Harewood-Bey v. Biden

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DIANA HAREWOOD-BEY, et al, Plaintiffs, v. PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-CV-1472 (LTS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 12, 2022

ORDER TO AMEND

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Diana Harewood-Bey brings this pro se action, for which the filing fees have been paid, on behalf of herself, Lisa Warburton-El, and the Federation Moorish Science Temple of America. She alleges that Defendants violated their religious rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff Harewood-Bey leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, Id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Harewood-Bey commenced this action by filing a complaint captioned for the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.^[1] Although the complaint is signed only by Plaintiff Harewood- Bey, she seeks to bring claims on behalf of herself, Lisa Warburton-El, and the Federation Moorish Science Temple of America (“Moorish Science Temple”). Named as defendants are President Joe Biden, New York Governor Kathy Hochul,^[2] Judge Clarence Thomas, Judge Samuel Alito, Judge Neil Gorsuch, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Floral Agency, Biljiana Stodjadinovic, and Marie Kingsley. By order dated January 24, 2021, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the matter to this Court because most of the parties named in the complaint are located in the Southern District of New York. (See ECF 3.)

The Court understands Plaintiff Harewood-Bey to be alleging a claim concerning religion. She alleges that she and Warburton-El are members of the Moorish Science Temple, and that the “5th circuit court of appeals paused implementation of a rule requiring companies that employ more than 100 workers to mandate either vaccination or testing.”^[3] (ECF 1 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Harewood-Bey further asserts that

[t]he defendants broke the oath of the first amendment of religious freedom in privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion. The legal right to oppose citizens, individuals and organizations alike for their religious belief does not exist in the United States. Human rights is important to a relationship that exists between citizens, individuals and organizations. Human rights mean the states has to look after the basic need of the people and protect some of their freedom[.]

(Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff Harewood-Bey also alleges that the Moorish Science Temple “practices their religion and dietary medical issue exemption in compliance with New York codes, Rules and regulations Title 10,sections 66-2.2e and 751.6(7).” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Harewood-Bey then asserts that Defendants “broke their oath” by [d]enying religious rights to the Moors and any one for that matter,” and that constitutes “genocide and a crime against humanity” and “a violation of Nuremberg law of the United Nations.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff Harewood-Bey concludes with statements that Defendants do not have powers that are expressly reserved to the States in the Constitution and that they “do not have the authority or violate the plaintiff's freedom.” (Id. ¶ 8.) On February 8, 2022, Plaintiff Harewood-Bey also submitted to the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania a package of exhibits (ECF 5) that included the following documents: (1) a copy of that court's notice of guidelines to persons representing themselves; (2) copies of documents from the Westchester County Supreme Court case, including a copy of the complaint; (3) a December 13, 2021, letter from the New York State Department of Labor (DOL) indicating that Plaintiff Harewood-Bey had been discharged from her employment and was seeking unemployment benefits; (4) Plaintiff Harewood-Bey's application to the DOL, in which she indicated that her former employer, Emerald Park Nursing Rehabilitation (Floral Agency) located in Peekskill, New York, terminated her employment for her failure to get vaccinated after it denied her a religious exemption; (4) a July 3, 2021, letter from the Moorish Science Temple requesting that Plaintiff Harewood-Bey be exempt from her employer's immunization requirements;^[4] (5) a “Refusal to Consent to Vaccination” for Plaintiff Harewood-Bey that is almost illegible (ECF 5, at 13); and (6) a September 15, 2021, letter, from Plaintiff HarewoodBey to unspecified persons, stating that the rejection of her request for religious exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine violates her constitutional rights.

Plaintiff does not explain what relief she is seeking.

DISCUSSION

A. Colorado River Abstention

Because the claims that Plaintiff raises in this complaint have been raised and are pending in the Westchester County Supreme Court, see Federation Moorish Science Temple of America, et al. v. President Joe Biden et al., No. 67667/2021, this Court must consider whether it should abstain from exercising jurisdiction of this action.

Generally, “[w]here a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, it has a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise that jurisdiction, even if an action concerning the same matter is pending in state court.” Mochary v. Bergstein, ___ F.4^th ___, 2022 WL 2962050, at *2 (2d Cir. July 27, 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In cases involving state and federal courts, “the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having jurisdiction.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Colorado River, however, the Supreme Court held that under “exceptional circumstances” a federal court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction “where an existing parallel state-court litigation would accomplish a ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation.'” Mochary, 2022 WL 2962050, at *3 (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court cautioned that abstention “is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it” and that “[a]bdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Before evaluating whether Colorado River abstention is appropriate, a court must first determine if the federal and state court actions are parallel. See Dittmer v. Cty. of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] finding that the concurrent proceedings are ‘parallel' is a necessary prerequisite to abstention under Colorado River.”). “Suits are parallel when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum.” Mochary, 2022 WL 2962050, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the court concludes that the suits are parallel, it must also consider the six factors identified in Colorado River to determine whether “exceptional circumstances” justify abstention:

(1) whether the controversy involves a res [property] over which one of the courts has assumed jurisdiction; (2) whether the federal forum is less inconvenient than the other for the parties; (3) whether staying or dismissing

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