authority to sanction a party under Rule 11(c) if it determines that the party has made false, misleading, improper, or frivolous representations to the court in violation of Rule 11(b). See Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P'ship, 542 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2008). However, "[a] motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). "Further, the motion must first be served upon the offending party, who is then given 21 days to remedy the sanctionable conduct before the motion may be made to the court." Finnan v. Ryan, No. 8:08-CV-259, 2008 WL 4891162, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.7, 2008). Compliance with these procedural prerequisites is mandatory. See Williamson, 542 F.3d at 51-52; Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1995). Additionally, "even when a district court finds a violation of Rule 11, the decision whether to impose a sanction . . . is committed to the district court's discretion." Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 698 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).

D. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The standard of review pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is well established and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standard, the court refers the parties to its decision in Wagner v. Swarts, 827 F. Supp. 2d 85, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd sub nom. Wagner v. Sprague, 489 Fed. App'x 500 (2d Cir. 2012).

IV. Discussion

A. Hardie's Motion to Strike

Defendants included thirty-three affirmative defenses in their answer. (Dkt. No. 28 at 1-5.) Hardie moves to strike the four affirmative defenses, which pertain to (1) the applicable statute of limitations, (2) personal jurisdiction, (3) the applicable provisions of the General Municipal Law, and(4) Hardie's membership in a protected group. (Dkt. No. 29 at 2-3.) Hardie...