Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

554 F.Supp.3d 900

Lakeisha HARDY, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Case Number 20-10918

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed August 13, 2021

Bethany G. Versical, Kwitoski & Associates, PLLC, Ferndale, MI, for Plaintiff.

Kevin M. Parrington, U.S. Department of Justice Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, Zak Toomey, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND REMANDING CASE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATON

DAVID M. LAWSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Lakeisha Hardy, a 35-year-old woman, says that she cannot work because of a variety of physical and mental disabilities. Her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act were denied after an administrative hearing, and she filed this case seeking review of the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment to reverse the decision of the Commissioner and remand the case for an award of benefits or for further consideration by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting affirmance of the decision of the Commissioner. Magistrate Judge Altman filed a report on March 17, 2021, recommending that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, and the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed. The plaintiff filed timely objections, and the defendant filed a response. The matter is now before the Court.

The sole issue for consideration is whether the ALJ sufficiently articulated her reasons for finding "unpersuasive" the opinions of two of the plaintiff's treating physicians, an appellation that means little in light of new regulations. As discussed below, those regulations, which supersede the old "treating physician rule," promise claimants that ALJs "will articulate in [their] determination or decision how persuasive [they] find all of the medical opinions ... in your case record." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). The plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not apply the new regulations properly, and therefore substantial evidence does not support the decision. The Commissioner takes the opposite view and points out other evidence in the administrative record that shores up the ALJ's determination.

Hardy filed her application for disability insurance benefits on May 25, 2017, when she was 30 years old. She obtained a GED certificate. She had worked at various entry-level-type jobs, but the ALJ found that she had not performed any past relevant work. She alleges that she is disabled as a result of her diabetes mellitus, anemia, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar neuropathy (causing pain and numbness in her wrists), de Quervain's tenosynovitis (causing pain on the thumb-side of the wrists), diabetic neuropathy, peripheral circulatory disorder, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, tachycardia, obesity, major depressive disorder, substance use disorder, and paranoid personality disorder. In her applications for benefits, the plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of September 1, 2014.

Hardy's benefit applications were denied initially on October 24, 2017. She timely filed a request for an administrative hearing, and on August 13, 2018, she appeared with her attorney before ALJ Carol Guyton. On November 19, 2018, ALJ Guyton issued a written decision in which she found that Hardy was not disabled. On February 14, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Hardy's request for review of the ALJ's decision. On April 10, 2020, the plaintiff filed her complaint seeking judicial review of the denial of her requested benefits.

The ALJ determined that Hardy was not disabled by applying the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the Secretary of Social Security in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one of the analysis, the ALJ found that Hardy had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2014. At step two, she found that Hardy suffered from diabetes mellitus, anemia, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar neuropathy, de Quervain's tenosynovitis, diabetic neuropathy, peripheral circulatory disorder, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, tachycardia, obesity, major depressive disorder, substance use disorder, and paranoid personality disorder — impairments that were "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ found that the plaintiff's other disorders — including migraines, osteoarthritis, essential hypertension, leukocytosis, and goiter — were not severe. At step three, the ALJ determined that none of the severe impairments, alone or in combination, met or equaled a listing in the regulations.

Before proceeding further, the ALJ determined that Hardy retained the functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a), with certain limitations. The ALJ determined that Hardy (1) only occasionally can climb ramps or stairs and balance, kneel, stoop, crawl, and crouch, (2) cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (3) can tolerate no more than occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, or poor ventilation, (4) must avoid exposure to extreme cold and heat, wetness, and humidity, (5) should have no work exposure to hazardous machinery or unprotected heights, (6) frequently can handle and finger with her upper extremities, (7) can perform only simple, routine tasks involving simple, short instructions and simple work related decisions with few workplace changes, and (8) cannot have contact with the general public and could tolerate only occasional contact with coworkers.

At step four of the analysis, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had no past relevant work experience. At step five, the ALJ found that, based on Hardy's residual functional capacity (RFC), and relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the plaintiff could perform the duties of representative sedentary occupations including bench hand (40,000 positions in the national economy), final assembler (40,000 positions nationally), and clerical sorter (35,000 positions). Based on those findings — and noting that, if the plaintiff had the capacity to perform a full range of sedentary work, then a "not disabled" finding would have been mandated by Medical Vocational Rule 202.21 — the ALJ concluded that Hardy was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

In her motion for summary judgment, Hardy posed the single argument that the ALJ's RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not explain why the opinions of the plaintiff's treating physicians were determined to be unpersuasive, according to the criteria enunciated in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c.

The magistrate judge rejected that position. She found that the ALJ drew on several sources when determining Hardy's RFC and provided an adequate rationale for declining to adopt the medical opinions stated in the two treating source disability evaluations. The magistrate judge noted that, although the conclusions stated by the ALJ were stated in single sentences addressing each source, those conclusions were backed up by an extensive preceding summary of the medical record. The magistrate judge also called out specific indications in medical notes by the same treating sources, which the ALJ did not mention, that contradicted the limitations that were recorded on checkbox disability assessment forms, and other instances where the sources indicated unelaborated assessments of limitations that were unsubstantiated by any associated medical notes of relevant clinical observations. The magistrate judge also noted that one case principally cited by the plaintiff in her briefing pre-dated the revisions to the Commissioner's regulations governing consideration of medical source opinions and applied the now obsolete "treating source rule."

The plaintiff filed a single objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The filing of timely objections to a report and recommendation requires the court to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; see also United States v. Raddatz , 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ; United States v. Walters , 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo review requires the court to re-examine all of the relevant evidence previously reviewed by the magistrate judge in order to determine whether the recommendation should be accepted, rejected, or modified in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

"The filing of objections provides the district court with the opportunity to consider the specific contentions of the parties and to correct any errors immediately," Walters , 638 F.2d at 950, enabling the court "to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute," Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). As a result, " ‘[o]nly those specific objections to the magistrate's report made to the district court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but failing to raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may have.’ " McClanahan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 474 F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231 , 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987) ).

The plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred when she found that the RFC determination adequately accounted for all of her...