Hardrick v. Gov't of the Dist. of Columbia

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CORTEZ HARDRICK, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF CO LUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 23-2151 (TJK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 25, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

TIMOTHY J. KELLY, United States District Judge.

In July 2022, the Metropolitan Police Department received a report that a driver had showed his firearm to occupants of another car while passing them. Several officers stopped Cortez Hardrick shortly after receiving the tip. During that encounter, the police took Hardrick's registered handgun from his car. An officer orally revoked Hardrick's registration for the handgun and the license that enabled him to carry it, and written revocations followed a few weeks later. All in all, Hardrick alleges that he was without his registration and license for two months and that it took the police department another eight months to notify him that he could retrieve his firearm.

Hardrick sued the District of Columbia over the incident a year later bringing three common-law claims and three constitutional claims. His allegations center on his detention during the stop, the seizure and retention of his handgun, and the revocation of his registration and license. The District now moves to dismiss each claim on several grounds. The Court agrees that two deficiencies doom almost all of Hardrick's claims. It will therefore dismiss his common-law claims for failure to comply with the statutory requirement that a plaintiff, before suing the District, must provide written notice within six months of the injury. The federal claims, moreover, largely fail because Hardrick alleges no basis to hold the District liable for the actions of the officers. But one of those claims survives: Hardrick has adequately alleged that a municipal policy caused his Second Amendment rights to be violated based on the revocation of his registration and license.

I. Background

Hardrick alleges that while he was driving in Georgetown two years ago on a narrow street, two individuals in an adjacent car began to act aggressively while trying to pass his car. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 14. Specifically, Hardrick says that the other driver “fake-swerved” towards his car and that both individuals shouted at him. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Hardrick claims that he responded by trying to record the other car with his phone. Id. ¶ 16. At the next intersection, Hardrick drove towards Bank Alley, N.W. while the other car went the opposite way. Id. ¶¶ 17, 22. Hardrick alleges that the occupants of the other car then falsely reported to the police that Hardrick had “exhibited” a pistol when passing his car. Id. ¶ 19. The police report clarifies that the tipster told the police that Hardrick brandished the gun but “never pointed his firearm at him or threatened him.”^[1]ECF No. 8-1 at 2; see also Compl. ¶ 20.

A few minutes later, two Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers approached Hardrick while he was parked on Bank Alley and told him to exit his car. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24. They quickly handcuffed him and asked whether he had a gun. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Hardrick responded that he had both a Concealed Pistol License (“CPL”) and a registered firearm, which “was stored in a closed console in the cockpit of” his car. Id. ¶ 29. The gun was not in plain view, Hardrick asserts, but was concealed by and secured underneath two covers. Id. ¶ 32. A sergeant took the gun from the console to an unmarked police car. Id. ¶¶ 23, 33.

About ten to fifteen other officers arrived on the scene soon after. Compl. ¶ 34. Hardrick was allegedly in handcuffs the whole time, which he says was around an hour. Id. ¶ 39. A high-ranking MPD officer eventually confronted Hardrick and purportedly told him that he was “illegally storing/carrying/transporting his firearm because he had it in the closed console.” Id. ¶ 42. According to Hardrick, this officer also informed him that his registration certificate and CPL “were legally revoked as of that time and that he was no longer able legally to carry a gun in the District.” Id. ¶ 47. The officer also told Hardrick that his gun was taken “as evidence” in connection with the offense of “negligent storage of a handgun,” and the police report later confirmed that the officers seized it as evidence “pending an arrest warrant.” Id. ¶¶ 48-49. A written revocation of both the certificate and CPL followed several weeks later, the former “pursuant to D.C. Code [§] 7-2507.02(B)”-criminally negligent storage of a firearm-and the latter because Hardrick lacked the necessary registration certificate. Id. ¶¶ 51-52.

Two months later, MPD restored Hardrick's registration certificate and CPL. Compl. ¶¶ 53, 55. But Hardrick claims that MPD did not “notif[y]” him “that he could retrieve his handgun from the Evidence Control Branch” until almost ten months after MPD took it from him. Id. ¶¶ 48-49, 56. Hardrick says that he engaged a lawyer to restore his registration certificate and CPL, but he does not claim that he tried to get his handgun back before MPD contacted him. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. No criminal prosecution was brought against Hardrick. Id. ¶ 87.

Hardrick sued the District in July 2023. He brings common-law claims for false arrest and unlawful detention (which he calls “Claim 1”), conversion (“Claim 2”), and “Negligent arrest and detention of Mr. Hardrick and detention of his pistol” (“Claim 3”). Claim 1 alleges that the police falsely arrested and unlawfully detained Hardrick for “improperly carrying his pistol in the absence of a valid statute governing his conduct.” Compl. ¶¶ 64-65. Claim 2 asserts that the officers and the District illegally converted his pistol by seizing it as evidence even though he was legally carrying it. Id. ¶ 68. And Claim 3 alleges that “[t]he District negligently failed to train its officers how to police citizens who are legally entitled to register and . . . carry pistols in the District.” Id. ¶¶ 71-73. Hardrick also brings several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that the District violated the Second Amendment (“Claim 4”), see id. ¶¶ 76-82, and that it ran afoul of the Due Process Clause (“Claim 5”) and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“Claim 6”),^[2]see id. ¶¶ 83-92. The District moves to dismiss all claims.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when he pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor.” Sissel v. HHS, 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Still, the Court need not accept the truth of “legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Put another way, “mere conclusory statements” are not enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. Analysis

A. Hardrick's Common-Law Claims Are Barred by D.C. Code § 12-309

Section 12-309 of the D.C. Code “requires potential tort plaintiffs to give written notice to the District within six months of an injury in order to bring suit.” Clark v. Flach, 604 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009). This notice requirement applies to Hardrick's common-law claims but not to his § 1983 claims. See McCain v. District of Columbia, 70 F.Supp.3d 525, 532 (D.D.C. 2014). Because the Court agrees with the District that Hardrick has not satisfied the statutory requirement, it will dismiss his claims for false arrest, conversion, and negligence.

“The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has . . . repeatedly held that compliance with Section 12-309 is a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit against the District.” McCain, 70 F.Supp.3d at 530 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That provision “serve[s] several important purposes” by providing the District with an opportunity to “conduct an early investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding a claim,” shielding the District “against unreasonable claims,” and “encourag[ing] prompt settlement of meritorious claims.” Id. (quoting Owens v. District of Columbia, 993 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C. 2010)). For that reason, and because § 12-309 “is a departure from the common law concept of sovereign immunity,” this statutory provision “is to be strictly construed.” Harris v. Bowser, 404 F.Supp.3d 190, 198 (D.D.C. 2019); see also Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of proving compliance with Section 12-309.” Barryman-Turner v. District of Columbia, 115 F.Supp.3d 126, 137 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Sheikh v. District of Columbia, 77 F.Supp.3d 73, 91 (D.D.C. 2015).

Hardrick does not claim that he provided written notice. Instead, he relies on the statutory language providing that a “report in writing by [MPD], in regular course of duty is a sufficient notice under this section.” D.C. Code § 12-309(a). But while a report may in some cases provide notice when a claimant fails to do so, “the mere ‘existence of a police report does not necessarily mean that the District has received the type of actual notice which § 12-309 contemplates.'” Patrick v. District of Columbia, 126 F.Supp.3d 132, 136 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Allen v. District of Columbia, 533 A.2d 1259, 1262 (D.C. 1987)). Rather, “a police report of an arrest is presumptively devoid of any notice of a potential claim of...