Hardy v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc.

953 F.Supp.2d 150

La Tricia HARDY, Plaintiff,

v.NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 13–0362(ABJ).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 12, 2013.

La Tricia Hardy, Washington, DC, pro se.

Oladipo A. Akin–Deko, Akin–Deko & Puig PLLC, Silver Spring, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint filed on behalf of Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. [ECF No. 11]. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from efforts by Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. (“NLS”) to enforce an equipment finance lease, personally guaranteed by the plaintiff, for the rental of equipment for processing non-cash payments at the plaintiff's business, Capitol Hill Beauty LLC. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–14; Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Def.'s Mem.”); id., Ex. 1 (New York Civil Court Summons and Verified Complaint and Non Cancelable Equipment Finance Lease Agreement (“Lease Agreement”)) at 5–10 (page numbers designated by ECF).

NLS is a “corporation located in the state of New York” which “finances the equipment needs of ... business[es]....” Def.'s Mem. at 1. NLS represents that it “has no ties to the District of Columbia,” that it “does not have an office in the District of Columbia, and that it does not “solicit or engage in persistent conduct aimed at deriving revenue from good or services from the District of Columbia.” Id. at 3.

The plaintiff entered into the Lease Agreement with NLS on October 14, 2010. See Def.'s Mem. at 1; Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Denying Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 3. She thereby agreed to “individually, absolutely and unconditionally guarant[ee] to [NLS] prompt payment when due” of all obligations under the lease. Lease Agreement at 2. The plaintiff “abid[ed] by her contract for over two years,” Am. Compl. ¶ 12, at which time she “stopped the automatic payment deductions from her bank account,” id. ¶ 14, and “requested that said contract be cancelled due to inequities within said contract.” ¹Id. ¶ 12. When the plaintiff defaulted on her payment obligations, NLS “filed a lawsuit against the [her] ... in New York State Court[.]” Def.'s Mem. at 1; see id., Ex. 1 (Verified Complaint). “[A] judgment was entered in favor of [NLS].” Def.'s Mem. at 1; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. B (Civil Judgment entered on October 26, 2012).

The plaintiff alleges that NLS “placed negative information on [her] credit reports with all three (3) Credit Bureaus,” Am. Compl. ¶ 15, and “placed two (2) inquiries on [p]laintiff's credit reports to reflect her account as being a charge off for non-payment,” id. ¶ 21. These actions allegedly “brought her credit down drastically.” Id. Due to what the plaintiff describes as “erroneous placements on [her] credit reports,” she further alleges that “she has been unable to secure any type of loan,” causing her “undue hardship.” Id. ¶ 22.

According to the plaintiff, NLS violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), see15 U.S.C. § 1681, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), see15 U.S.C. § 1692, certain District of Columbia criminal statutes, seeD.C.Code §§ 22–3401 to –3403, the D.C. Consumer Protections Act (“Consumer Act”), seeD.C.Code § 28–3814, and the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), seeD.C.Code § 28–3904. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–28 (Counts I–IV). She demands a declaratory judgment and monetary damages. See id. at 5 (page number designated by ECF).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court recognizes its ongoing obligation to ensure that “it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,” Ha v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 680 F.Supp.2d 45, 46 (D.D.C.2010) (internal citations omitted), and begins its discussion with NLS's motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's FDCPA and Consumer Act claims. According to NLS, neither statute applies, and therefore, “the Court lacks power to hear [these claims].” Def.'s Mem. at 4. The plaintiff responds that the Court has jurisdiction because “liability and damages are founded on [f]ederal question jurisdiction.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 5. The Court concurs.

It is apparent that the plaintiff's causes of action arise in part under two federal statutes—the FDCPA and the FCRA—and these are matters over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Whether the statutes are applicable is a different question which the Court will address in the context of NLS's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

NLS moves to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. See Def.'s Mem. at 2. Because “the [p]laintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over [NLS],” it argues that “the suit must be dismissed.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff counters that NLS falls within the scope of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute because the equipment “was that of [NLS], it was set-up on behalf of [NLS] and any payment made regarding this lease was made to [NLS].... [T]his is evidence of them doing business within the District of Columbia.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 6.

The plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant.” Thompson Hine LLP v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 138, 141 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 455–56 (D.C.Cir.1990)). She cannot rely on bare allegations or conclusory statements, but “must allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum.” Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C.Cir.2001) (internal quotation omitted). The plaintiff's pro se status does not relieve her of her obligation to “plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for [her] claims.” Donnelly v. Sebelius, 851 F.Supp.2d 109, 116 (D.D.C.2012) (internal citation omitted).

The Court determines whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised “by reference to District of Columbia law.” United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C.Cir.1995). “A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in ... or maintaining ... its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief.” D.C.Code § 13–422. Nowhere in the complaint does the plaintiff allege that NLS either is domiciled in or maintains its principal place of business in the District of Columbia.

The Court next engages in a two-part inquiry to determine whether a non-resident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.Cir.2000). The Court “first examine[s] whether jurisdiction is applicable under the [District of Columbia's] long-arm statute and then determine[s] whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process.” Id. (citing Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828). To this end, the plaintiff may show that NLS has “minimum contacts” with this forum, such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). These minimum contacts must arise from “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities with the [District of Columbia], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). In other words, “the defendant's conduct and connection with the [District of Columbia] are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

In relevant part, the long-arm statute allows a court in the District of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with regard to a claim arising from the defendant's conduct in:

(1) transacting business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.

D.C.Code § 13–423(a).² Although the plaintiff alleges that “the conduct complained of occurred here,” Am. Compl. ¶ 7, she does not indicate which provision of the long-arm statute applies in this case. Her opposition to the defendant's motion, however, suggests that she relies on the “transacting business” provision. She “contends that due to the fact that no one other than [NLS] provided the equipment, installed it or received payment, that this is evidence of [NLS] doing business within the District of Columbia. Pl.'s Opp'n at 6.

Section 13–423(a)(1) is “interpreted to be coextensive with the Constitution's due process limit.” First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C.Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted). “To establish personal jurisdiction under the ‘transacting business' clause of the long-arm statute ... a...